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The goal of this thesis is to explore the short- and long-term ramifications of various taxation 
regimes on the Norwegian aviation industry. The bulk of the research is focused on the 
probable effects of a tax placed on empty seats on commercial aircraft operating in Norway. 
This “empty seat tax” is contrasted in various ways with both the current taxation scheme, 
namely the flight passenger tax, and with other methods in which the Norwegian government 
could alter taxing the commercial aviation industry to combat CO2 emissions while keeping 
revenues constant. 
 
A selection of previous research on the subject is presented through the themed lenses of 
environmental taxation, the economic implications of aviation taxes, elasticities of demand and 
supply, and green innovation in aviation. The authors developed an original microeconomic 
model for the empty seat tax, and use this and other theoretical foundations in order to gain a 
better understanding of various methods of taxation. An original flow chart model which 
illustrates the consequences of an empty seat tax for airlines, other industry stakeholders, the 
market equilibrium for air travel, and the wider society follows.  
 
The analysis is based on a series of semi-structured interviews with various experts linked to 
the Norwegian aviation industry, in both the public and private sectors. Word clouds were used 
as a tool to facilitate analysis of these interviews, alongside additional comparisons categorized 
by respondent group in order to elucidate different points of view. The results are discussed 
through the themed lenses approach developed by the authors, and linked back to the theoretical 
foundations of the thesis. Overall, the authors find that neither the empty seat tax nor the current 
taxation regime is the most efficient or ideal, and recommend instead a distance-based tax on 
kilometers flown or a simple root tax on jet fuel burned, both of which are better aligned with 
the environmental motivation underlying aviation taxation and fairer to airlines operating with 
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Completing this thesis has been a personally and academically enriching research experience 
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it provides you with some fresh insights into the Norwegian aviation industry and the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
During a company performance presentation to shareholders in February 2016, Bjørn Kjos, the 
CEO of Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA, made the following statement to the media: 
  
“Add the fee to the empty seats instead” – Bjørn Kjos (Lilleby, 2016). 
 
Kjos’ statement, made not long after the tax was introduced, represents one of many different 
opinions on the heavily debated and controversial introduction of an air passenger tax by the 
Norwegian government in 2016. The air passenger tax is an excise duty levied on each 
passenger physically occupying a seat on an airplane in Norway on both domestic and 
international flights. The fuller the plane, the larger the total passenger tax collected from that 
flight. The current air passenger tax was passed by Parliament on December 14 2015 as a part 
of the budget agreement between multiple parties (Toll og avgiftsdirektoratet, 2015). Recently, 
Parliament has been implored to review the current air passenger tax, and there is an ongoing 
debate over changing the current tax to give it a clearer environmental profile (Finanskomiteen, 
2017). 
 
In 2017, the Norwegian government collected 1 813 million NOK from the air passenger tax 
alone, and is expected to collect 1 850 million NOK in 2018 (Stortinget, 2017). In the immediate 
aftermath of its passage, it was unclear whether the air passenger tax was implemented purely 
as a fiscal tax, or if it was supposed to have an actual environmental effect in the form of lower 
emissions from aircraft. Norway’s finance minister, Siv Jensen, was soon quoted as saying that 
the air passenger tax was meant as a fiscal fee, but that it could also have an environmental 
effect if it resulted in a decline in air travel (Stortinget, 2016). A decline in air travel would 
mean lower overall carbon emissions from passenger airplanes, but these emissions could be 
partially or fully compensated for if would-be passengers substituted another form of travel 
instead of avoiding travel altogether. Recent studies have shown that the new tax does not 
appear to have an effect on consumer demand for air travel, and therefore does not have a 
significant effect on aviation-related emissions in Norway (Runsjø & Moum, 2017). 
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Aviation is vital to the Norwegian economy, and the industry has a variety of different 
stakeholders who hold differing views on how the future of aviation should look. It is therefore 
of great interest to explore the potential economic ramifications of an empty seat tax and other 
different taxation regimes on these various stakeholders and the industry’s effects on the 
environment. Norway has a unique and often extreme topography which is characterized by 
long, steep fjords and vast mountainous regions. The country itself is also long and vast, with a 
constellation of cities and towns ranging up past the Arctic Circle and sparse populations 
sprinkled in between. The winter also brings snow and at times difficult driving conditions with 
mountain roads closing on short notice due to weather. For these amongst other reasons, 
aviation is of particularly vital importance as a form of transportation in Norway, for both 
leisure and business travelers on domestic and international routes. This can be illustrated by 
the example presented in Figure 1, which shows the different travel times from Stavanger to 
Oslo via train, car, and airplane: 
 
 
Figure 1 Travel times Stavanger – Oslo with different transportation options (figure copied from Avinor, 2017a) 
 
Motivated by the statement by Kjos, the authors have chosen to write a thesis that will look into 
the potential effects of placing a tax on empty airplane seats. Given this topic, the authors have 
formulated the following simple research question: 
 
 How would the Norwegian aviation industry be affected by an empty seat tax?  
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The authors explore this alternative to the current air passenger tax, looking into its potential 
effects on different airlines operating in Norway, the aviation market in general and the rest of 
society. There is currently no academic research done on an empty seat tax, which gave the 
authors the additional motivation of performing original research in unexplored territory. If an 
air passenger tax were placed on unoccupied seats instead of individual passengers, the tax 
would effectively impose a penalty on airlines flying with open seats. Adding a tax on empty 
seats would give the airlines an immediate incentive to fill them beyond the inherent profit 
motivation of selling additional tickets. This could potentially improve efficiency on already 
scheduled routes by increasing load factors, meaning that an airline’s resources would become 
more fully utilized.  On the other hand, an empty seat tax could also cause negative effects for 
the industry by crimping profit margins and flexibility of supply.  
 
There are many possible approaches on how the Norwegian government could change the 
current air passenger tax. Related research questions that materialized during the writing 
process include “What are the effects of the current air passenger tax?”, “What are the effects 
of a distance-based tax?”, and “What are the effects of a root tax on fuel?”. The results from 
the author’s research conclude that both the current tax and a tax on empty seats would be bad 
for Norwegian aviation and that other, more effective options such as distance based taxes 
would be more appropriate.  
 
The thesis continues as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of the recent dynamics of the 
Norwegian aviation industry and previous as well as existing taxes in Norway. Chapter 3 
presents the literature review which samples previous research on aviation and environmental 
economics. The authors’ understanding of the literature is presented through the themed lenses 
of environmental taxation, taxes on aviation, economic and financial implications of aviation 
taxes, elasticities of demand and supply, and green innovation in aviation. In Chapter 4 the 
theoretical foundations of this thesis will be presented. This includes an original microeconomic 
model of the empty seat tax developed by the authors of this thesis and an adapted model of an 
individual airline’s supply function. Chapter 5 is devoted to an original flow chart model 
designed to show interrelations between stakeholders in the Norwegian aviation industry. 
Chapter 6 gives a practical outline of our methodological approach of collecting qualitative data 
through interviews. The authors will then analyze, present and discuss the results found during 
the research in Chapter 7. Since the current Norwegian air passenger tax is often the subject of 
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discussion in the media, political arena and business community, the authors will tie in current 
events where they are tangent to the discussion. The thesis concludes with a brief summary of 
the above in Chapter 8. Appendices 1-5 provide interested readers with additional information, 
including full transcripts of all interviews.  
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Chapter 2: Background  
 
This chapter aims to provide readers with a concise overview of the complex workings of the 
aviation industry in Norway. It begins with an overview of the Norwegian aviation industry 
before discussing the current aviation taxes paid by airlines operating in Norway.  
 
2.1 Overview of the Aviation Industry in Norway 
 
The following section presents an industry overview of the commercial aviation sector in 
Norway, including its three major players, traffic development, and recent passenger volumes. 
The chapter will then examine the competitive environment present in the industry. Emissions 
levels from commercial aviation, in Norway and globally, will also be briefly discussed. 
 
2.1.1 Introduction to the Norwegian aviation industry 
 
Norway is a geographically unique country with large distances between its cities and a 
challenging, mountainous topography. There are limited suitable alternatives to flying in 
Norway for efficient and quick travel over longer distances. It is estimated that only 30 percent 
of domestic and international flights from Norway have viable transportations alternatives to 
flying (Avinor, 2017a). Nearly all Norwegian airports are owned and operated by Avinor, a 
wholly-owned state limited company which falls under the country’s Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. Avinor is also responsible for the operation and maintenance of air traffic 
control towers and other infrastructure necessary to the aviation network. Interestingly, 
Avinor’s airport operations are managed collectively as a single unit. Thus, the airports which 
operate with a financial profit pay for those which operate at a financial loss. This is a decisive 
factor for the availability of transportation for those residing outside of the major hubs of Oslo, 
Bergen, Trondheim, and Stavanger, who are dependent upon smaller, less profitable airports. 
Despite the lack of profitability of smaller, regional airports, they are prioritized by the 
government in both this way and through public subsidization of many routes in order to 
maintain national air connectivity (Avinor, 2017b).  
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In 2017, nearly 53 million passenger trips were made from Avinor-run airports, an increase of 
4,1 percent from the previous year (Avinor, 2018b). The increase is mainly accredited to the 
growth in the Norwegian economy, with increased optimism leading to more business and 
leisure travel by residents, as well as an increase in international visitors. A study on the social 
benefits of Norwegian aviation conducted in 2014 showed that 99,5 percent of the Norwegian 
population can travel to the capital Oslo and back home again by plane on the same day It is 
also estimated that aviation contributes to between 60 000 – 65 000 jobs to the Norwegian 
economy (Avinor, 2017a). In addition, 300 000 patients travel to receive medical treatments by 
way of commercial aviation each year, and hospitals in northern Norway are structured in part 
based on the availability of air transport (Avinor, 2017b). 
 
There is a huge demand for commercial aviation in Norway, which has the largest number of 
airline trips per capita in all of Europe. In 2016, people residing in Norway conducted roughly 
5,6 million round trips by air to both international and domestic destinations, on average 1,07 
round trips per capita. There are also over 200 direct international routes with at least one 
weekly departure from Norway. The number of tourists arriving by air has nearly doubled 
recently, from 2,4 million in 2011 to 4,4 million in 2016 (Avinor, 2017a).  
 
There are a variety of commercial airlines operating in Norway. On domestic routes, the three 
main players, SAS, Norwegian, and Widerøe, account for the majority of the traffic. There were 
over 40 different airlines flying international routes from Norway in 2015 (Thune-Larsen & 
Farstad, 2016). The amount of direct intercontinental, long-haul flights from Norway has also 
increased, with 22 unique routes in 2017 (Avinor, 2017b).  
 
2.1.2 The three main players in Norwegian aviation 
 
In Norway, there are currently three airlines that are characterized as the main players in the 
Norwegian aviation market: Scandinavian Airlines System (also called SAS), Norwegian Air 
Shuttle, and Widerøe, which had 46%, 35%, and 18% of the total market share of domestic 
routes in 2015, respectively. On international routes from Norway in the same year, Norwegian 
Air Shuttle held 36% market share to SAS’ 30%, while Widerøe held only 2% (Thune-Larsen 
& Farstad, 2016). 
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The first major player in the domestic Norwegian market is SAS. SAS can trace its roots back 
to 1946, when it was founded by a merger between the national airlines of Denmark, Sweden, 
and Norway (SAS, 2018a). SAS’ business model builds on its’ broad network, with frequent 
departures and a range of services that provide customers with a high freedom of choice to, 
from, and within Scandinavia. SAS’ strategy is to focus on frequent travelers, and it has the 
most focus on business travel of the three major carriers. SAS offers more destinations and 
departures than any other Nordic airline, a core strength of their business model (SAS, 2018b). 
In the fiscal year 2016-2017, SAS transported 30 million passengers on its diverse fleet of 158 
aircraft, earning a total of MNOK 1 805 before tax (SAS, 2018c). At the beginning of 
November 2017, SAS had an additional 18 aircraft on order.  
 
The second major player, Norwegian Air Shuttle, was founded in 1993 when it began flying 
regional aircraft on domestic routes on behalf of Braathens, an agreement which lasted until 
2002 (Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA, 2018a). Norwegian Air Shuttle subsequently launched its 
own domestic operations in September 2002. Norwegian Air Shuttle defines itself as a low-cost 
carrier. The company’s vision is to give everybody the opportunity to fly, which they aim to 
realize by offering a wide variety of destinations and good service at competitive, low prices 
(Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA, 2018b). Norwegian achieves this by “unbundling the ticket”, 
letting the customers choose and pay for only what they need, besides the ticket itself, such as 
checked in luggage and advance seat reservations. Norwegian Air Shuttle has expanded rapidly, 
and now offers around 500 routes to 150 destinations in Europe, Northern Africa, the Middle 
East, Asia, South America, and the USA. The company currently has around 250 aircraft on 
order (Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA, 2018c). For 2017, full year financial key figures show a 
net loss of MNOK 298,6 despite the airline having carried over 33 million passengers on its 
current fleet of 145 aircraft (Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA, 2018d).  
 
The third and final major player in the domestic Norwegian aviation market is Widerøe. 
Widerøe was founded in 1934, making it Norway’s oldest airline (Widerøe's Flyveselskap AS, 
2018). The airline started by flying taxi, ambulance, school and aerial photography flights. In 
the 1970s the airline was reorganized to play a role in the development of intraregional routes 
in Norway and is today the leading carrier of Norwegian regional routes. Widerøe’s route 
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network is twice the size of SAS’ domestic route network. 60 percent of the routes operated by 
Widerøe are commercial and the remaining 40 percent are Public Service Obligation (PSO, or 
FOT in Norwegian) routes operated on behalf of the government (Widerøe AS, 2017a). The 
Widerøe group’s operating profit for 2016 was positive, at MNOK 377,1. The airline 
transported 2,84 million passengers on its all-turboprop fleet of 41 aircraft operating between 
46 airports, mainly domestically (Widerøe AS, 2017b). In April 2018, Widerøe became the 
global launch customer for the Embraer E190 E-2, its first jet aircraft, which has lower CO2 
emissions than comparable aircraft (Dalløkken, 2018). The airline currently has a firm order for 
three jets with options for 12 more.  
 
2.1.3 Competition in the Norwegian aviation industry 
 
The Norwegian aviation market is in a state of hard competition between the airlines, at times 
experiencing weak profitability overall (NHO Luftfart, n.d.). Figure 2 (copied from Thune-
Larsen & Farstad, 2016) shows the market share of the airlines operating in Norway for the 
period 2003-2015. Note the rapid growth of Norwegian’s market share at the expense of SAS’, 
and Widerøe’s relatively stable development over time: 
 
 
Figure 2 Market share between airlines in Norway 
 
 18 
According to Statistics Norway, between 2002 and 2012 the total yearly result for the entire 
Norwegian aviation industry was only MNOK 803 overall. This gives the industry a profit 
margin of only 0,3 percent (NHO Luftfart, n.d.).  
 
2.1.4 Traffic development 
 
Numbers from the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the world’s largest trade 
association for airlines, show that global consumer demand for air travel is growing strongly. 
According to their January 2018 analysis, year-on-year passenger traffic increased by 8% from 
2016 to 2017, an upward trend that is expected to strengthen in the coming years. The same 
study revealed that global capacity increased by 6,3% in this timeframe, and that load factor in 
2017 reached an all-time high of 80,4% (IATA, 2018). Growth in the Norwegian market for air 
travel parallels these developments.  
 
Over the years, traffic at Norwegian airports has grown considerably and Avinor has seen more 
international trips than domestic trips since 2005. During the 32 years leading up to 2015, 
international traffic increased with an average yearly trend growth of 5,6%. For domestic 
flights, the yearly average trend growth has been 3,9% during the same time period (Thune-
Larsen & Farstad, 2016). 
 
Norway continues to see growth in the number of departing passengers, with a 4,1 percent 
growth rate from 2016 to 2017 (Avinor, 2018b). Further growth is expected due to expected 
increases in the population and a general growth in income (Avinor, 2017a). This will most 
likely lead to improvements in the offered route network, which could cause an even higher 
demand for air travel. It is worth mentioning that there is a strong connection between the 
economy and demand for air travel. The development in the aviation industry generally follows 
the business cycle, but as air travel is a luxury instead of a necessity, it experiences a higher 
cyclical volatility. Avinor’s internal projections of its expectations for strong year-on-year 
percentage growth in number of passengers into the future are shown in Table 1 (adapted from 
Avinor, 2017a):  
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Time period Domestic Europe Intercontinental Total 
2016-2030 22% 64% 100% 41% 
2016-2040 33% 107% 143% 66% 
Million departures 2016 15,1 10,8 0,6 26,5 
Million departures 2040 20,0 22,4 1,4 43,8 
Table 1 Expected growth in passenger departures from Avinor 
 
 
2.1.5 Current emissions from aviation 
 
Aviation and other modes of transportation produce both direct and indirect emissions. Indirect 
emissions include emissions from the building of infrastructure and its maintenance. It is 
estimated that indirect emissions account for 40 percent of the total emissions for cars, 50-70 
percent for trains and around 20 percent for aviation. However, the numbers on indirect 
emissions can vary greatly depending on the assumptions used to calculate them, and are more 
ambiguous than direct greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions produced from fossil fuels burned 
during the actual operation of a car, train, or airplane. GHG emissions are of huge and growing 
concern to the international community, and the aviation industry is a relatively small but fast-
growing emitter of greenhouse gases. Overall emissions from the activities of the aviation 
industry are currently at 2-3% of total energy-related emissions, but are projected to 
dramatically increase up to 22% by the year 2050 due to strong and continually growing 
demand (European Parliament, 2015).  
 
Statistics Norway’s figures for 2015 show that domestic civil aviation in Norway emitted 1,28 
million tons of CO2, about 2,4 percent of Norway’s total domestic emissions, figures which 
more than double when adding in international flights departing from Norway (Avinor, 2017a). 
Norwegian travelers’ long-haul travel routes usually also pass through hubs outside Norway, 
such as Stavanger to Amsterdam to New York, and is therefore not shown in the numbers above.  
 
To put things into perspective, a typical two engine jet aircraft during a 1-hour flight with a 
load of 150 passengers would consume 2 700 kg of kerosene. By burning this fuel, the aircraft 
would emit 8 500 kg carbon dioxide (CO2), 3 300 kg water vapor (H2O), 30 kg of nitrogen 
oxides (NOx), 2,5 kg of Sulphur dioxide (SO2), 2 kg carbon monoxide (CO), 0,4 kg 
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hydrocarbons (HC) and 0,1 kg of particulate matter (PM) and soot (EASA, EEA, and 
EUROCONTROL, 2016). 
 
2.2 Overview of Aviation Taxes 
 
This section will provide an overview of aviation-related taxes and their importance to the 
workings of aviation industry in Norway.  
 
2.2.1 Non-passenger taxes on Norwegian aviation today 
 
In addition to the current air passenger tax which will be discussed further in the next 
subsection, airlines operating in Norway are also subject to a multitude of other mandatory 
taxes and fees. Those fees are which are ultimately used to finance the operations of Norwegian 
airports are referred to as airport fees.  
 
There are currently four different airport fees. The fees for 2018 in NOK are (Avinor, 2018a): 
 
• Start fee: This fee is based on the aircrafts maximum takeoff weight (MTOW). If the 
aircraft is under 75 ton the fee is 62 NOK per ton MTOW, if between 75-150 ton the 
fee is 31 NOK per ton MTOW, and if above 151 ton, the fee is 12,4 NOK per MTOW.  
• Passenger fee: This fee is not to be mistaken for the recently implemented air passenger 
tax, but is a fee is based on the number of passengers departing Avinor airports. It is 
currently set at 48 NOK per passenger. The fee for transfer passengers on international 
flights is 34 NOK per passenger.  
• Security fee: This fee is used to finance security measures at the airports, and is 
calculated based on the number of passengers with passengers transferring from other 
flights being deducted. The security fee is 64 NOK per passenger.  
• De-ice fee: Some airports also charge a fee for de-icing. This is used to safely recycle 
and dispose of de-ice fluid.  
 
The fees are more or less the same across all of Avinor’s airports, but some of the smaller 
regional airports offer airlines a 30% discount on the start fee.  
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In addition to the airport fees mentioned above, airlines also have to pay an air traffic control 
service fee. This fee is split into two. The first part is an en-route charge which applies for all 
aircraft flying through Norwegian airspace regardless of whether the aircraft touches down in 
Norway or not. The en-route charge is calculated on the basis of distance flown and aircraft 
weight. The other fee, which applies only to aircraft taking off or landing in Norway, is called 
a tower fee and is charged for the use of air traffic control services on arrival and departure, and 
is calculated based on aircraft weight.  
 
Airlines also have to pay a fee for aircraft emissions. One of these fees are for nitrogen oxide 
(NOx) emissions. The fee is calculated on the basis of actual amount of NOx emitted. For fixed 
wing aircraft, the fee only applies to the takeoff and landing phase. The NOx fee only applies 
to domestic flights (Skattedirektoratet, 2018). In 2018 NOx fee was set at 21,94 NOK per 
kilogram (Skatteetaten, 2018a). However, airlines can obtain payment exemption from the NOx 
emission fee if they adhere to the environmental agreement called the “NOx Fund for 2018-
2025” put together by NHO (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon) and 15 participating 
organizations, which is a fund that finances emission reduction measures with regard to NOx 
emissions. Participating airlines then pay 6 NOK per kilogram NOx emitted to the fund instead 
of paying 21,94 NOK per kilogram to the government (NHO, 2018).  
 
In addition to fees on nitrogen oxide emissions, there are also fees on carbon dioxide (CO2) and 
sulfur emissions (Toll og avgiftsdirektoratet, 2015). Norway is one of the few countries in the 
world that has implemented a CO2 fee on domestic flights. In 2017, the CO2 fee was 1,10 NOK 
per liter jet fuel used or 431 NOK per ton of CO2 emitted. International flights are exempt from 
Norwegian carbon dioxide and sulfur emission fees.  
 
On top of all of this, since 2012 the Norwegian aviation industry has also been bound by CO2 
emission quotas from the EU emissions trading system (Avinor, 2017a). The EU emissions 
trading scheme (EU ETS) works according to the ‘Cap and Trade’ principle. The scheme is in 
place in 31 countries including all EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, and 
covers 45 percent of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. The idea of the quota scheme is to set 
a cap on the total amount of certain greenhouse gases and then to reduce the cap so that total 
emissions fall over time. When adhering to the scheme, companies can receive or buy emission 
allowances that they can subsequently trade (European Commission, 2018a). Each allowance 
gives the holder the right to emit 1 ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) or the equivalent amount of 
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more powerful greenhouse gasses such as nitrous oxide (H2O) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). 
Aviation, as a part of the EU ETS has its own cap that remains the same each year of the 2013-
2020 trading period. This cap is fixed at 5 percent below the annual average level of emissions 
in the period 2004-2006 (European Commission, 2018b).  
 
2.2.2 The current air passenger tax in Norway 
 
The air passenger tax currently enforced in Norway was put into effect on June 1, 2016 
(Regjeringen.no, 2016). Currently, the tax is 83 NOK on each passenger, which comes to 93 
NOK per passenger after adding VAT (Skatteetaten, 2018b). The air passenger tax has not had 
a significant effect on consumer demand for air travel on Norwegian domestic routes, as this 
demand is quite inelastic. However, the tax has caused a 3 percent reduction in the supply of 
routes from airlines (Runsjø and Moum, 2017). Airlines operating in Norway have complained 
about their profit margins taking a hit as a result of the added tax in an already tough market 
(Hovland & Lorentzen, 2017). Airlines have absorbed parts of the tax since they are not able to 
pass all of it on to consumers in the form of higher ticket prices due to the highly competitive 
nature of the aviation industry. This has driven up the airlines’ costs leading to airlines cutting 
capacity even though demand for air travel has not dropped.  
 
Change in number of domestic departures 
Year SAS/Norwegian Air Shuttle Widerøe 
2013 -1,2% 5,4% 
2014 1,9% 2,6% 
2015 -1,5% -0,2% 
2016 0,9% -3,4% 
2017 -1,9% -3,6% 
2018 (Planned first half) 0% -4,2% 
Table 2 Change in number of departures (from Widerøe) 
 
A Widerøe representative provided the information in Table 2 to this paper’s authors (numbers 
from internal Widerøe document “Rammebetingelser for kommersielle distriktsruter”). 
Widerøe maintains that, holding all else constant, the air passenger tax has had direct and 
negative consequences on its operations: 
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Prior to the introduction of the air passenger tax in 2016, most of the regional routes Widerøe 
operated were profitable. By 2017, most of the routes Widerøe operated had become 
unprofitable (personal communication, Widerøe, 2018). This information is supported by the 
information on the negative trend in Widerøe’s domestic departures supplied in Table 2.  
 
The reason for the reduction in domestic departures for Widerøe is the increased level of fees, 
not only from the introduction of the air passenger tax, but also annual increases in other taxes 
and fees levied on the aviation industry as described in the previous subsection. Consequently, 
many routes have recently become unprofitable. Note that public service obligation routes 
operated by Widerøe on contract by the government are compensated for the air passenger tax 
(Toll og avgiftsdirektoratet, 2015). Even though the other airlines have to pay the air passenger 
tax, Widerøe takes a relatively big hit. This is because most of the routes operated by Widerøe 
are domestic routes, where passengers have to pay the air passenger tax two times on a domestic 
round trip. Passengers travelling on international flights only have to pay the air passenger tax 
upon leaving the country, not upon the return. Therefore, if the airlines are struggling to pass 
the air passenger tax on to passengers, the airlines with a majority of domestic routes will have 
a higher burden than airlines with a majority of international.  
 
2.2.3 Air passenger taxes in other countries 
 
Many countries in Europe and beyond have also introduced air passenger taxes over the years. 
It is estimated that total passenger taxes in European aviation will raise 6 billion euros in tax 
revenues during 2017 (PwC, 2017). It is worth noting that the size of the tax and way the 
different taxes work vary from country to country and therefore in some cases, making a direct 
comparison more difficult. For more details about these taxes’ rates and functioning’s, the 
authors refer the reader to appendix 4.  
 
These air passenger taxes are taxes that are paid to governments with the purpose of raising 
revenue instead of being collected with the intention of offsetting the cost of a service provided, 
as aligned to the IATA list of ticket and airport taxes and fees (PwC, 2017). Sweden is 
implementing an aviation tax in 2018 (Statens Offentliga Utredningar, 2016). This will be a tax 
where the rate is based on distance traveled. The proposed rates are, within the EU 60 SEK, 
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outside the EU but closer than 6 000km 250 SEK and for flights longer than 6 000km 400 SEK. 
This tax will enter into force on 1 April 2018 (Sveriges Riksdag, 2017).  
 
2.2.4 Industry view on aviation taxes 
 
As the representative for the vast majority of the world’s airlines, the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) publicly opposes aviation taxes, especially those that “single out 
aviation simply to raise revenue for non-aviation purposes.” (IATA, 2016). The IATA also calls 
them “a quick money grab” for governments and cautions that imposing aviation taxes is 
shortsighted and will lead to negative economic effects in the long term (IATA, 2016). These 
negative effects are the ripple effects from an increase in the cost of travel, which theoretically, 
per the law of demand, decreases consumer demand which further impacts supply of flight 
routes and takeoffs, and ultimately damages connectivity. Worsened connectivity within or 
between countries has a negative effect on the global economy through limiting business 
opportunities and other chances for economic growth. Essentially, the industry argues that 
abolishing or limiting aviation taxes will lead to an overall increase in national wealth.  
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Chapter 3:  Literature Review 
 
The literature review samples from the vast body of literature on environmental taxes in general 
before delving more specifically into a selection of the literature dealing with taxes on aviation. 
After, there will be an overview of the literature on some of economic implications of these 
taxes, specifically for airlines but also on other stakeholders. Next, the authors will review 
evidence of elasticities of demand and supply for air travel and briefly overview “green 
innovations” in aviation before concluding by pointing out a few existing gaps in the academic 
research.  
 
As will be detailed further in the methodology chapter, the literature review relies on four major 
themes that emerged as especially important to the scope of the research – environmental 
taxation, including taxes on aviation, implications of these aviation taxes, elasticities of demand 
and supply, and green innovation in aviation. 
 
A total of 33 sources were used in the literature review, and are listed in Table 3 in the order 
they are cited in the following literature review. As can be seen in Table 3, these sources were 
classified by category and by source type. To begin with the former, the four categories adhere 
to the structure of the following subsections 3.1-3.4, respectively. Category 1 refers to literature 
on environmental taxation, category 2 refers to the economic and financial implications of 
aviation taxes, category 3 refers to elasticities, and category 4 refers to green innovation in 
aviation. The last category has fewer sources than the others, mainly because information on 
environmental innovations in aviation generally comes from news media sources and therefore 
falls more naturally into other sections of the thesis. These four categories will be further 
detailed in their respective subsections.  
 26 
Author(s) Year Category Source Type 
Kosonen and Nicodème 2009 1, 2 Working paper 
Leicester and O’Dea 2008 1 NGO report 
Hsu 2008 1, 3 Journal article 
Keen and Strand 2007 1 Journal article 
Jones, Keen, and Strand 2013 1, 2, 4 Journal article 
Krenek and Schratzenstaller 2016 1, 3 Working paper 
US IAWG 2016 1 Government report 
Bhattacharyya 2011 1 Academic textbook 
Khan 2015 1 Journal article 
Brouwer et al. 2008 1 Journal article 
Andrew 2008 1 Journal article 
IMF and World Bank 2011 1 NGO report 
Milne 2016 2 News article 
Bottini and Morphet 2015 2 Industry report 
Tol 2007 2 Journal article 
WTTC 2017 2 NGO report 
Koopmans and Lieshout 2013 2 NGO report 
Starkie and Yarrow 2013 2 NGO report 
Wang et al. 2017 2 Working paper 
Truby 2010 3 Journal article 
Runsjø and Moum 2017 3 Academic thesis 
Jorge-Calderón 1997 3 Journal article 
Sivrikaya and Tunç 2013 3 Journal article 
Gillen et al.  2004 3 Government report 
Levine 1987 3 Journal article 
Borenstein 1989 3 Journal article 
Bilotkach and Lakew 2014 3 Journal article 
Ciliberto et al. 2016 3 Working paper 
de Jong et al. 2016 3 Working paper 
Captain and Sickles 1997 3 Journal article 
Takriti et al. 2017 4 NGO report 
Macintosh and Wallace 2009 4 Journal article 
Avinor 2016 4 Industry report 
Table 3 Overview of sources used in literature review 
 
The majority of sources presented in the literature review are academic in nature, mainly journal 
articles from various academic and industry journals and academic working papers not 
published in structured journals. “Government report” includes sources sponsored by 
government organizations, while the category “NGO report” refers to non-governmental 
organizations / non-profit organizations. For example, the Takriti et al. source is a white paper 
written for the International Council on Clean Transportation. Some of the sources used are 
more technical, but provided valuable supplementary information to the more traditional 




3.1 Environmental Taxation 
 
Aviation, like most other industries, imposes external costs onto society in the form of 
greenhouse gas emissions and other forms of pollution. These external costs are called 
“negative externalities,” and are borne by society, which is an external third party to the market 
transaction between airlines and passengers. Negative externalities are a form of market failure. 
Environmental taxes are market-based instruments that are important to environmental policy 
because they can potentially contribute to achieving environmental goals in a cost-effective 
way (Kosonen and Nicodème, 2009). In economic theory, the goal of these kind of taxes is to 
“internalize externalities”, which provides the primary rationale for governments to choose to 
impose specific taxes on the aviation industry (Leicester and O’Dea, 2008; Hsu, 2008; Keen 
and Strand 2007). The most obvious implication of aviation taxes is that they raise money for 
governments through revenues collected by passengers and/or airlines.  
 
A quality environment is a public good whose provision is not ensured by the market 
mechanism. As Jones, Keen, and Strand (2013) point out, anthropogenic climate change that 
affects this public good is simply an externality problem which can be tackled most effectively 
through fiscal means. Ideally, a government’s imposition of taxes can be used to correct this 
market failure. When designed correctly, they are called Pigouvian taxes, and involve charging 
a price for emitting a unit of CO2 which is equal to the present value of the marginal social 
damage caused by that unit of emissions (Krenek and Schratzenstaller, 2016). The social cost 
of carbon (SC-CO2), is a term which captures “the monetized damages associated with an 
incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given year,” including damages to a wide variety 
of actors in society at large, and is most conservatively estimated at $11 per metric ton of CO2 
in 2015, with a higher-impact SC-CO2 over $100 (US IAWG, 2016). A global charge on 
aviation emissions even on the conservative side of this range would raise billions. 
 
However, climate change is an extremely complex externality problem, with innumerable 
sources emitting greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, and effective fiscal measures to 
mitigate it are thus challenging to design (Bhattacharyya, 2011). Mitigating climate gas 
emissions is particularly difficult in the international arena, due to the obvious spillover issues 
stemming from the fact that a single country’s emissions ultimately affect all others.  
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3.1.1 Taxes on Aviation 
 
Aviation taxes are said to be Pigouvian in nature, because they aim to internalize the range of 
externalities brought about by the operations of airlines. The negative externalities specific to 
aviation are both local, for example noise pollution and NOx emissions when aircraft takeoff 
and land, and global, as CO2 and other GHG emissions ultimately affect the entire world 
(Krenek and Schratzenstaller, 2016). As mentioned, the main rationale behind implementing 
such taxes is that they internalize these externalities of aviation, which motivates consumers to 
choose alternative, and presumably less carbon-intensive, transportation methods (Hsu, 2008). 
This means that revenue raised should be considered as an ancillary benefit of environmental-
based taxation for policymakers, not the main reason for it.  
 
Theoretically, under a Pigouvian tax, polluting firms will abate up to the point at which the 
marginal private benefit to the polluter is equal to the marginal social costs (i.e. the external 
costs) of the pollution. This is also known as the “polluter pays principle,” because the polluter 
pays the cost of the pollution incurred by the wider society in the form of a tax (Khan, 2015). 
When buying a plane ticket online, customers can often pay a bit extra on top of their flight 
purchase in order to offset their carbon emissions. This is an example of the polluter pays 
principle in action. Although this is not mandatory, many consumers are actually willing to pay 
to compensate for their portion of the damage caused by their personal air travel. In fact, 
willingness to pay (WTP) estimates are in fact close to the estimated marginal cost of this 
damage done (Brouwer et al., 2008). 
 
Some economists argue that of the wide range of fiscal instruments available, the best way to 
target a policy is to charge emitters an appropriate price for units of greenhouse gas emissions 
into the atmosphere (Andrew, 2008). This is colloquially referred to as “carbon tax”. In the case 
of aviation emissions, a root carbon tax would be imposed upon the fuel burned by aircraft from 
takeoff to landing. The major problem in respect to collective action on climate change in this 
instance is that per the fuel tax exemption developed at the 1944 Chicago Convention, taxes are 
not levied on fuel used on international shipping and aviation. Finding an “appropriate price” 
per unit is a challenge in itself, and falls outside of the scope of this research. 
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However, real-life market distortions, such as multilateral air service agreements and 
commitments to international treaties, especially the Chicago Convention, hinder the potential 
effectiveness of carbon pricing and a root tax on fuel used on international flights. Jones, Keen, 
and Strand (2013) state that in the case of international aviation, per-ticket taxes such as the 
current Norwegian air passenger tax can therefore be beneficial, though still a second-best 
option. This and other possible solutions to the international negative externalities of aviation 
are also explored by other key studies (Keen and Strand, 2007, IMF and World Bank, 2011).  
 
3.2 Economic / Financial Implications of Aviation Taxes 
 
Environmental taxes do more than simply affect a company’s bottom line. International 
competitiveness may be affected when a country unilaterally sets a tax, as was the case when 
the Ryanair pulled out of the Rygge airport, which quickly led to the airport’s closure, as a 
direct result of the Norwegian government introducing the air passenger tax (Milne, 2016). This 
tax put the Norwegian aviation industry at a competitive disadvantage, and has the possible 
future consequence of airlines moving out of Norway.  
 
Theoretically, the sectors that are the most vulnerable to being placed at a competitive 
disadvantage are those characterized by a high degree of energy intensity, a large share of 
products and services exposed internationally, and a modest ability to pass cost increases 
through to consumers (Kosonen and Nicodème, 2009). The aviation industry checks all three 
of these boxes – it is currently entirely dependent on fossil fuels to power aircraft, the most 
profitable airlines operate internationally, and some cost increases are difficult to pass on to 
consumers due to the fiercely competitive environment.  
 
It can be argued that air connectivity and consumer choice are also public goods which enhance 
consumer welfare overall and also boost global trade opportunities.  Bottini and Morphet (2015) 
argue that air connectivity is essential to the economic growth potential of a country, partially 
because a well-connected country can better attract business investment and partially because 
national connectivity props up a country’s entire tourism industry. Tourism is important to the 
Norwegian economy in terms both of tourism-related employment and an important non-
petroleum-related contribution to GDP. Some researchers argue that imposing special taxes 
upon the aviation sector could have damaging effects on the tourism industry in Norway by 
encouraging European visitors to travel closer to home (Tol, 2007). International tourism, in 
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particular, is a flourishing industry, thanks in part to the emergence of newly developed markets, 
especially China. For reference, in 2016 the growth rate of the global GDP was 2,7%, but the 
growth rate of the tourism industry was estimated at 4% by the World Travel & Tourism 
Council (WTTC, 2017).  
 
3.2.1 Cost pass through  
 
“Pass-through” refers to airlines’ ability to pass changes in costs through, on to their customers, 
via increased ticket sales prices. A general rule of thumb for cost pass-through is the more 
competitive the market, the lower the percentage of cost changes that can be passed on to 
consumers, and that market-wide cost increases have higher pass-through rates than individual 
firms’ cost increases (Koopmans and Lieshout, 2013). The level of pass-through is important 
to both airlines’ profit margins and the actual environmental effects realized by the imposition 
of an aviation tax, in terms of changes in travel patterns.  
 
Charges to airports and other aeronautical charges, for example air traffic control fees, are 
relatively easily recouped by airlines from passenger fares (Starkie and Yarrow, 2013). These 
charges have a relatively high degree of pass-through into airfares compared to environmental 
taxes, where the burden falls more upon the airlines in a competitive environment. Therefore, 
changes in airport and other mandatory fees are generally reflected by changes in ticket prices, 
suggesting a classical price elasticity of demand, i.e. that consumer demand for seats on an 
airplane decreases. A secondary effect of this decreased consumer demand, besides the obvious 
effect on airlines’ bottom lines, is the dampened profitability of marginal services at airports 
(Starkie and Yarrow, 2013).  
 
Airlines tend to pass a higher proportion of fuel-related cost increases onto passengers than 
those of non-fuel related costs. Wang et al. (2017) find that an increase in nonfuel costs per 
passenger, i.e. the flight passenger tax, mandatory charges to air traffic control, etc., has a 
significantly smaller effect on airfares than does an increase in average fuel costs per passenger. 
Overall, airlines respond more to fuel cost changes than to any other change in variable costs. 
Jones, Keen, and Strand (2013) also find that the level of pass-through depends largely on the 
elasticity of airlines’ fuel supply response – the more inelastic, the higher the impact on 
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producer prices. This finding is applicable in all markets, and is the result of fuel cost making 
up the lion’s share of airlines’ operating costs.  
 
3.3 Elasticities of Demand and Supply  
 
Elasticities can measure whether or not aviation and other environmental taxes truly have an 
effect on reducing emissions by affecting demand. According to Grethe Dahl, an official from 
the taxation department in the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, the current flight passenger tax 
in Norway “is fiscally justified, but can also have environmental effects by reducing the demand 
for flights” (personal communication, March 7, 2018). It has been argued that an air passenger 
duty is a misconceived instrument which is far removed from its stated environmental 
objectives (Truby, 2010). Other academics argue that environmental taxes on aviation are a 
good thing, given that all revenues collected from them are used to reduce overall emissions 
contributions of the countries which implement them (Hsu, 2008; Krenek and Schratzenstaller, 
2016). However, this is not the case in Norway, where the revenues collected from the various 
taxes go towards the general government budget, without any earmarking. 
 
A comparable recent study in this line of research concentrated on elasticities of demand for air 
travel in its literature review, finding that consumer demand for flights is primarily dependent 
on geo-economic and service-related factors (Runsjø and Moum, 2017). For an example of the 
former, the higher the GDP and average disposable income of a country, the less price sensitive 
its inhabitants are towards purchases of plane tickets (Jorge-Calderón, 1997). This is a key 
factor behind relatively wealthy Norwegians having the most flight trips per capita in Europe. 
Service-related factors are encompassed within a consumer’s perception an airline’s overall 
quality, in addition to its route map and departure frequency (Sivrikaya and Tunç, 2013). Of 
course, the law of demand is, as always, relevant here, and consumer demand for airfare is in 
no way inelastic regardless of the wealth of the population. The higher the ticket prices, the 
lower the consumer demand for tickets, ceteris paribus.  
 
When faced with higher prices for air travel, more budget-conscious consumers might choose 
alternative forms of transport when this is geographically possible. Others may forego travel 
entirely. The air demand elasticities of business and leisure travelers are both negative, however 
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it has been shown that leisure travelers are more than twice as responsive to a price increase in 
airfare than are passengers traveling for business (Gillen et al., 2004).  
 
Consumers (passengers) and producers (airlines) are not the only stakeholders relevant to the 
aviation industry. Airports are an indispensable part of the transport network, and are dependent 
upon the performance of the airlines they host, since they earn money by collecting various 
charges from the downstream airlines and selling goods and services to passengers. Starkie and 
Yarrow (2013) conclude that consumer demand as measured by total passenger numbers is 
affected both directly and indirectly by airline response to these charges to airports. This is due 
to the aforementioned result of easier cost pass-through of airport charges which results in 
higher final ticket prices for consumers. 
 
Within the aviation economics literature, it is well established that airlines do exhibit some 
degree of market power, despite their existing within competitive environments (Levine, 1987; 
Borenstein, 1989; Bilotkach and Lakew, 2014; Ciliberto et al., 2016, etc.). Newer studies show 
that airlines tend to have relatively more market power in their domestic countries relative to 
internationally (de Jong et al., 2016). The extent to which airlines face price-elastic demand for 
their tickets is a key factor behind their level of market power, which impacts the overall 
competitive environment. Captain and Sickles (1997) argue that the market power of European 
airlines has less influence on ticket price increases than does the high cost structure of the 
aviation industry. The total number of airlines has blossomed in the two decades since the 
publication of their paper, a fact that ultimately lends support to their conclusion that the airline 
industry is characterized more by the competitive paradigm than the monopolistic.  
 
For airlines, “supply” means an airline’s ability and willingness to provide consumers with a 
number of seats on their aircraft. Therefore, elasticity of supply for airlines means the change 
in number of seats supplied in response to a change in the ticket prices airlines can feasibly 
charge. In the short term, an airline’s available fleet (level of capital) cannot be changed, as new 






3.4 Green Innovation in Aviation 
 
Analysts from the International Council on Clean Transportation predict that the international 
aviation sector will continue to grow significantly over the next few decades, increasing at a 
rate of up to 4.3% each year (Takriti et al., 2017). Expansion in the aviation sector is expected 
to go hand in hand with a faster pace of development in increased fuel efficiency measures and 
other technological and operational improvements, but for now it is not hyperbolic to assume 
that there will be a corresponding increase in carbon emissions from the aviation sector. 
Researchers doubt that international aviation emissions can be stabilized into the near future 
without restricting demand growth (Macintosh and Wallace, 2009). However, there are strides 
being made to make the industry greener and less carbon intensive, and better prepared to 
handle climate-related disruption. 
 
Jones, Keen, and Strand (2013) argue that mitigating climate change necessitates public 
intervention, but successful adaptation to climate change in the long term will ultimately be 
dependent on the private sector. They hold that the key role of the public sector is determining 
an appropriate carbon price pathway, which will be the key driver behind the private 
development of less carbon intensive technologies. 
 
A very large percentage of airlines’ variable operating costs come from jet fuel. As stated earlier 
in this chapter, fuel costs have a downward-trending component due to improvements in overall 
fuel efficiency with time. Developments such as electric passenger planes and biofuel as the 
main component of the jet fuel mixture are not yet commercially viable, but their development 
is important to the Norwegian aviation authorities, with Avinor investing hundreds of millions 
of kroner in research and development as part of its short-term strategic plan (Avinor, 2016). 
Airlines will also have to consider the short- and long-term costs of introducing new 
technologies which mitigate CO2 emissions from their aircraft. 
 
3.5 Limitations of Current Research  
 
Academic literature on the aviation industry, especially that pertaining to pricing strategies, is 
broad. However, there are a variety of gaps in the existing research, and to conclude the 
literature review and background chapter, the authors will briefly point some of these out. This 
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thesis endeavors to help fill a hole in the research gap on how the aviation industry, specifically 
in Norway, responds to different taxation scenarios. 
 
Wang et al. (2017) found that the bulk of airline pricing literature is biased towards the United 
States’ domestic market, and is therefore less relevant to other important markets. Furthermore, 
market segments such as the Asia-Pacific market, where aviation emissions grow rapidly to 
keep up with exploding demand for air travel, have rarely been subjected to academic scrutiny. 
Another research gap highlighted by Wang et al. (2017) is the lack of empirical studies on 
airline cost pass-through under competition. This is important because of the need to understand 
pass-through in the intensely competitive nature of the aviation industry in Norway and beyond. 
 
The authors began this research project with an interest in exploring the effects of a theoretical 
empty seat tax. The authors quickly found that there is currently a dearth of academic research 
on the taxation of empty seats in passenger travel. Therefore, the selection of literature reviewed 
in this section focuses on related, broader aspects of the topic at hand, including the economic 
and climate-related effects of aviation taxes. 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Foundations  
 
In this chapter, the authors will present theoretical, microeconomic perspectives on our research 
topic. The chapter begins with an original microeconomic model for the empty seat tax and then 
links it to a generalized airline supply function before discussing abatement.  
 
4.1 Microeconomic Model of the Empty Seat Tax 
 
The short-term decision margins of an airline include fleet configuration, number of seats 
available for consumer purchase, and route configuration. The following will serve as the short-
run theory basis for airlines for the quantity decision margin of number of seats available for 
purchase.  
 
A general microeconomic model to represent profit to an airline for each flight under the 
assumption of a tax (T) on empty seats is presented in Equation 1: 
 
𝜋 = 𝑝(𝑞) ∗ 𝑞 − 𝑐(𝑞) −  𝑇(?̅? − 𝑞) 
Equation 1 
 
The first term in Equation 1, 𝑝(𝑞) ∗ 𝑞,  represents the generalized revenue structure of the 
monopolist or firm with market power, and is stated in terms of inverse demand. For a 
monopolist or firm with market power, price is negatively affected by an increase in the number 
of units produced. Showing price as a function of quantity recognizes that airlines have at least 
some degree of market power.  
 
As the airline increases its quantity supplied in terms of seats sold, it gets a revenue of p per 
unit, but a lower unit price. This is due to the standard microeconomic result of the monopolist 
facing the downward-sloping demand curve. The price that the monopolist receives falls as it 
increases its output, therefore there exists an inverse relationship between a monopolist’s 
marginal revenue and its output. 
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The second term in Equation 1, cost as a function of quantity produced, or c(q), represents the 
generalized cost of producing each unit. 
 
The final term in Equation 1 represents the empty seat tax, where T is conceptualized as a 
financial penalty per empty seat, where ?̅? represents the full capacity utilization and q represents 
actual seat sales per flight. Note that ?̅? is equivalent to qMAX from the perspective of an 
individual flight.  
 







∗ 𝑞 + 𝑃 −  
𝑑𝑐
𝑑𝑞
+ 𝑇 ; and set = 0 
Equation 2 
 
A penalty on a negative externality is usually negative, but T is positive in Equation 2. This 
leads to the result that for every seat filled, the airline is receiving the theoretical equivalent of 
a unit subsidy in that they do not need to pay the penalty for having an empty seat on a flight. 
Quantity is another piece of the marginal cost expression 
𝑑𝑐
𝑑𝑞
, but it is negative here. 
 
Rewriting Equation 2 gives Equation 3: 
 









The left hand side of Equation 3 gives the marginal revenue of the airline. The right hand side 
of Equation 3 represents the marginal costs of an increase in quantity, which rise due to higher 
costs of production. In our example, a higher fuel price is associated with added passenger 
weight from additional passengers, among other factors. If the airline decreases quantity, for 
example by using a plane with less seats on board, there is another perspective to consider. A 
decrease in quantity leads to the missed opportunity cost of lost marginal revenue, but is also 
associated with a lower marginal cost. Note that the final term in Equation 3 is negative, but 
later becomes positive due to the mathematics involved in multiplying a negative term with 
another negative term.  
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Equation 3 solves for the airlines’ profit maximizing quantity of seats sold, qM, which represents 
the short run decision basis for the firm, specifically the firm’s quantity decision margin in 
terms of seats available for sale. In the longer term, amounts of capital, specifically the aircraft 
which make up the airline’s fleet, are not fixed as they are in the short run. Therefore, longer 
term effects of a tax on empty seats could include pricing changes (as airlines must decide how 
much to cut prices to sell all of their seats) and route changes (ex. scaling down aircraft size or 
stopping certain routes entirely), leading to a societal welfare loss in terms of less consumer 
choice. 
 
Note again that airlines, while generally not pure monopolists, do have market power. Basic 
microeconomic theory tells us that since airlines are in market power situations, they produce 
a quantity (of available seats on airplanes) which is less than equilibrium output. To put it 
succinctly, qm < q*, while the free market under perfect competition tends to produce more than 
the equilibrium output, or qc > q*. By taxing a monopolist, qm could fall even further below q*.  
 
4.2 Airline Supply Function 
 
Demand for air travel is cyclical, meaning that it fluctuates along with the business cycle and 
general macroeconomic conditions. Estimating this demand on a month-to-month or even 
week-to-week basis is further complicated by the wide heterogeneity of the consumer base and 
uncertainty about travel dates and final destinations (Cento, 2009, pp. 33). Successful airlines 
must reconcile the volatile nature of consumer demand with their relatively stable available 
capacity (supply) – a simplifying assumption is that the total number of available seats for sale 
is fixed in the short term (disregarding leasing opportunities).  Another complication for airlines 
is that their supply is perishable, meaning that empty seats cannot be “re-used” after a flight is 
completed, or kept as inventory to sell later.  
 
The implicit supply function of an individual airline is conceptualized in Equation 4 as 
(equation and explanation adapted from Vasigh et al., 2016):  
 




Equation 4 shows that the quantity of seats supplied for any individual flight by an airline is a 
function of the ticket price, the price of resources, technology, competition, random factors, and 
government. These variables are further explained below. 
 
In Equation 4, Pt represents the ticket price. According to the law of supply, airlines are more 
willing to supply seats as ticket prices increase. Changing ticket prices are represented as 
movements along the supply curve.  
 
Pr represents the price of resources, including fuel prices, labor costs, operations and 
maintenance fees (including fees to airports), et cetera. When the prices of resources increase, 
airline production costs increase. If they increase enough, airlines may cut unprofitable routes, 
which would be represented as a leftward shift in the supply curve. If the price of resources 
declines, more seats could be offered at the same ticket price, shifting the supply curve 
rightward.  
 
T represents technology. The technological development of commercial aircraft has continually 
trended towards larger and more fuel-efficient planes, gradually shifting the supply curve to the 
right over time as airlines introduce newer aircraft into their fleets. 
 
C represents competition, or the competitive environment. As has been discussed, commercial 
aviation is a highly competitive industry, and individual airlines regularly adjust their supply to 
tackle developments in the competitive environment. Competition could also be taken to 
include developments in substitutes, meaning the availability and accessibility of other modes 
of transportation. The authors have already discussed how aviation is a non-substitutable means 
of transportation for some areas of Norway, but in other areas, train and car travel are viable 
alternatives. 
 
R represents random factors, for example the sharp decrease in passenger volumes following 
the 9/11 terror attack (CAPA, 2011). Other stochastic factors could include employee strikes or 
even unexpected volcanic activity, such as the 2010 eruption of Icelandic volcano 
Eyjafjallajökull, which paralyzed European airspace for weeks (Andrews, 2017). Random 
factors generally shift the supply curve leftward. 
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G represents government regulation, including taxes. Imposing special taxes upon the airline 
industry causes an increase in operating costs and is meant to shift the airline’s supply curve to 
the left, causing less flights and less GHG emissions.  
 
 
4.3 Abatement Theory 
 
 
Greenhouse gas emissions can be conceptualized as a function of the production level of a good 
or service. Therefore, GHG emissions are a production externality of airline operations, as 
shown in Figure 3: 
 
 
Figure 3 Marginal social cost equilibrium versus marginal private cost equilibrium 
 
This externality can be corrected for with a decrease in production. This kind of market failure 
calls for a policy correction through the imposition of a Pigouvian tax equal to the marginal 
social cost minus the marginal private cost in order to force an airline to internalize this 
externality (Pigou tax= marginal social cost MSC – marginal private cost MPC). A Pigouvian 




Taxes, subsidies, and other market-based instruments are often, but not always, more efficient 
than regulatory instruments such as the implementation of sets of environmental standards. In 
the case of GHG emissions taxes (also called environmental taxes, pollution taxes, etc.), 
producers are incentivized to reduce their emissions up to the point at which the marginal cost 
of pollution is equal to the tax (Kosonen and Nicodème, 2009). In microeconomic theory, this 
is efficient in two main ways. The first is static efficiency, meaning that costs of reaching an 
environmental target are minimized since producers are automatically incentivized to reduce 
their emissions (given that their marginal costs of emitting are already lower/higher than the 
tax being introduced). Secondly, there is dynamic efficiency inherent in market-based 
instruments because polluting firms have the flexibility to choose how much to abate, and how 
(Blaug, 2001). This is a built in incentive for continuous innovation towards more and more 
emissions-efficient capital investments. Additionally, market-based instruments provide price 
signals to consumers, thereby pushing them to choose more environmentally friendly products.   
 
As mentioned above, sometimes direct regulation can be a more efficient instrument to address 
excessive emissions. For example, quantity-based instruments such as the European Union’s 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) can be favorable because they are more certain to achieve 
targets than price-based instruments (Kosonen and Nicodème, 2009).  
 
In the case of either a tax on carbon emissions or a tradable permits system, the correct price to 
set on emissions (Pe*) is that which equates the marginal social cost of emissions MSC(E) with 




Figure 4 Marginal social cost and marginal social benefit of emissions 
 
As shown in Figure 4, setting too high of a price (PH) would lead to too few emissions (EL), and 
a dead weight loss equal to the area to the left of the equilibrium. Having too few emissions is 
theoretically possible, as emissions support consumption and production. However, in a more 
realistic sense, there would be too low of a price (PL), which would lead to too many emissions 
(EH) and a deadweight loss equal to the area to the right of the equilibrium. The goal is to set a 
price equal to P*, which brings about E*, the socially optimal level of emissions. 
 
Sections 4.1-4.3 serve as the theoretical microeconomic basis necessary to explore our 
research question in depth. The following chapter presents an original flow chart model 







Chapter 5: Flow Chart Model 
 
The following chapter presents an original flow chart model developed by the authors of this 
thesis. The model aims to give a comprehensive understanding of how a tax put on empty seats 
will affect the airlines, the market equilibrium for air travel, and the rest of society. The model 
was made by combining pre-existing knowledge about the aviation industry with data collected 
during the research process. Although basic, the authors believe that the model is sufficient in 
explaining the key effects that would result from the introduction of an empty seat tax.   
 
5.1 Main Flow Chart Model 
 
The main flow chart model is as follows:  
 
Figure 5 Main flow chart model 
 
At the top of the flow chart in Figure 5 is the empty seat tax. Naturally, the first stakeholder 
affected would be the airlines, who would immediately need to take into account how the tax 
affected their daily operations, marketing and pricing, route configurations, future fleet 
planning, staffing needs, and finances. Microeconomic theory holds that elasticities, of both 
supply and demand, are generally lower in the short run than in the long run. Therefore, the 
short term response would be more muted than the long term response. 
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In the immediate aftermath of an empty seat tax’s implementation, the daily operations of an 
airline would most likely not be affected to a large degree. Airlines would still be committed to 
operating scheduled flights in the short run, maintaining safe operations, and going about 
normal competition with other airlines. The same would apply to staffing, as it is difficult to 
make comprehensive changes with already-contracted employees in the very short run. On the 
other hand, finances would immediately be affected. An empty seat onboard an aircraft has 
never had revenue tied to it, but with an empty seat tax, empty seats would now represent 
financial penalties for airlines. Introducing a tax on empty seats on departing aircraft would 
therefore directly affect the margins of the airlines from day one. Fleet planning, route 
configuration and marketing & pricing are all categories where airlines would need to make 
decisions based on both the short run and the long run. These categories will however be 
expanded upon later in another subchapter.  
 
Taken together, the sum of the various effects of applying an empty seat tax on the airlines 
would in turn affect the market equilibrium for air travel. There are several possibilities as to 
how this would turn out. The consumer demand could increase, as airlines would lower prices 
in order to fill up aircraft. Another possibility would be a decrease in supply if airlines reduced 
the number of seats available on the market. This shortage of supply would create a market 
inefficiency. Since supply would go down, the prices on the remaining seats would go up.  
 
A change in the number of passengers traveling by air would therefore affect close stakeholders 
and even the rest of society in various ways. Airport and infrastructure could be affected as a 
result of an empty seat tax. The most likely short- and long-run effect would be the 
postponement or pushing ahead of airport expansion plans, depending on how the market 
equilibrium evolves. Of course, present infrastructure like airport terminals, air traffic control 
towers, and runways would still have to be maintained. Consumer welfare, with regards to both 
leisure and business travel, would also be greatly affected by changes to the market equilibrium. 
If frequencies and routes were cut, the consumers would be worse off from having less freedom 
of choice. On the other hand, if airlines drastically lower their fares, this could have a positive 
effect and increase consumer surplus in the commercial aviation market. A reduction or increase 
in the number of flights following from the changes in the market equilibrium, will have a 
definite effect on the environment through increased or decreased aircraft emissions. A change 
in the market equilibrium would also have an effect on other businesses and industries related 
to aviation. Many people work within the aviation industry in secondary positions such as 
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catering, handling, and other functions that could be affected if a change in the marked 
equilibrium was to occur. Many times, the full scope of ripple effects upon different stakeholder 
groups does not appear until some time has passed and the long-term effects are better known. 
 
In the following subchapters, the authors will now expand the model in Figure 5, taking a closer 
look at the central factors such as marketing and pricing, route configuration and fleet planning.  
The authors would like to pinpoint that in this model, our definition of the short run ranges from 
0-2 years depending on category.  In the short run, the airlines’ quantity of capital is held fixed, 
as it often can take years from ordering an aircraft to introducing it into operations. Therefore, 
from the author’s point of view larger structural changes require a certain amount of time.  
 
5.2 Marketing & Pricing 
 
 
Figure 6 Flow chart: Marketing & Pricing 
 
A department that would immediately feel a tax on empty seats is marketing and pricing. One 
area that airlines would be able to make immediate changes to is marketing. In the short run, 
airlines could increase their marketing efforts in order to fill up their planes, thereby bypassing 
some/all of the new empty seat tax. Airlines could also possibly adopt new and more aggressive 
pricing strategies to compensate for the new tax. One of these potential emerging strategies 
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would be dumping prices on leftover seats at the gate before departure, trying to collect some 
revenue instead of paying a tax on a seat with no revenue.   
 
In the long run, airlines would have more options to deal with such a tax as shown by Figure 6. 
Within the company, cost reductions to ease the tax burden could be implemented. How to deal 
with customers would also be an issue to consider. Airlines would have to carefully consider 
price elasticities of demand to determine whether the empty seat tax could be compensated for 
by increased ticket prices. As mentioned in the short run effects of Figure 6, another scenario 
would be a lower average ticket price in order to fill the planes. Low cost carriers are already 
good at doing this today, and generally have higher load factors than network airlines. An airline 
would also have to consider its competitors’ actions. Heavy competition is one of the reasons 
that airlines operating in Norway today are not able to fully pass the air passenger tax on to the 
consumers. If the general trend were lower ticket prices, a competitive airline would have to 
respond to this by lowering its own prices in order to remain an attractive choice. Airlines could 
also check into the possibilities of increased efficiency gains by working closer with 
collaborators.  
 
5.3 Route Configuration 
 
As Figure 7 expands upon, existing route configurations would also be reviewed by the airlines. 
Possible consequences in the short run would most likely not be too large, as tickets booked in 
advance for predetermined routes must be honored. The route structure of an airline is generally 
split into two main schedules, the winter schedule from the end of October until the end of 
March, and the summer schedule from the end of March until the end of October. These 
schedules are usually released to the public well in advance. This will most likely limit the 
amount of major available options for the airlines in the short run. Minor adjustments like 
frequency changes on trunk routes with many daily departures could potentially be viable. 
Depending on the current flexibility in the airline’s fleet, substituting aircraft types according 




Figure 7 Flow chart: Route Configuration 
 
 
In the long run, airlines have a wider range of options, as shown in Figure 7. Frequencies could 
be adjusted with regards to both demand and aircraft size. New and existing routes would have 
to be thoroughly evaluated. Depending on the size of the empty seat tax, there is a potential for 
many routes to be shut down as a result of no longer being profitable, especially on more 
regional routes with more variation in passenger loads and an uneven directional load. This 
could also have different effects depending upon if airlines operate a hub and spoke system or 
a point-to-point structure. The hub and spoke system involves channeling the traffic through 
hubs with stops instead of flying directly between the desired city pairs (Brueckner, 2004). An 
example would be flying SAS from Stavanger to Trondheim via the hub in Oslo instead of 
flying point-to-point, Stavanger to Trondheim directly. Another option for the airlines could 
also potentially be to open new routes and test new markets if existing routes are not able to 







5.4 Fleet Planning 
 
 
Figure 8 Flow chart: Fleet Planning 
 
Figure 8 expands upon the aspect of fleet planning. Aircraft are expensive machines that, if 
maintained in a proper condition, have a long service life. After agreeing to purchase an 
aircraft, an airline would potentially have to wait several years to get the aircraft delivered, 
depending on the model and producer (Deloitte, 2016). Some type of leasing contracts also 
usually last for several years or more. As depicted in Figure 8, in the short run, airlines would 
have limited options. The airlines could consider retiring, storing or keeping existing aircraft. 
Dry leasing, where airlines only lease the aircraft itself, or wet lease, where airlines lease 
aircraft together with cockpit, cabin and maintenance crew, could be viable options. Used 
aircraft are also cheaper and can often be delivered quickly. As shown in Figure 8, in the long 
run, airlines would have a wider variety of options to optimize their fleets.  
 
Leasing could also be a long term option both with regards to new and older aircraft, as well 
as purchasing new aircraft directly from the producers. Note that aircraft are legally required 
to go through rigorous and expensive service intervals. These type of checks often mean the 
end of an aircraft’s service life if market conditions are slow and the costs of the check exceed 
the benefits of keeping the aircraft operational. In the long term, there is reason to believe that 
future investments also could be affected. As airlines will effectively be punished for flying 
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around with empty seats, airlines might be tempted to invest in smaller aircraft that would be 
easier to fill up. Instead of investing in smaller aircraft, another option could be to reconfigure 
the existing aircraft with a smaller amount of seats than before in order to keep the load 




Chapter 6: Methodology 
 
 
This chapter will provide the methodological details of the processes used in this thesis, from 
the initial outlining phase to the final stages of data interpretation. The main sources of 
qualitative data used are the transcripts of in-depth semi-structured interviews carried out by 
the authors during the writing process.   
 
6.1 Research Process 
 
The entire thesis was inspired by Bjørn Kjos’ statement in favor of an empty seat tax. It soon 
became clear that this idea was largely unexplored in the transport economics literature. The 
authors hope that their investigation into the idea of taxing empty seats aboard commercial 
aircraft helps to fill this research gap. 
 
After reviewing many aviation- and environmental economics-related literature, eventually 
some key themes emerged as the most important to the scope of our research. Notes on articles 
and documents found during our research process were then categorized by these key themes, 
which were used to organize the body of literature reviewed. They were also used as a 
preliminary basis for coding the interview data, and the subcategories that eventually resulted 
from the analysis were based on these broader categories. The authors concluded that these 
themes were ultimately the factors are most important to our specific aviation economics 
research. In no particular order of relative importance: 
 
1. Green innovation, including new technology for aircraft design, fuel efficiency, biofuel 
development, R&D for electric-powered infrastructure, and so on. The authors wanted 
to explore whether different taxation regimes would incentivize airlines and other 
stakeholders to modernize into less carbon intensive capital. In order to avoid over-
specification in our non-technical thesis, everything in this category was grouped into 
one of two subcategories for green innovation: “present/short-term” and “future/long-
term” efforts towards environmentally friendly innovation. The distinction was based 
on the classical economic definition of time horizons – “short term” indicates the time 
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period where capital, namely an airline’s available fleet, is fixed, and “long term” 
indicates the time period in which all inputs are variable. This category includes both 
endogenous R&D efforts spearheaded within companies and exogenous, market-based 
developments in which pose a disruptive threat to airline business models. 
 
2. Environmental taxation was a particularly broad category that yielded various 
subcategories, including the EU’s quota system, the environmental rationale for taxing 
aviation, the taxation exemption on international flights, the actual environmental 
effects realized by taxation, and so on.  
 
3. The implications of aviation taxes were split into two broad subcategories, financial and 
economic implications. Financial implications included financial impacts on individual 
firms, such as the level of pass-through. Economic implications contained impacts to 
the wider economy, for instance changes in welfare, such as impacts on consumer 
freedom and consumer choice, and the exogenous market environment.  
 
4. Elasticities, including actual/projected changes in consumer demand for air travel and 
actual/projected changes in number of seats supplied on various routes by airlines. 
Elasticities of both supply and demand are important because they show the actual, 
measurable responses to the imposition of (environmental) taxes. This category was 
further broken down to include responses touching on the degree of substitutability 
between air travel and other modes of transportation. 
 
5. Miscellaneous, a category which of course includes phrases and words unique to 
individual interviewees. The miscellaneous category became more condensed upon 
further analysis. For example, multiple respondents touched upon the idea of the 
“fairness” of different taxes vis-à-vis different stakeholders. Therefore, fairness was a 







6.2 Research Design 
 
The choice of using interviews as a method was natural for the authors’ research goals, given 
that the authors intended to collect perspectives on empty seats, an area where there was not 
much in the literature. Individual, in-depth interviews with figures connected to the Norwegian 
aviation industry in various ways were the primary qualitative research method used in this 
thesis. The authors served as the interviewers, and followed a semi-structured interview format. 
As implied by the name, semi-structured interviews are a midway point between unstructured, 
conversational interviews and structured, quantitatively-oriented interviews. Semi-structured 
interviews roughly follow a predetermined script of open-ended questions, but allow 
researchers the flexibility to take conversational detours (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). 
The more relaxed nature of this interviewing method led the authors to gain new insights into 
their research questions from a variety of perspectives. 
 
In an effort to create continuity among the interviews, the authors emphasized asking as many 
of the same questions as possible to each interviewee to facilitate later comparison. However, 
the informants often touched upon multiple subjects in their responses. The coding method used 
while later analyzing the interview transcripts helped to capture these interconnections.  
 
6.3 Methodological Process 
 
The authors’ methodological process is summarized by Figure 9, and detailed further in the 
proceeding subchapters: 
 











6.3.1 Question Design 
 
Qualitative research interviews are structured conversations that serve as a primary data source 
for exploring research questions in depth. The design of the list of questions to be asked is an 
important step in the research process, because it is the basis for the qualitative data collection.  
 
The questionnaire developed by the authors as the basis for the interviews is attached in 
Appendix 1. Note that the interviews were semi-structured and the authors/interviewers 
therefore did not stick to the script precisely. The authors aimed for neutrality in phrasing and 
word choice. 
 
6.3.2 Data Collection 
 
The authors wanted to come into contact with leading figures in the Norwegian aviation 
industry in order to gain a variety of perspectives. Therefore, the study’s sampling strategy was 
to choose “key informants”. The choice of candidates in this type of qualitative research is 
critical to its overall success, because the key informants “not only provide insights into a matter 
but also can suggest sources of corroboratory or contrary evidence” (Yin, 1994, p.90). The 
interviewees in this thesis were key informants who provided the authors with a wealth of 
expertise on aviation-related issues. These candidates represent various stakeholder groups in 
both the public and private sectors. 
 
Potential interview candidates were selected based on their proximity to current affairs within 
the Norwegian aviation industry, and contacted via e-mail with interview requests. The primary 
objective of the research, exploring an empty seat tax, was withheld from these requests, which 
were intentionally vaguely written. Seven interviews were eventually conducted, with the 
authors of this thesis serving as interviewers and using the aforementioned questionnaire as the 
basis for the individual, in-depth interviews. The final field of interview candidates is listed in 
Table 4, in chronological order of interview date.  
 
These interviews were conducted via telephone and video conferencing technology over a one-
month span from March to April 2018, and lasted for 45 minutes on average. With each 
interviewee’s permission, these interviews were recorded and later transcribed for use in our 
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final document. The interviews were conducted in an informal style, and conversation often 
drifted from the pre-set questionnaire into new directions, an advantage of the semi-structured 
interview method. For example, the authors decided to more explicitly incorporate questions 
on distance-based taxation into the interview protocol after the subject was brought up during 
the first few interviews.  
 
Name Position 
Jon Inge Lian Senior Advisor for Strategy and 
Development, Avinor 
Jacob Pedersen Head of Equity Research, 
Sydbank 
Terje Skram Director of Strategy and 
Infrastructure, Widerøe 




Director General, NHO Luftfart 




Chief Research Economist, TØI 




Associate Professor of Strategy, 
BI (Norwegian Business 
School) 
Table 4 List of interview candidates 
 
6.3.3 Transcription  
 
In order to create the data set necessary for analysis, the seven interviews were recorded through 
a lengthy transcription process. The authors recorded the text of the interviews as precisely as 
possible by listening to the audio files of the interviews. The validity of each transcription was 
verified by re-listening to each interview while reading the transcript. 
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Note that only two of the interviews (with Espen Andersen and Jacob Pedersen) were originally 
conducted in English. The other five interviews were conducted in Norwegian, recorded in 
Norwegian, and afterwards translated into English for use in this research. All efforts were 
made to preserve the original meaning of the candidates’ words so that nothing was “lost in 
translation” despite the necessary liberties one must take in translating from one language to 
another. The seven English-language transcriptions can be found in Appendix 2. In this type of 
research, the content of the responses was the most important, as opposed to forms of qualitative 
research in which how something was said is pertinent to the outcome of the analysis. 
Therefore, the transcripts are “clean” versions, where language and grammar were cleaned up 
where necessary without affecting content.  
 
Translation of data from one language to another in a qualitative research project is common 
methodological challenge which could potentially result in some semantic losses (Temple and 
Young, 2004). There are several possible drawbacks of the amateur translation used in this 
thesis, which range in severity from slight word cloud distortions to a fundamental 
misunderstanding of interview data in the worst case. However, the data were reviewed enough 
times in both Norwegian and English by the authors, who are native speakers of each language 
in turn, that any potential semantic losses have been minimized.  
 
6.3.4 Reading  
 
After making the transcriptions, the authors began the process of reviewing them all as a 
collective database. In the reading and re-reading process, the same broad categories of 
recurring themes were kept in mind to provide continuity. The coding process detailed in 




The seven transcriptions were thousands of words in total. The overall goal of any analytical 
process is to break larger amounts of data down into more easily understandable chunks.  
 
Originally, the coding process consisted of a rudimentary color coding of the printed transcripts 
according to the aforementioned five categories: new technology, environmental taxation, 
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economic/financial implications, elasticities, and miscellaneous. The authors used Excel as a 
tool to organize this roughly coded information into a self-made database in order to facilitate 
comparisons. The five broad categories were divided into smaller subcategories which emerged 
as natural to the nature of the data. The coding process devised by the authors was organic and 
unrefined, but the conceptualization process of generating specialized categories helped the 
authors to organize the data and explain the wide range of effects of various taxation regimes. 
 
6.3.6 Analysis  
 
The qualitative data collected from analyzing the interview transcripts is presented in Chapter 
7: Analysis of Results. A drawback of using qualitative data in the form of transcripts as 
compared to “harder” quantitative data is that the presentation of the data is a more ambiguous 
process. Therefore, the goal of the analysis chapter was to highlight not only connections and 
interrelations between the individual responses to certain questions, but to capture unique points 
of view. 
 
Initial analysis began with comparing the interviewees’ reflections on the empty seat tax, as 
exploring its’ ramifications was the initial and primary research goal. However, the 
interviewees unanimously suggested alternatives that they felt were more appropriate than an 
empty seat tax. The analysis chapter therefore details our further study into distance-based 
taxation, a root tax on fuel, and the European Union’s quota system.  
 
The analysis of results was completed by splitting the interview data up into two broad 
categories – first, everything relating to the empty seat tax and second, everything else- and 
analyzing them separately. The interviewee’s statements were compared against each other to 
compile the bulk of the Analysis of Results chapter. In addition to the main analysis described 
above, the authors also decided to include word clouds as a tool in the analysis. The word clouds 
consist of responses with the authors’ questions filtered out. Word clouds allow a reader to 
easily see the most commonly reoccurring motifs in a text and were therefore included to 
provide a basic and initial analysis before moving on to the main analysis. The authors 
generated word clouds for various respondents, groups and by answer categories. The word 
clouds are presented in Chapter 7..  
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6.3.7 Interpretation  
 
Chapter 7 also gives the authors’ interpretations of the data presented in the chapter. The 
penultimate chapter aims to provide real-world meaning to the data, highlighting relevant 
explanatory factors, and link our findings both back to theory and with current events in the 
Norwegian aviation industry (will be done after May 15 budget comes out).  
 
As in the literature review, the presentation and discussion of results are structured by a 
categorical framework in order to easily explain our findings related to these various 
dimensions. 
 





Chapter 7: Analysis of Results 
 
This chapter begins with a general overview of the results using word clouds before going 
deeper into the wealth of data received from the seven interviews. The data was divided into 
two different categories for analysis. The first category of data collected is related to the initial 
research question and concerns only the potential effects of a theoretical empty seat tax. This 
data is presented in section 7.2. During the interviews, the authors also collected data on other 
forms of aviation taxation, which are analyzed in the second category and presented in section 
7.3. Due to the quantity of data collected, not everything is presented and discussed in this 
chapter. If the reader is interested in viewing all of the interview data, full interview transcripts 
are in Appendix 2.  
 
7.1 Overview of Results 
 
Word clouds were produced in order to visualize the data received from the interviewees and 
to provide a quick, but basic, initial analysis. The more commonly repeated the words, the larger 
they appear in a word cloud. This was done by taking the interview transcripts and removing 
the author’s own comments and questions. The remaining answers were fed into a word cloud 
program. The authors manually deleted common words they deemed not relevant to the word 
clouds.  
 
7.1.1 Word cloud on empty seats 
 
The word cloud below contains only the responses stemming from questions asked about the 
tax on empty seats. This word cloud contains these pooled answers from all of the interviewees.  
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Figure 10 Word cloud on empty seats 
 
In Figure 10, the dominant words include “seat”, “tax”, and “route”, which indicates that these 
are key concepts for the interviewees. An interesting word to notice is “think”. The authors 
chose to include this word as it may indicate that the interviewees simply are not sure when 
they answer. On the other hand, “I think” or “I feel,” et cetera, can also be simple figures of 
speech with no real meaning. Furthermore, they could have been affected by the authors’ own 
biases in translation from Norwegian to English. However, the authors chose to leave “think” 
in the word cloud because it reflects the inherent uncertainty of the consequences of introducing 
an empty seat tax. As Espen Andersen noted, “a tax like that sounds like an experiment, so I 
think people would sort of wait for a while to see what they do.” There is always a risk of 
unintended consequences when analyzing the effects a new form of taxation would have.  
 
In Figure 10, the words “airlines”, “passenger”, and “price” are frequent in the data. Airlines, 
passengers, and prices are very likely to be affected depending on how a tax on empty seats 
would be designed. Of the airlines mentioned, “SAS” is dominant. This might indicate that the 
airline SAS might be especially affected by such a tax compared to other airlines, namely 
Widerøe and Norwegian.  
 
7.1.2 Word cloud on other data 
 
The word cloud in Figure 11 contains the pooled responses from the rest of the collected data 
when omitting responses pertaining to the empty seat tax.  
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Figure 11 Word cloud on other data 
 
In Figure 11, the dominant word is, again, “tax,” which indicates that taxes are still the general 
topic. Interestingly, the word “think” has increased in size compared to its counterpart in Figure 
10. Again, this raises the question of whether the interviewees are uncertain of the effects under 
discussion or if the word is used as figure of speech. In Figure 11, words such as “Norway”, 
“emission” and “quota” are more frequently used when respondents are not discussing the 
empty seat tax. This indicates that Norway itself is significant in relation to aviation taxation. 
The increased use of the word “emission” could indicate that in general, aviation emissions play 
a vital role from the interviewees’ point of view. This could also apply to the word “quota”. 
The different results from Figures 10 and 11 do show that there are differences in what the 
interviewees consider important when asked about the empty seat tax and when they discuss 
other aspects of aviation taxation.  
 
7.1.3 Word clouds by respondent type  
 
In this subchapter, word clouds based on the grouping of interviewees into categories based on 
their professions are presented. This has been done to see if there are any differences in 
responses between these groups, which are analysts, airline industry representatives, 
government institutions, and researchers. For each group, the authors present a word cloud for 
answers regarding the empty seat tax and other data collected. There were several possible 




- Analysts: Jacob Pedersen and Hans Jørgen Elnæs 
- Airline industry representatives: Terje Skram and Torbjørn Lothe 
- Government Institutions: Jon Inge Lian and Harald Thune- Larsen 
- Researchers: Espen Andersen and Harald Thune-Larsen 
 
The authors felt that Harald Thune-Larsen could fit into two different groups. Since he works 
as a Chief Research Economist at the Norwegian Center for Transport Research (TOI), a public 
institution, the authors felt that he could be placed in the government group, but also into the 
researcher group, given his line of work. As there were an odd number of interviewees, this 
double placement evened out the categories such that each included two respondents. Note that 
this could affect the comparison between the different groups to a degree, as Thune-Larsen’s 
response is included in two clouds. 
 
Figure 12 Empty seat tax airline industry                                               Figure 13 Empty seat tax analysts 
 
Figure 14 Empty seat tax government institutions                                        Figure 15 Empty seat tax researcher 
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The word clouds in Figures 12, 13, 14, and 15 are made from data related to the empty seat tax. 
An interesting observation is that the word “think” is frequently mentioned in all word clouds 
except the word cloud in Figure 12, which is built upon statements made from airline industry 
representatives. This might indicate that airline industry representatives are more certain about 
their responses compared to the others. Another interesting observation is that the airline 
industry representatives mention “emissions” very frequently relative to the other groups. This 
might indicate that for the airline industry representatives, a tax on empty seat could be related 
to emissions in some way. As shown in Figure 14, representatives of government institutions 
do not mention the word “tax” to the same degree as the others. “Tax” is also mentioned more 
frequently by analysts and researchers compared to the airline industry representatives and 
airline industry representatives. It also appears that for the analysts, “price” is a relatively 




Figure 16 Other data airline industry                            Figure 17 Other data analysts 
 
The word clouds in Figures 16, 17, 18, and 19 are based on the other data collected during the 
interviews. “Tax” is frequently used in all of these word clouds. This could indicate that taxation 
of the Norwegian aviation industry is a subject that generally concerns all of these groups. 
Again, the word “think” is strongly represented in all of the word clouds except the word cloud 
based on the responses from the airline industry representatives. This group however, as seen 
in Figure 16, mentions the word “quota” frequently. This could highlight the importance the 
industry representatives’ place on Norway already being a part of the EU ETS scheme. The 
word “quota” is also mentioned frequently by the government institutions group but is absent 
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from the words most frequently said by analysts and researchers. All the groups except 
researchers also frequently mention the word “emissions”. Researchers, on the other hand, seem 
to focus more on the word “effect”, together with the government institutions.  
 
 
Figure 18 Other data government institutions                                    Figure 19 Other data researchers 
 
These comparisons give some quick surface-level comparisons on the interview data collected 
by the authors. In the following subchapters, we will take a deeper look.   
 
7.2 Empty Seat Tax Results 
 
In this subchapter, the authors will analyze the results from our data specifically related to our 
research question about a tax on empty seats. Five of the seven interviewees had heard of the 
idea of an empty seat tax prior to their interview. All of the interviewees expressed a degree of 
skepticism towards the idea.  
 
7.2.1 Varying effects on varying stakeholders  
 
The empty seat tax would have different effects both on different airlines and on consumers 
living in different parts of Norway. Recall that aviation is a non-substitutable means of travel 
for many consumers living outside of major cities.  
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All of the respondents agreed that the probable effects of this taxation regime would differ in 
terms of their consequences on low-cost carriers versus network carriers because of the absolute 
importance an empty seat tax would place on load factors. Their unanimous consensus was that 
an empty seat tax would favor low-cost carriers, which already have relatively high load factors, 
relative to network carriers, which generally have lower cabin factors.  
 
Elnæs, an analyst from WinAir, calls low-cost carriers such Norwegian Air Shuttle and Ryanair 
“yield passive, load factor active” airlines, and network carriers “yield active, load factor 
passive”, and argues that a tax on empty seats would especially hurt the latter category of 
airlines. A diminishing of the position of the network carriers, namely SAS, could especially 
harm Norway’s air connectivity both domestically and internationally by forcing cuts in the 
number of routes flown. In the face of financial penalties from flying with empty seats, airlines 
would reduce route frequencies, leading to weakened air connectivity on a national scale and 
less freedom of choice for consumers of air travel overall. Jacob Pedersen, Head of Equity 
Research at Sydbank, noted that the empty seat tax would push SAS to prioritize higher cabin 
factors over a better route offer – “if they fly on the same destinations, 7 or 8 times a day then 
they’ll probably just fly 5 or 6 times a day” in the case of the more popular routes. This is not 
particularly dangerous in and of itself, but the future supply of seats on thinner and less popular 
routes could be jeopardized by an empty seat tax. Elnæs also points towards a potential situation 
of worse supply on these secondary routes to and from smaller cities in Norway. 
 
Skram, Director of Strategy & Infrastructure at Widerøe and Lian, Senior Advisor for Strategy 
and Development at Avinor, both mentioned the uneven directional balance that many regional 
flights have, meaning that morning flights heading out to the districts to pick up passengers 
have lower load factors. Examples of these are FOT routes and similar commercial routes, 
which would be hit extra hard by an empty seat tax. Lian also says it would be hard to increase 
load factors on these routes through triggering more traffic by discounting tickets due to the 
way the market on these routes work. He thinks these routes will be cut as a result.  Skram also 
mentions that this tax would not combat the main problem, which is the explosive growth on 
international flights. International flights have relatively more favorable framework conditions 
than domestic flights since they are only subject to Norwegian taxation one way, upon 
departure, compared to domestic flights which are subject both ways of a round trip.  
 
Lothe, the CEO of the Federation of Norwegian Aviation Industries (NHO Luftfart), said that: 
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The disadvantage of taxing empty seats is that the marginal flight routes will be taxed the 
hardest. On smaller flights and on flights with multiple connections it is harder to achieve 
higher capacity usage. 
(Lothe, CEO of NHO Luftfart) 
 
Lothe also argues that in the end, how the tax ends up being designed does not matter too much 
anyways, because the government will want to maintain its level of revenues. According to 
Lothe, it is difficult for operators, especially Widerøe, to make a system that will increase their 
capacity usage significantly compared to today. Furthermore, both Skram and Lian mention 
that a tax on empty seats is redundant since airlines will always have a preexisting incentive to 
try to fill the seats. Lian illustrates this with the following statement: 
 
So (airlines) have such strong incentives basically to fill the seats that a small fee on empty 
seats will not contribute to anything. Simply a bad idea.... 
(Lian, Senior Advisor for Strategy and Development at Avinor) 
 
7.2.2 Financial effects and competition between airlines 
 
It is obvious that a tax on empty seats would hurt the profitability of routes with low load factors. 
This subchapter contains the interviewees’ further thoughts on how an empty seat tax would 
affect airline finances and the competition between the airlines.  
 
The intensely competitive environment in the Norwegian aviation industry means that aviation 
taxes are usually not passed on to final consumers (passengers), leading to the unintended 
consequence of taxes being absorbed almost fully by airlines instead of by consumers. 
Therefore, airfare prices have not risen proportionately to the amount of the air passenger tax, 
which has had obviously negative financial effects for various airlines. The level of pass-
through of taxes from airlines onto consumers is a decisive factor in how much airlines are 
financially affected by any taxation-related changes. Since the introduction of the air passenger 
tax, airlines in Norway have had a hard time passing it on to passengers. For example, Lian 
states that airlines have so far only managed to recoup 0 to 50 percent of the current air 
passenger tax through higher prices. However, much hinges on the level of competition. 
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Pedersen believes that if there is a steep competitive environment with a drag on demand and a 
lot of capacity coming into the market, then aviation taxes will be almost 100 percent paid by 
the airlines as they strive to lure customers with attractive ticket prices. Given the fierce 
competition present in the Scandinavian aviation market today, the airlines are not able to pass 
the majority of aviation taxes to the passengers. Pedersen notes that: 
 
 …in normal circumstances, probably around a third of taxes they’ll be able to pass on to 
customers, and in a more benign environments, competitive-wise, it’ll probably be around 
half. 
(Pedersen, Head of Equity Research Sydbank) 
 
An empty seat tax would most likely parallel the low pass-through rates of the current air 
passenger tax, or even make them lower. Thune-Larsen, a Chief Research Economist at 
Transportøkonomisk Institutt, believes that an empty seat tax would hit the bottom line of the 
airlines even harder because it would be more difficult for airlines to do anything about the 
ticket price with such a tax. The tax would simply reduce profitability. He also says that a 
potential tax would need to be much higher than the current air passenger tax to compensate for 
revenue loss for the government and therefore it would be relatively catastrophic. It would need 
to be higher because despite varying load factors among airlines, there are more passengers 
than empty seats overall. 
 
Skram from Widerøe points out that as more routes become unprofitable and face being shut 
down, the government would need to buy more routes through the tender scheme in order to 
maintain connectivity to more scarcely populated regions. The higher government expenditure 
needed would somewhat defeat the purpose of aviation taxation. Today, the public service 
obligation network is exempt from this kind of additional taxation, but on the commercial 
routes, a tax would have an effect right on the bottom line as the tax today. The following quote 
by Skram describes the situation Widerøe faces under the air passenger tax: 
 
We tried to pass this on to customers so that already high prices became even higher and then 
we saw that there was a large drop and the cabin factor, that’s more empty seats … The 
market does simply not tolerate this. Then we chose to a larger degree to lower the ticket 
prices again, something that also affects the bottom line. 
(Skram, Director Strategy & Infrastructure at Widerøe) 
 66 
Skram’s fellow airline industry representative Lothe agrees that Widerøe is heavily taxed and 
that they have a relatively high tax burden because they fly short distances. An empty seat tax 
would exacerbate this difference between airlines following different business models.  
 
In contrast, Elnæs believes that airlines such as Norwegian and SAS will eventually be able to 
pass any tax adjustment on to consumers through the gradual and cautious adjustment of ticket 
prices. However, he believes that for low cost airlines, the story will play out differently, 
because the tax represents such a large part of the average ticket price for a short domestic flight 
versus, for example, an intercontinental one. Going back to the literature, Lu (2009) concluded 
that the percentage loss in demand for flights in response to environmental taxation on aviation 
would be greater for low-cost carriers, for both business and leisure travelers.  
 
In general, the interviewees agreed that network carriers, who have higher supply-side costs, 
would take a much larger hit as a result of a tax on empty seats compared to low-cost carriers. 
Pedersen said that due to differences in average load factors, a tax on empty seats would 
necessitate an increase in SAS’ ticket prices, so that SAS can continue to provide the product 
they offer today. Andersen, an Associate Professor at the Department of Strategy and 
Entrepreneurship at BI, agreed, saying: 
 
It will be a boon for people like Ryanair or Norwegian. Mostly Ryanair and Wizzair, I think, 
because they are good at having high load factors. It would be a problem for SAS, which is 
much more of a network airline. A network airline needs to maintain a certain capacity in 
their whole network, their whole infrastructure, in order to provide necessary flexibility. 
(Andersen, Associate Professor - Department of Strategy and Entrepreneurship –BI) 
 
The fact that an empty seat tax would hit SAS harder than Norwegian is a returning point in all 
of the interviews. The effects on Widerøe are more ambiguous, as much would depend on the 
change in percentage of PSO routes they fly. Andersen also stated that an unintended side effect 
of an empty seat tax could potentially be experimentation on the pricing side to try to fill up 
planes, since airlines have a very un-differentiable product and high fixed costs. 
 
Like I said, the competition is heartless. 
(Andersen, Associate Professor - Department of Strategy and Entrepreneurship –BI) 
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Overall, an empty seat tax would be better for carriers like Norwegian who have high load 
factors than for airlines like SAS and, possibly, Widerøe. 
 
7.2.3 Environmental effects 
 
To use a quote from Espen Andersen, “I’m not sure there is any sort of environmental taxation 
at all in the Norwegian airline industry,” a sentiment which was echoed by all but one of the 
interviewees. The consensus was that the 2016 imposition of the air passenger tax in Norway 
does not have any significant environmental effects. This is in part because the amount charged 
is too low to have any effect on demand were it to be reflected in ticket prices, and in part 
because the competitive environment makes the charge hard to pass on to consumers, so it is 
essentially hidden from them and absorbed by airlines. 
 
In contrast to the other six interviewees, Thune-Larsen said that today’s air passenger tax does 
have an environmental effect and in order for an empty seat tax to achieve the same emissions 
reductions, it would have to be double the amount to achieve the same overall effect. As a 
reminder, the current tax is 83 NOK per passenger. He also argues that a tax on empty seats 
would work much more efficiently than the current tax in terms of cutting out routes that are 
not profitable. Thus, an option would be to levy a similar amount as today on empty seats, even 
though the proceeds raised for the government would be lower. His research colleague 
Andersen also the idea of simply switching the current air passenger tax to apply to empty seats 
instead of passengers. 
 
In summary, some of the interviewees were clear in their opinion that current taxation schemes 
are excessive and that the need for tax on emissions itself are well handled by the EU ETS. A 
tax on empty seats would have little if any positive impact on the environment according to the 
interviewees. However, to go back to abatement theory, it does not seem that the emissions are 
at a socially optimal level, as those interviewees who discussed the quota system all agreed that 
the quotas are priced too low. This could however change over time as the number of allowable 
quotas decreases. The possibility of trading these quotas will help to encourage the optimal 
outcome of the socially optimal level of abatement. 
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No other respondent was willing to venture a guess on a specific, concrete numerical range for 
the empty seat tax which in itself reflects the idea that such a tax could be unsustainable for the 
industry to bear. Espen Andersen colorfully noted that “as long as Norwegians are so stinking 
rich as we are,” such a tax is highly unlikely to have an effect on demand. The general consensus 
was that Norwegians have too much disposable income and too high a desire to travel by air 
for any such tax to have a real environmental effect while still allowing for the aviation industry 
to prosper. 
 
All seven of the interviewees shared the opinion that an empty seat tax would have little, if any, 
positive impact on the environment through reduced emissions. Pedersen says that no matter 
how one “twists and turns it, there will be a small positive, but it’s only (an) incremental, on 
the margin positive effect”. Airlines would increase their efficiency in that less planes would 
be flying with more passengers, but more heavily loaded aircraft need to burn a more fuel due 
to added weight from passengers and their luggage. A tax on empty seats would force Widerøe 
among other airlines to consider cutting down on route frequency. This would have an 
environmental effect, but to the disadvantage of passengers reliant on regional routes. Pedersen 
would rather call an empty seat tax an efficiency tax than an environmental tax, since he really 
cannot see what such a tax would do for the environment.  The following quotation from Lian 
sums up all of the interviewees’ thoughts on this subject: 
 
No, it will maybe have a weak effect because I believe that I could happen that some 
frequencies are reduced. But this is totally dependent on what the companies do. 
(Lian, Senior Advisor for Strategy and Development at Avinor) 
 
Lothe argues that an empty seat tax would not have any effect whatsoever, because Norwegian 
aviation is already are a part of the EU quota system and that it would therefore not have any 
real meaning beyond symbolic value. Because the quota system is based on emissions trading, 
any reduction in emissions from the Norwegian aviation sector would be compensated for by 
more allowable emissions from some other European industry. However, some of the other 
respondents also felt that the EU quota price was too low, and served as more of symbolic 
politics than a well-functioning climate initiative. The only respondent who was fully in favor 
of abolishing national aviation taxes in favor of relying fully on the gradual emissions decreases 
implicit in the quota system was, unsurprisingly, an airline representative.  
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Additionally, Lothe holds that the empty seat tax would only contribute to the current explosive 
development on international flights, which of course have more emissions than shorter flights, 
which would have a relatively higher tax burden.  
 
Espen Andersen mentioned that an empty seat tax could be counterproductive in terms of 
emissions as it may “lead to more spurious travel” in the form of people driving to the airport 
and waiting around to see if any cheap seats were auctioned off at the last minute by airlines 
attempting to bypass paying a tax on empty seats. This ties back into the microeconomic model 
of the empty seat tax as presented in Section 4.1 – the empty seat tax essentially functions as a 
subsidy on filled seats.   
 
Elnæs argues that the first thing that would happen as a result of a tax on empty seats would be 
that routes on which medium sized aircraft are used, such as the Boeing 737 that SAS and 
Norwegian use domestically on routes with low load factors, would be switched out with 
smaller aircraft.  This would in turn affect route quality and routes would eventually be scaled 
down. This would cause a reduction in emissions.  
 
These flights will fly just as much, but in other places, with just the same emissions, the same 
air, just not in Norway. 
(Elnæs, owner and founder of WinAir) 
 
What Elnæs means with this statement is that an empty seat tax could cause airlines to flee 
Norway, as seen in Ryanair’s response to the introduction of the air passenger tax. This would 
cause less flights and emissions in Norway, but these flights and emissions will just be moved 
elsewhere and still contribute to overall global emissions.  
 
7.2.4 Effects on airlines in the short/long-run 
 
The interviewees’ predictions on short and long run effects regarding price strategy, route 
structures and fleet planning as a result of an empty seat tax varied more than their predictions 
on changes in emissions levels and financial impacts. Lothe said that this tax would not have a 
very big effect on airline operations. Andersen is also unsure of the effects, but indicates that it 
might have an effect in the long term. He said but that a tax on empty seats “sounds like an 
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experiment” and that airlines would therefore wait some time to see what happens with it before 
making major decisions. He does not think that this tax would have a direct effect on an airline’s 
fleet planning: 
 
You can’t order a 100 million dollar plane, on some sort of tax experiment. 
(Andersen, Associate Professor - Department of Strategy and Entrepreneurship –BI) 
 
In terms of fleet planning, an empty seat tax would theoretically incentivize airlines, mainly 
those with lower load factors, to shift to flying airplanes that have less seats. However, 
introducing new aircraft as a result of this tax would be difficult, as aircraft manufacturers 
would not line up to build new planes simply as the result of one country’s tax. There is 
relatively little that airlines can do in the short term to lower their emissions while maintaining 
current operations and upholding the same level of frequency on their routes, but in the long 
term when capital is variable, airlines can demand more and more fuel-efficient aircraft. 
However, this green trend is not influenced by taxation as much as it is by high jet fuel costs 
and an overall green shift in all sectors of the economy. Airlines want to minimize their 
operating costs to the greatest extent possible, but have no control over the oil price, which 
determines the price of jet fuel. Therefore, there is already a built-in financial incentive for 
airlines to invest in more modern, fuel-efficient aircraft, which would bring about lower 
operating costs in the long run. However, to use the classical economics definition, in the short 
term the level of capital is fixed. For our purposes, the short-term is taken to mean the time in 
which airlines must work with only the possibilities offered by their current fleet. Of course, 
leasing aircraft is an option in the short term, as are mergers and acquisitions.  Instead, airlines 
would be more focused on their strategy, especially pricing strategy in response to an empty 
seat tax.  
 
On the subject of pricing strategy, Pedersen questions if airlines would sell more tickets at a 
lower price to fill the last seats on the aircraft or if they actually would increase prices for some 
types of passengers in order for them to pay for the empty seats to have the flexibility they want. 
Lian stated that a potential long-term effect would be that airlines, to a greater extent than now, 
would have to discount some tickets in order to fill seats. The following quote illustrates his 
view on the long run price strategy: 
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There will always be an economic trade-off for companies to give away an additional 
discount compared to what it costs for the empty seat. 
(Lian, Senior Advisor for Strategy and Development at Avinor) 
 
In the long run, a tax on empty seats would maintain the pressure on airlines to offer ever-
cheaper airline tickets, the interviewees agree that it would not significantly affect fleet 
planning.  
 
7.2.5 Wider economic effects 
 
Aviation taxes in general have economic implications to the wider society, on a whole country 
or region. The latter has been discussed throughout this thesis in terms of regional connectivity. 
The aviation industry is crucial to the health of the national economy in various ways. Several 
interviewees pointed out that introducing special taxes on Norway’s aviation sector makes the 
country a less attractive place for foreign airlines to operate within. Additionally, aviation is of 
obvious importance to the tourism industry. Tourism is important to the Norwegian economy, 
supplying roughly 160,000 jobs and accounting for 4,2% of the country’s mainland GDP in 
2015 (Innovasjon Norge, 2016). 
 
Consumer choice, also referred to as consumer freedom, can be conceptualized as a public 
good. Multiple interviewees mentioned that when airlines restrict supply, this amounts to 
“withhold(ing) this type of freedom from consumers” (Jacob Pedersen) or “restrict(ing) 
people’s freedom to fly” (Han Jørgen Elnæs). This can be conceptualized as a shrinking of 
overall consumer and producer surplus. 
 
 
7.3 Other Data 
 
In following subchapter, the interview data collected that does not relate to the empty seat tax 
is presented and analyzed, including the interviewees’ views on aviation taxes in general, 
alternatives to the current tax such as emissions- and distance-based taxes, new technology, and 
how these affect the aviation industry overall. 
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7.3.1 Environmental effects of aviation taxation  
 
As a reminder, the current taxation scheme on aviation consists of the air passenger and CO2 
taxes, among others, which come on top of national obligations to the EU quota system. Five 
of the seven interviewees, excluding the two government representatives, were negative 
towards the current taxation regime in Norway. The main reason for this opposition boiled 
down to the interviewees’ perception of special aviation taxes constituting “triple taxation”, 
meaning the CO2 tax plus the air passenger tax plus obligations to the EU quota system. The 
interviewees were especially critical of the air passenger tax, using descriptions such as “not 
well thought out”, “a result of late night budget negotiations”, “a political compromise because 
(the government) needed to raise another billion,” and “symbolic politics,” in relation to the 
environmental motivation behind it.  
 
Lothe, the CEO of the Federation of Norwegian Aviation Industries, believes that the quota 
system, which will force a collective reduction in members’ emissions by 43 percent by 2030 
compared to 2005 levels, is the only way to achieve emissions reductions: 
 
So the short answer is that this kind of extra taxation on, national taxation in Norway … it 
has little to do with real environment meaning collectively in Europe. It has a bit of local 
importance in Norway, but has no meaning when viewed as a part of the quota system’s 
scope. 
(Lothe, CEO of NHO Luftfart) 
 
The two government representatives interviewed had slightly different points of view on the 
environmental effects of special taxation. Lian from Avinor recognized that there is “a 
balancing act” between emissions reductions goals and economic growth. He notes that there 
must be a political weighing of the consequences of aviation taxation, questioning how much 
one is willing “strike at their own country in the service of the environment,” as Norway is so 
dependent on air travel. Thune-Larsen, a research economist at Transportøkonomisk Institutt, 
said that compared to other forms of transportation, he is unsure if aviation is actually heavily 
taxed. He says that he believes that cars, for example, are taxed significantly higher relative to 
their external costs than aviation is.  
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Andersen, a researcher and professor at BI, clearly wants aviation to be subject to meaningful 
environmental taxation, in contrast to the analysts and airline industry representatives. 
Andersen says that the taxes on air travel in Norway should be increased in order to have a 
greater environmental effect. In his opinion, the best and most efficient way to achieve this is 
to introduce a simple tax on fuel burned during flight.  
 
7.3.2 Distance-based tax 
 
The idea of an air passenger tax being based on distance was a returning point of conversation 
during the interviews and the most discussed tax alternative besides an empty seat tax. For a 
long-haul flight, the final ticket price paid by a consumer is generally higher than for shorter 
flights. A distance-based tax on aviation would therefore be relatively less impactful on the 
total price for longer flights, which are already relatively expensive.  
 
In general, the interviewees supported distance-based taxation, sometimes referred to in our 
transcripts as “the Swedish model,” over the current system. All of the interviewees said that a 
tax based on distance would be an objectively more efficient alternative to the current air 
passenger tax, as seen from an environmental point of view. Lothe raised the question of 
fairness, stating that a tax based on distance would for example favor Widerøe, which mainly 
operates short regional routes, compared to Norwegian which focuses more on longer, often 
international, routes. Lothe also argued that a distance based tax would introduce an 
environmental effect on intercontinental flights, as all flights exiting the European area are 
currently exempt from the EU emissions quota scheme.  
 
Terje Skram, the director of Strategy & Infrastructure at Widerøe, presented to the authors’ two 
different alternatives on how Widerøe would want to change the current air passenger tax into 
a distance-based tax. This model could also be used for other airlines. The first alternative builds 
upon different distance categories ranging from short-haul local flights to long-haul 
intercontinental flights, similar to the taxes found in other countries today such as Sweden and 
Germany. The other alternative is a tax based on the amount of offered seat kilometers. An 
offered seat kilometer is one airline seat flown one kilometer. How much one seat kilometer 
would be taxed would then be calculated of the basis of total yearly seat kilometers offered in 
and from Norway and on the required amount of revenue the government would need. Such a 
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model could decrease an airline’s tax burden per passenger on a short flight, such as 
Hammerfest – Tromsø to 18 NOK instead of today’s 83 NOK. On a longer flight, for example 
Bergen to Las Palmas, an airlines’ tax burden per passenger would increase to 140 NOK. Skram 
also says that if a tax based on distance would be introduced tomorrow, Norwegian aviation, 
and especially Widerøe, would be better off than today, an argument supported by the other 
interviewees.  
 
Even though a distance-based tax seemed to be the most popular and objectively, one of the 
fairer options, of the different taxes presented to the interviewees, it has its own drawbacks. A 
potential problem bought forward by both Lian and Thune-Larsen is that the aviation industry 
would be somewhat dependent on international agreements to achieve this. If Norway was the 
only country to introduce distance-based taxation, passengers might be encouraged to travel 
first to a nearby country in order to depart on an intercontinental flight from another place 
instead of Norway, which would actually lead to more emissions than a direct flight from 
Norway would have produced. In addition, as a general rule of thumb, international routes are 
longer and have more emissions than domestic routes, but since Norway is such a long and 
spread-out country, many domestic routes actually burn more fuel than popular, shorter 
international routes such as Oslo – Copenhagen or Stavanger – Amsterdam. The most 
commonly suggested model for distance-based taxation is a tiered system based on kilometers 
flown, but this could potentially have a negative effect on regional connectivity with regards to 
flights between southern and northern Norway.  
 
Andersen argues that a distance-based tax is unnecessarily getting into very minute details. An 
aircraft consumes much more fuel during the climb phase than it does when cruising any 
distance, and fuel burn per kilometer is much lower on long-haul flights than on shorter flights. 
These are competing considerations that would have to be taken into mind in the design of a 
distance-based tax. Multiple interviewees felt that a distance-based tax alone would be 
inadequate in order to achieve lower emissions. Hans Jørgen Elnæs suggested a distance-based 
tax alongside some sort of bonus scheme, perhaps in the form of a tax rebate, to further 
incentivize airlines to fill up their planes, because “flights will fly anyways” and there are not 




7.3.3 Emissions-based tax 
 
The authors asked the interviewees for their views on differentiating a tax based on the actual 
greenhouse gas emissions produced by an aircraft in operation. The authors predicted that the 
main possible effects of such a tax could be airlines expediting their adoption of the newer and 
greener generation of aircraft hitting the market. 
 
These findings partially overlap with the results found on the empty seat tax. Four of the 
interviewees argue that an emissions based tax would not be a practical solution, because 
airlines already have strong incentives to renew their fleets when taking into consideration fuel 
consumption. Andersen mentions that incentive is further strengthened when taking lower 
maintenance costs of newer aircraft into the equation. 
 
Again, most of the interviewees also argue that when it comes to reducing overall emissions, 
airlines are already bound by the EU ETS, making a differentiated emission tax redundant - 
reduced emissions in Norway would mean that airlines in other parts of Europe can pollute 
more, because of the emissions trading mechanisms of the EU ETS. However, Lian agrees with 
the authors’ prediction that an emissions based tax could lead to a tendency for airlines to push 
forward changes in their fleets. Lothe and Lian state that the main limiting factor on pure 
emissions-based taxes on the fuel burned, especially on international flights, are long-standing 
international agreements, namely the Chicago Convention, which prevents taxes on fuel burned 
on international travel. From an environmental standpoint, Thune-Larsen argues that the current 
fee could be dropped since it is solved in other ways, but the problem is that is has a fiscal effect 
that would need to be compensated for. On the other side, both Pedersen and Elnæs reacted 
positively to this type of tax, illustrated by the following quote from Elnæs: 
 
I think this is a very reasonable idea, that those who have less emissions must come out of it 
better than those who have higher emissions 
(Elnæs, owner and founder of WinAir) 
 
Both Elnæs and Pedersen argue like the idea of a tax which differentiates based on emissions 
and states that it would be unfair that an airline operating a brand new aircraft would have to 
pay the same as an airline operating a 25-year-old aircraft which pollutes more. Aviation is a 
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capital-intensive industry and airplanes are long-term investments with long lifespans. 
Transitioning to a more environmentally friendly fleet is not an easy task for an airline due to 
the high capital costs involved with purchasing and maintaining newer aircraft, especially given 
that there is not a market for used airplanes that parallels the market for used cars, for example. 
Older airplanes are generally sold off for scrap parts instead of being refurbished and used for 
additional years, because newer airplanes are constantly becoming more and more fuel efficient. 
Therefore, even though Pedersen is positive to an emissions based tax, he also points out that 
encouraging airlines to change their fleets would be costly and time consuming.  
 
An emissions-based tax would also create definite “winners and losers,” meaning that airlines 
with different business models would be affected unevenly. Andersen shares this concern and 
notes that one of the main problems for legacy carriers in fleet renewal is a lack of financing 
for the newest and most fuel-efficient airplanes. Instead, Andersen favors simple taxation 
schemes like taxing fuel. He also points to the fact that CO2 and NOx emissions into the 
atmosphere are harder to measure than simple fuel burn. 
 
7.3.4 New technology 
 
Another recurring talking point was the interviewees’ view on the potential of technological 
advances in aviation, in terms of growth for the industry and emissions reductions. Two long-
term trends in green aviation discussed in multiple interviews were investing in biofuel as a 
larger part of the jet fuel mix and Norway’s commitment to electric commercial aviation. In the 
long term, Avinor is investing in both biofuel and electric planes, and intends for domestic 
Norwegian aviation to be fully electric by 2040.  
 
The authors explored the interviewees’ opinions on whether paying aviation taxes would be 
more tolerable for airlines if the funds went towards climate mitigation efforts, through a fund 
for technological advances in aviation for example, than into the general government fund, as 
they do today. Pedersen states that it would possibly makes taxes more digestible for the 
industry, but no matter how much you twist and turn it, aviation taxes still negatively affect 
airlines. Four of the interviewees were positive to such measures, citing that the aviation 
industry is already considering a proposal for the CO2 tax currently placed on emissions today 
to be used to subsidize biofuel production, given that a sustainable solution for producing these 
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biofuels can be found. There are also discussions about doing the same with the proceeds from 
the current air passenger tax. Lothe mentions that in addition to the production of biofuel, the 
funds should also be used to stimulate the use of new, greener technology in commercial 
aviation. At the same time, Lothe says that most of the development is dependent on 
international progress and how the global industry sees other actors responding to opportunities 
for greener modernization. 
 
Andersen holds a different view on earmarking proceeds from aviation taxes to fund biofuel. 
He argues that the current volume of biofuel in the jet fuel mix is almost negligible and that too 
much complexity is introduced by focusing on biofuel subsidization. Instead, Andersen argues 
for funds going directly into the government coffers. 
 
Some of the interviewees are also positive towards researching and introducing electric aircraft. 
Skram believes that for Widerøe, it will be possible to fly electrically over short distances based 
on the current technological developments currently in progress. On the other side of the scale, 
we find Elnæs and Andersen. As both Andersen and Elnæs noted, electric planes will not be 
commercially viable for another few decades at least. This is partially due to the technology 
and infrastructure not being adequately developed as of now and partially because of the long 
and drawn out process of certifying aircraft for commercial use in civil aviation. Electric planes 
cannot be compared to electric cars in this respect. Electric planes would necessitate wider 
reforms in terms of revamped infrastructure systems at airports. Fully electric domestic aviation 
would mean that all Norwegian airports would have the capacity to recharge aircraft before 
departures. Of course, if electric aircraft were used on international routes, various international 
standards on electrifying infrastructure would need to be agreed upon. Elnæs also cites 
Norway’s at times challenging operating conditions as a reason to why Norway might not be 
the best location regarding the introduction of such technology. Although positive towards the 
idea of electrical aircraft, Thune-Larsen finds it hard to believe that electrical aircraft will be 
profitable from an environmental perspective.  
 
7.4 Critical Evaluation of Methods 
 
Qualitative research in general has a potential for bias. Several possible drawbacks of our 
approach were considered by the authors during the research process. Firstly, the number of 
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respondents was small, although the authors could have potentially interviewed more 
candidates from a greater variety of organizations connected to the Norwegian aviation 
industry. The sample of interview candidates cannot be taken as representative of their 
respective groups, or even their respective organizations. The authors contacted a number of 
candidates who did not respond, or rejected, requests to be interviewed for this thesis. 
 
Norwegians are the most well-traveled nationality in Europe in terms of total air passenger 
numbers (excluding the island nations of Iceland and Malta). As a group, Norwegians are 
extremely wealthy relative to the rest of the world, and even relative to Western Europe. A 
possible caveat to our analysis is that Norwegian data can therefore be seen as a sort of outlier 
in terms of comparing aviation data from other European Economic Area countries, or 
developed countries more generally.  
 
Another drawback of our methodology is a reliance on first impressions to guide the process. 
Using pre-established categories of themes from the literature read as a basis for reading and 
analyzing the interview data risks a form of path dependency. However, breaking data down 
into more specific groups helped greatly in spotting patterns.  
 
One negative of open-ended interviewing in general versus more rigid data collection formats 
is the lack of standardization amongst the interviews, which makes comparison difficult. This 
is a reason why the authors emphasized asking as many of the same questions from the 
interview guide as possible to each of the interview candidates. 
 
The authors considered using qualitative research software in the analysis process, but reached 
organic conclusions without using it.  
 
 
7.5 Personal Reflections  
 
We will conclude the presentation and analysis of results chapter by offering our personal 
reflections on the implications of the results. 
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The authors are of the opinion that an aviation tax which is actually high enough to effectively 
discourage air travel would be detrimental to the aviation industry and Norwegian air 
connectivity. As Jacob Pedersen said, “I don’t think it will hurt aviation – I’m confident that it 
will hurt aviation.” Realistically, there will probably never be an aviation tax high enough to 
actually deter people who have the ability to pay higher ticket prices from flying. The authors 
are generally opposed to the current taxation system, which in our opinion hurts the Norwegian 
aviation industry and furthermore risks endangering the national economy in the long term. We 
hope that this research can potentially be useful to policymakers who have the opportunity to 
design a more ideal taxation regime.  
 
All of the respondents agreed that the current aviation taxation system in Norway has very little, 
if any, environmental effect because the dampening effect on consumer demand for flights 
resulting from the air passenger tax is incidental at best. This is a direct contradiction to the 
stated goals of the government. Hans Jørgen Elnæs mentioned that the Norwegian government 
wants to have the transport sector, including aviation, boat, and ground transport, to make up 
40% of a planned national reduction in overall annual emissions into the future. 
 
An important implication of this thesis’ research is that GHG emissions reduction policies 
should result in fuel cost increase in order to be most effective in terms of their stated 
environmental goals. Therefore, the authors are of the opinion that the simplest and most 
efficient aviation taxes that could be imposed are those which directly increase the effective jet 
fuel cost paid by airlines. To maintain profit margins in this case, airlines must increase their 
ticket prices, at least partially passing on the tax to consumers instead of absorbing it. All else 
equal, a higher price will dampen consumer demand and possibly lead to less flights flown. 
This is one way in which governments can partially internalize the externalities of the aviation 
industry. Of course, policymakers should consider the wider implications of air connectivity 
for the entire economy, and not just emissions reductions, when designing aviation taxes.  
A final consideration is the more philosophical question of the fairness of special taxes on 
aviation. All of the interviewees referred to the concept of fairness, if not by name (using the 
words “fair” or “just”), then indirectly. The empty seat tax is considered to be unfair in that it 
would have different effects on different airlines, creating definite “winners” and “losers” based 
on different business models, versus the more even disruption caused by the current passenger 
tax. Of course, we have already discussed in depth how the current tax also has uneven 
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consequences. A distance-based tax was considered by the interviewees to be more fair than 
these, but the authors’ share Espen Andersen’s conviction that the most fair tax would be a 
simple tax on fuel burned while an airplane is flying. 
 
Of all the taxation methods discussed both before and after conducting our interviews, in the 
absence of international restrictions such as the Chicago convention, the authors hold that taxing 
fuel burned is the most rational solution in order to achieve emissions reductions. Taxing fuel 
is the simplest solution, and has the potential to be the most widely applicable. A root tax on 
fuel burned in commercial aviation instead of a more complicated taxation system would be a 
direct application of the polluter pays principle. Having a single price per common unit of fuel, 
and charging each airline that same unit price for each unit of fuel burned, is undeniably the 
simplest solution discussed in this thesis. It would also be fair in that it would not have uneven 
effects across different types of companies. It is also a more direct form of taxing than the 
current carbon tax, which involves a (relatively) more complicated calculation.  
 
The authors would recommend for the revenues from this, or any other purportedly 
environmental tax, to go into a specialized climate fund instead of into the general budget, 
where it will not have as large or targeted an effect in abatement efforts. The revenues raised 
through environmental taxation of aviation can be used specifically for the good of the 
environment, for example through earmarking revenues for specific purposes, such the 
financing of research and development of biofuels. The revenues could be collected into a fund, 
for example a CO2 fund for the private sector of the type advocated for by the Norwegian 
Center for Transport Research (Hovi and Pinchasik, 2016). Revenues could be used to finance 
tax subsidies for energy efficiency improvements, or in a variety of other ways, as an alternative 
to the indiscriminate placement into a government’s general fund, as is currently the case in 
Norway. 
 
The authors began this research process with an interest in exploring the ramifications of a 
theoretical empty seat tax. We can sum up our findings by concluding that on balance, an empty 





7.6 Current Affairs 
 
This subchapter is a summary of recent news regarding the air passenger tax in Norway, as of 
June 2018. As stated in the introduction to this thesis, Parliament has been implored to study 
alternatives to the current air passenger tax. In the time leading up to the publication of the 
revised national budget on May 15, 2018, which would include news about whether or not the 
air passenger tax was to be changed, the debate regarding the current air passenger tax reared 
up again.  
 
In April, government researchers from Avinor together with the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications published a study on possible changes to the air passenger tax. Their resulting 
recommendations would mainly benefit Widerøe and transfer the majority of the burden of the 
air passenger tax onto SAS and Norwegian. The proposals were to either exempt all aircraft 
under 20 tons or to change the tax to apply only to international departures. Representatives 
from both Norwegian and SAS were strongly critical of these proposed changes (Gjerstad, 
Skard, & Trumpy, 2018). Publicly, there was speculation that the Ministry of Finance was 
leaning towards implementing a version of the “Swedish model”, meaning a distance-based 
aviation tax system, which caused great concerns from the CEO of the Oslo airport, Øyvind 
Hasaas. In a news article published on April 24, he made it clear that the airport would fight 
such a tax, mainly because the airport’s largest passenger growth is on intercontinental flights 
(Trumpy, 2018). A large increase in taxes on intercontinental flights would potentially have 
significant effects on the development of these profitable routes.  
 
Some of the interviewees predicted that changes to the current air passenger tax would be 
presented in the revised national budget, viewing a distance-based solution as the most likely 
outcome. However, on May 15, 2018 it became clear that no changes would be made to the 
current air passenger tax in the revised national budget. In light of the news, Ryanair has 
publicly reconfirmed its affirmation to not invest any more in Norway, where the airline still 
flies to despite the 2016 closure of its base at Rygge airport, or in Sweden, where the distance-
based tax was officially introduced in April 2018. Instead, the company will focus its 
Scandinavian investments into Denmark in the future, as the Danish government has promised 
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not to impose special taxes on aviation. CEO Michael O’Leary commented the development by 
saying, “If you tax aviation, you punish growth.” (Ripegutu, 2018). 
 




Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
The primary objective of this thesis was to investigate the potential consequences of introducing 
an empty seat tax on commercial aviation in Norway. Before collecting any original data, the 
authors focused their efforts on reviewing past literature on aviation and environmental 
economics in addition to becoming well acquainted with the structure of the Norwegian aviation 
industry and its major players. Data was collected by conducting in-depth semi-structured 
interviews of seven candidates who are linked to the Norwegian aviation industry in various 
ways. Their responses were analyzed so that the authors could develop a well-rounded 
understanding of the probable effects that the introduction of an empty seat tax might have not 
only on airlines operating in Norway, but on the wider web of stakeholders involved.  
 
During the course of the interviews, it became apparent that the empty seat tax idea was not just 
unpopular amongst the respondents, but overall as inefficient an option as the current flight 
passenger tax in that it would favor certain airlines above others and lack any discernible 
environmental effect. The authors came to the conclusion that other options would be more 
practical for the airlines and for the wider society. The secondary focal points in the interviews 
became discussion on a distance-based tax, possibly one that introduces zones based on 
kilometers flown, and on a root tax on fuel, which would be an environmentally effective and 
simple option. However, we must note once more that aviation taxes do not seem to have any 
discernible dampening effect on consumer demand for air travel on either domestic or 
international routes beginning in Norway, due to Norwegian consumers’ relatively high 
disposable incomes and demand for leisure travel. The authors caution that aviation taxes in 
Norway are essentially financial penalties on airlines in practice, because airlines in this 
competitive market environment have recently been shown to absorb the majority of cost 
increases from aviation taxes instead of passing them on to consumers via significantly higher 
ticket prices. Policymakers should carefully consider this result when designing future taxes on 
the aviation industry, which is critical for domestic and international connectivity and the health 
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Questions for Interview Guide 
 
Initial questions: 
• Background info on candidate: state official job title etc. 
• Thank you for taking the time to meet with us, brief intro on us. etc. 
• Is it okay to refer to you by name/position in our final document?  
• Aviation is taxed for environmental reasons. Given this information, what is your 
opinion on taxing aviation given air travel’s lesser degree of substitutability as a means 
of travel within Norway relative to, for example, mainland Europe?  
o (if they have a question, have a statement prepared on unique geography, non-
substitutability of air travel in Norway vs for example a really well-functioning 
train system in much of mainland Europe) 
 
Main Section: 
• What immediately comes to your mind when we say flypassasjeravgift? 
• How do you feel that the current tax is working (Optional depending on answer from 
previous question)? Good sides, bad sides 
• Have you noticed any consequences (positive or negative) of the current passenger tax 
since its implementation on the aviation industry in Norway? 
• Some people, including Norway’s finance minister, have said it is basically just a fiscal 
tax although it is being marketed as an environmental tax. What are your thoughts on 
this? 
• Have you heard about the idea of only taxing empty seats on aircraft? 
o Even if they have heard of it, read this short statement after initial reply:  
 
In the next part of the interview, we are going to focus more closely on our research are, which 
relates to different taxation schemes on Norwegian aviation. For example, we are exploring the 
effect of a theoretical flight seat tax placed on empty seats and how this will affect Norwegian 
aviation. We are basing this and our other research questions on statements from industry 
leaders and also on the ongoing debate in Parliament on how today’s flight passenger tax can 
be most effective 
 
Questions to gather in-depth data 
• What immediately comes to your mind after hearing this statement? 
• How would an empty seat tax generally affect the airlines? 
o Would this have different effects on different airlines? 
o What if FOT-routes were to be exempt? (state subsidized flight routes) 
• How would an empty seat tax generally affect other key stakeholders, for example 
airports and other businesses that rely on air travel? 
o Business travelers in general but also businesses linked to airlines’ operations 
ex. Catering, handling agents etc.  
o Ripple effects 
o Consumer choice overall reduction?  
• In your opinion, how would this impact climate efforts in Norway?  
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• What are your predictions for the short run effects? 
o Regarding Price Strategy 
o Regarding Fleet Planning 
o Regarding Route Structure 
o If not interviewing an industry professional, instead ask how they think the 
industry will respond in the short run. 
• What are your predictions for the long-term effects?  
o Regarding Price Strategy 
o Regarding Fleet Planning  
o Regarding Route Structures  
o If not interviewing an industry professional, instead ask how they think the 
industry will respond in the long run. 
• If interviewing some airline representative: How do changes in taxes affect your profit 
margins? 
o Ask more specific questions from here based on response ex. What portion of 
aviation taxes can be passed onto consumers? 
• If the empty seat tax were to be implemented tomorrow, would the aviation industry be 
better or worse off than it is today? 
• What would you say would be a sufficient/effective price per empty seat for such a tax 
in order for it to achieve its stated environmental purpose? (Ask for specific number or 
numerical range) 
o If airline representative: sufficient/effective price between different 
aircraft/different price for distance? 
• What would be the largest concerns regarding such a tax? 
 
In the nest part of the interview, we look closer at other taxation alternatives. 
 
• Is it better for an aviation tax on passengers/empty seats to be distance-based, as in other 
countries, or a flat fee, as it is now? 
o Give example of Stavanger -> Bergen as opposed to Stavanger -> Bødø having 
the same passenger fee although there are obviously more emissions from a 
longer flight 
• Given the development of increasingly more fuel- and emission-efficient airplanes, 
could the tax also be differentiated to “reward” airlines for flying more efficient aircraft? 
(gives companies an incentive to avoid excessive taxation by flying more fuel-efficient 
aircraft) 
• If a tax based on distance were to be introduced tomorrow, would Norwegian aviation 
be better or worse off than it is today? 
• Would airlines be more receptive towards an aviation tax in general if the revenues from 
it were to be earmarked for aviation related climate efforts instead of going into the 
general fund? 
  
Ending the session: 
• Given the need for a tax on aviation. How would you design an optimal aviation tax (ex. 
empty seats, one time fee for entire aircraft etc.)? 
• As long as there is going to be an environmental tax on airplane seats, would you prefer 
it to be on occupied or on unoccupied seats? 
• If we need more time filler: Do you think this will have an overall positive, negative, or 
neutral impact on: 
o The aviation industry 
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o Climate 
o Society in general  
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Jon Inge Lian 
 
Senior Advisor for Strategy and Development, Avinor 
 
Notes: 
• Interview conducted via Skype voice call on March 6, 2018. 
• Language of interview was Norwegian, originally transcribed directly in Norwegian 
by Rasmus, translated into English by Kayla afterwards. 




…Based on your experience, does Norwegian aviation contribute significantly to climate 
emissions in relation to the Norwegian transport sector more generally? 
 
That’s an empirical question which you can figure out for yourselves. But aviation’s climate 
emissions are five percent total of Norwegian emissions, of which 2.5% are international and 




If that’s a lot or not, that’s…yes. 
 
Aviation is taxed for environmental reasons, amongst others. In view of this 
information, what is your opinion about taxation of Norwegian aviation given fewer 
available substitutes for flights as modes of transportation in Norway versus mainland 
Europe? 
 
Here is a bit of a balancing act. Firstly, aviation is a part of the EU quota system, and it is true 
that the tax treatment is correctly handled there when the EU reduces quotas by two percent 
annually according to a plan. And now it has gone faster than two percent because it has gone 
badly for the industry and some of the industry has been phased out from Europe over to Asia 
for example. And so the quota prices are so very low, you can say, while the result is that the 
EU's CO2 emissions are reduced. So aviation is part of that system and so it would be 
unnecessary to make further national measures. That's one side. But at the same time, I 
understand the patience because the quota prices are ridiculously low. It's like talking about 
20 øre per liter of fuel or something, that's ridiculously little. At the same time, we are much 
more dependent on aviation than any other country, both domestically, but also because we 
are remote in Europe and a very open economy. So there must be a political weighing of how 




I think one should be careful, yes. 
 
Right. So in a way, it can be seen as unfair that we may have to… 
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Fairness is not a term I wish to use here. 
 
Or when thinking of domestic trips, for example, one thing is abroad, to other countries, 
but because aviation is part of our way of getting around the country relative to France, 
for example, when they much can take train much more easily, so maybe inland ... 
 
Yes, we are much more dependent on aviation, so therefore one has to think about it because 
it affects people and business. But I can understand, for example, the desire to have special 
taxes, for example, for a period until the quota price becomes high enough, because it will be 
high. As one only reduces allowances for emissions year by year, there will be a higher quota. 
And now the industry, it’s said they are good and power producers are also good, because it is 
becoming more and more non-fossil power that is produced in Europe and so emissions are 
sharply reduced. And hence the quota prices are low. 
 
What is the first thing you think when we say airline passenger fee? What words are 
there immediately coming to mind? 
 
Nothing special, to be honest.  
 
Some people would associate it with a punishment on traveling… 
 
No, I would not say that, we don’t use those sorts of terms as professionals. So it’s just what it 
is. Ok.  
 




Have you notived any consequences of the current tax? 
 
No. No, that’s, it’s the airlines that must pay this, and what I have heard and had contact with 
companies about is that they, to a certain extent, are able to push over some of the tax onto the 
passengers, but to a very small extent. So most of this tax actually becomes increased costs 
for airlines. I know that the Norwegian companies, SAS, Norwegian, and Widerøe, feel that 
they have a bit of a bigger burden than the foreign companies because they are also punished 
in their home market when they fly domestically. For outbound abroad flights, it’s only on the 
wat out and not coming in this tax applies to. 
 
Some people, including Norway's finance minister, have said that this was initially a 
fiscal tax even though it is marketed as an environmental tax. What are your thoughts 
about that? 
 
Yes, that’s probably correct, because it is a type of fee that comes up in the final budget 
debate in December just before the budget is in the box, but some will argue that it works for 
environmental reasons. So it's a bit of both, depending on which party you listen to. 
 
Have you and the rest of the team at Avinor seen that there have been positive 




There is very little effect to track so far really. Traffic continues to grow. 
 
So basically it was simply a way for the authorities to get more money in the first place. 
 
Yes, that how it works now as there are no traffic effects to talk about. 
 
Have you heard of the idea of taxing empty seats on board flights before?  
 
It’s been up in the debate, I think it’s a bad idea. 
 
Yes, because as you saw on the sheet we sent, this part of the interview will focus ... 
 
I see you have talked a lot about it. I think it's a bad idea because the companies will always 
try to fill the seats. An empty seat is no point for them, so they will try to fill the seats with 
discounts, and they do so very to a very large extent. But there are some markets where there 
is an uneven directional balance where it is difficult to fill, and there are typically thin markets 
in Norway. I'm referring to what are called FOT routes, what the Ministry of Transport put 
out. There, it is often that someone will fly Lofoten to Bodø in the morning and home in the 
evening. The aircraft are located in Bodø and must fly empty and retrieve. So in all the thin 
markets where there is an uneven directional balance around the clock it is impossible to get 
very high cabin factor and such routes will be hit extra hard. 
 
As stated, the purpose of this thesis is to see how an alternative flight seat fee on empty 
seats will affect the Norwegian aviation industry. We have seen a little beforehand that a 
number of business leaders and other stakeholders who have talked about this before. 
We were motivated by an ongoing debate in the parliament where they said they would 
like to investigate alternative ways one can redo it today. We were quite well aware of 
what thoughts you are having immediately after this. Registering bad idea. 
 
And what the companies will do then, at their stations, they will cut departures, cut 
frequencies where there is little coating, knowing there is little coating because they try to 
discount and they try to trigger more traffic at those times of poor coating. But, they do not 
manage anyway because the market is not there, and then they will cut those departures. So 
there will be fewer frequencies and it will hit primarily thin markets. And it will also hit the 
markets where the public purchases airline services, i.e. FOT off of Widerøe, because there 
are many routes that are not commercial but have been purchased on a bid from the Ministry 
of Transport. And then the price of the Ministry of Transport must pay then goes up right 
away because they have to pay attention because there will be an additional fee on just these 
routes. 
 
How will a tax on empty seats generally affect the airlines? Will it have different effects 
on different airlines, since Norwegian might have a higher cabin factor than SAS has? 
You mentioned Widerøe who runs regionally. 
 
 
Norwegian doesn’t have a higher cabin factor than SAS domestically, on comparable routes 
it’s reversed because SAS has a bit of a better grip on the market. But Norwegian has a much 
higher long haul cabin factor, aka long distance flights. There, cabin factor is always high, it 
lies over 90%. This applies to all companies which are involved in intercontinental flights. 
They always discount significantly to get the seats filled up, and they always do it. But on 
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short flights there is often a lower occupancy, where the proportion of business is larger and 
where it is difficult to fill up with leisure traffic. 
 
…And where there is a slight direction of balance. And then you will try to just customize 
that offer so that you serve the business traffic because it has a willingness to pay, or 
otherwise reduce frequency. On the routes we are talking about here, there are more short-
distance routes than long-distance routes. So it will hit Norwegian domestic much more than 
international traffic, and short Europe routes much more than intercontinental routes. 
 
Right. Were it possible for example to make exceptions. You talked a lot about it being a 




Especially FOT routes. Were it possible to make an exemption… 
 
Everything is politically possible, everything is politically possible. 
 
In order to, as there is an additional, as said, group of flights postponed, it is after all a 
service the state buys, so if an exception to this was made and looked at the more regular 
routes, those who were run purely commercially, would it be as catastrophic then? 
 
Yes, on the thinner routes, they could lose their profitability so that you have to reduce the 
frequency so much that it is not a good deal. And maybe even more routes must be bought 
publicly because the offer is politically not accepted, because it's too bad. This can help to 
increase the size of the public purchase. So  I think it's generally a bad solution and the 
airlines are struggling. It's something that they work the most with in their yield management 
operation, it's filling the seats. So they have such strong incentives basically to fill the seats 
that a small fee on empty seats will not contribute anything. Simply a bad idea and in 
addition, I think it's a point to invoice the passengers traveling. 
 
That it will be automatic …  
 
That you put it on the ticket and say that there is a passenger fee of 88 kroner. It has been put 
on by the authorities. Because it will be a thought for passengers that they see it being paid, 
but in empty seats there are no passengers who can be billed there, just to the company as 
such. 
 
How would this type of tax affect climate efforts in Norway? 
 
 
No, it will maybe have a weak effect because I believe that it could happen that some 




I don’t think this would be introduced because I believe there will be strong resistance from 
the whole industry.  
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The predictions regarding short-term effects for this branch about price strategies, 
route planning, and route structures… 
 




First they will cut, can come to cut frequency on short routes with a lot of work traffic and a 
bad directional balance on the thinnest routes. That is first and foremost. 
 
Regarding the long-term effect, how will it affect price, flight fleet planning, and route 
structure?  
 
No, nothing special at all. Only thing will be that they will, to a greater extent, even more 
likely have to discount such that it will be cheaper to fly. To make it so important to fill, it 
depends on how high the fee is in relation to the fare then. There will always be an economic 
trade-off for companies to give away an additional discount compared to what it costs for the 
empty seat. If the empty seat costs a hundred kroner, then it's nice to give off an extra 
discount of ninety kroner, then you still earn ten kroner more than just letting it get lost. So it 
will be a pressure to sell still cheaper airline tickets. This applies to the price strategy and 
when it comes to fleet planning, I do not think this will be so crucial. On route structure, I 
think that frequencies on thin routes may be exposed. Yes. 
 
For example, SAS has taken more use of these CRJ900 machines from Cityjet among 
other things, for example, to fly inland. They offer a little less capacity than the smallest 
737s. Do you think we could see more of this kind of activity at the expense of bigger 
aircraft or would it not have much of an effect?  
 
I do not know. It is always a disadvantage to have a large aircraft fleet with a lot of different 
models. It will not be Norwegian that runs efficiently. I do not think SAS will do that very 
much, but Widerøe has bought new machines now, Embraer, which has 114 seats of first 
version coming in. So it is possible that they will try to create a few more direct routes such as 
Bergen - Tromsø and Bergen - Bodø and, linked to weekend then, especially where there is a 
private market. At the same time they will have major problems getting a fill rate on such thin 
routes . So it's hard to say what the consequences will be. And if they are unable to fill then 
they have to pay a lot of fees. 
 




0 and 50 percent. So, even though if it is a fee intended to hit consumers, the competition 
is simply so great that ... 
 
There is hard competition between airlines so it's difficult to turn up prices. 
 
Yes, then we feel that question number 18 is quite obvious. It would become worse for 
Norwegian aviation if it had been introduced tomorrow. 
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Yes, I certainly think it would be worse for the supply, for the transportation offer in the 
regions in a way or where there are thin markets. 
 
What would you say is a sufficient, if this had been introduced for example, no way out, 
what would you say would be a sufficient / effective price per empty seat so that such a 
tax could achieve an environmental goal that ... 
 
It's hard to say anything concrete about. So I can not answer that. 
 
No. Question 20 can we jump over. Number 21. Would it be better if a flight tax on 
passengers or empty seats were based on distance traveled, as in other countries, or 
would it be best as it is today? 
 
No, it is clear that distance is more correct if one is to choose environmental reasons, so it is 
better, and that is the logic of the other countries in many places. If it's an environmental 
motivation, it's important. The problem here, and especially for long international travelers 
who contribute a lot to emissions here… The problem here is that you are somewhat 
dependent on the fact that there was some international agreement on this. Because if only 
Norway introduces such things, people traveling to Copenhagen will also take long-distance 
routes, or travel to Amsterdam and take long-distance routes from there. Because several of 
these countries rely on transfer traffic to develop their hubs and they can get a big route 
network that the whole country and business and the people can enjoy. They are very careful, 
have started, have had such fees but then they have reversed it out of competition 
considerations. So they are very careful to introduce fees that the others don’t introduce. So, a 
Danish airline strategy, we say should have competitive fees. So that means they will not do it 
as they reach the Swedes doing it more or less as everyone else does. 
 
I read articles where the Netherlands and Denmark simply removed them because they 
experienced escape to other countries ... 
 
 
It is also true that even though the idea of distance-based taxation itself is good, they become 
intercontinental routes. At least if you are going to the United States then the big circle goes… 
the shortest way it returns is across Norway, so if you fly from Copenhagen, you fly right 
back across Norway again and across Iceland and Greenland and back down to, wherever you 
go, Seattle, New York. Such a journey is associated with much higher CO2 emissions than a 
direct journey with Norwegian from Oslo to New York. If there is a consumer adaptation to 
an eventual a high distance fee in Norway, then it's a balancing one must make as a politician, 
both that it affects the Norwegian aviation industry especially where it is our home market but 
also that you get unintended effects that actually contribute to more emissions. 
 
So such a charge should be applicable for all or no one to give a ... 
 
Yes, in principle, maybe it should be, maybe the EU could. In such areas, international 
agreements and the EU as an overseas body are really very smart constructions. 
 
Certainly, given the evolution of ever more fuel and emissions-efficient aircraft. Can the 
current fee, or an eventual empty seat fee, be differentiated to reward companies that 
use more efficient and environmentally friendly aircraft? I  am thinking about Widerøe 
who gets these new E2, you have the A320 NEO, B737 MAX, all these and the 
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dreamliners versus the A340 machines that SAS uses. Do you think that could be 
something? 
 
Airlines will always have the incentive to spend as little fuel as possible because it's a very 
high proportion of their costs, especially on the intercontinental routes. The fuel share is about 
thirty to fifty percent of operating costs. So they have the incentive to use energy efficient 
aircraft already, so it has to be traded off against capital costs and possibly reduced 
maintenance costs for new aircraft. So it's a calculation they do, of course they have a market 
effect also of new aircraft. But, yes, it may perhaps increase the tendency to change to newer 
aircraft, but that's something they're already doing right. So, both SAS and Norwegian and 
they, yes, so that's part of the picture too. 
 
Yes, of course. 
 
So, of course, it's not negative, but how much extra power it would have and how it would be 
done practically, yes it would probably be possible. One of the problems is that we have a 
CO2 tax on domestic aviation fuel, yes it went up now in connection with a dispute, increased 
to 1.28, I think. 1.28 per liter, but it only applies domestically because you can not introduce it 
abroad, there are some rules that come with an ICAO and Warsaw commission or something 
like that, I'm not entirely sure. But there are at least international agreements that prevent fuel, 
national fuel tax on international departure. So, therefore, it is only domestic while a seat or 
passenger fee you can make apply both at home and abroad. It does not violate any 
international conventions. 
 
Right. Because you have a NOx fee on domestic flights. 
 
Yes, it is much smaller. 
  
Newer aircraft will emit both less CO2 and NOx so there is already an effect. However, 
you see that it could have, that is, an even greater the gap in what you have to pay 
depending on newer and older aircraft. Do you have any idea about how big it might 
have to be to give that little extra incentive? Obviously there are capital costs associated 
with it so it's not an easy decision, but how drastically... 
 
You have to consider if it's going to be, let's say that there will be one, you'll simply have a 
fee for consumption. That's because consumption is a problem, because it's the fuel that is 
burnt and released, so it's best to charge the tax directly on the source, really, the actual fuel 
consumption. When you can not do it internationally, there must be such a second best 
solution, which is to take the passenger fee and travel distance for example. However, this 
usually becomes a small amount in relation to the actual fuel cost. So it will not have such a 
big effect. 
 
So could an alternative be to dismiss an airline ticket fee and instead introduce much 
stiffer taxes on, for example, CO2 or NOx? 
  
Yes, but the problem is that you can not do it on foreign flights. So, therefore, you choose the 
solution of putting it on the passengers. 
 
There is quite a lot of resistance to charges in general. It is something we know from 
studying economics, but would the airlines be a little more receptive to this fee if the 
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revenues were earmarked for aviation-related climate measures in a way that the NOx 
fund for NHO operates today? 
 
Yes, and there is an initiative from the airlines if you go on the pages of NHO Luftfart, so 
you'll see what's their point of view. Because they want the money from this seat fee ,and 
possibly the CO2 tax, to enter a fund that will stimulate the production of biofuels. Norwegian 
biofuels, which can give industrial incentives, such that someone dares to invest in a 
production facility that can use residual waste from the forest, for example, not the log, but 
the remains, peaks and branches, and so on, to make biofuels. So, that's something we're 
positive about if the fee goes to it. Because instead of a requirement for a percentage of 
interference, there has now come sales orders that they think will apply from 01.01.2019, I 
think, which have been accepted, but the problems are access to approved biofuels. 
 
So then it is a little difficult order when it is not possible to obtain, so I understand these 
airlines, I think that incentives are better for getting Norwegian production. It is a better 
procedure. 
 
And then they are willing to take the fees. But exactly what is their precise position is 
mentioned on the pages of NHO aviation. 
 
We will look into it. Now we will move into the closing part of the interview. In order to 
be able to get some views and provide the basis for further research and so forth. Given 
the need for an aviation tax such as the airline fee, how would you have designed an 
optimal tax? What we are looking at is empty seats, you have the airline fee that goes on 
empty seats, so there are a number of ways you can do this. 
 
I looked at that question there, a one-time fee on the whole plane. You know, many of the 
planes are leased and you can rent them with crews. You can rent in many ways, so a one-
time fee would be a bit strange, because there will come Irish airplanes, registered in Ireland 
and used by the companies here. So a tax, a one-time fee, on the whole plane is not a good 
idea at all.  
 
In the case of empty and full seats, in principle, all such charges should follow the actual 
source of pollution, i.e. fuel consumption or fuel sales. It would be the best way, because it 
follows proportionally to the heating effect it has as fuel is burned. However, we do not do 
this on international flights and international flights should also be subjected to the same 
regime, not only domestic, one has to look for other solutions.  
 
And in the EU we have this quota system which is really a very good idea, because it's global 
emissions and it's not unique to aviation. One should simply reduce CO2 emissions globally 
and in Europe, right? And if the price of quotas gets high, you may get twisted between 
sectors. The really energy intensive industries or coal-fired power plants also have to pay 
relatively much. And if they do not have the ability to, then they will reduce their business 
and that's fine. While other sectors may not… the aviation that is so in demand will not 
decrease, but the total emissions will decrease as long as the number of allowable emission 
quotas is reduced steadily and year by year. And then the price will eventually reflect how 
expensive it is to emit something, because then you only have to pay more and more and more 
and more to get it the right to let go. The penalties are very high in the system there. If you 
release without paying then it's very high, it's a hundred euros per tonne of CO2 or something, 
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it's very high. So they have to buy quotas. It does not help to bypass it. And there a system for 
recording all sales and follow-up on European sectors, it's not possible to get around it.  
 
The problem is then flights from Europe to third countries, to the United States and China, 
and they would not accept the regime that Europe could try to introduce. So now it's an 
initiative under the auspices of ICAO to come to some market-based solution on how to get a 
tax on CO2 emissions. It will take a long time because it requires international unity as well, 
and certainly very small levels of taxation. But for a second best solution, I see a passenger 
fee differentiated by distance as not so bad.  
 
But one has to think about it and you have to see what the neighboring countries do so that 
you do not get adaptations that will actually lead to more CO2 emissions than if you have 
direct flights. Especially from Norway, because all the intercontinental routes cross north on 
the northern hemisphere over Norway so we travel first down to Europe so back across 
Norway again, right? And the same will happen with our fish exports as well. Then the 
salmon, if there are not so many intercontinental routes from Oslo, the salmon will be driven 
by car to Amsterdam or something like that, and then fly over Norway again. 
 
So you get some side effects that are not good if not everyone is in on it. But in principle, it's 
not that stupid of a solution to differentiate after distance. But then you have to look at the 
level and the adjustments that are taking place in the market. 
 
Yes. Do you have any thoughts about how you could differentiate? Could there be a 
separate rate inland, abroad, intercontinental etc.? Since Norway is an elongated 




Yes, if there was a clean climate fee, it would have to be distance based regardless of where it 
is. You could differ in zones, or you could set strategic distances so that most northern 
Norwegian flights are not affected particularly. All that is possible when designing such fees 
in detail. 
 
That one differentiates a little after distance, I think in principle is a good idea. 
 
…irrelevant section removed… 
 
Do you have any more questions for us? 
 
No, I was perhaps very critical of that idea with empty seats. 
 
I can see that many will think it may be a bit of a bad idea, but… 
 
But it will not hit intercontinental. Intercontinental is the biggest problem because they also 
release a lot of the emissions in the nighttime and it's worse than the daytime. In the day the 
visible sunlight is reflected partially in the contrails, especially in the night where you prevent 
heat emissions, radiation from the earth . So, night flights are worse than day flights and it's 
the contrails especially. So what you're looking for here as an additional effect from aviation, 
then in addition to the actual big emissions, and they are big, intercontinental flights are 
generally flown at night.  
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That was a fact that we did not realize. So, in view of that, you think, now, transatlantic 
flights from the US go to Europe at night, given the time of arrival and supply, and it is 
quite complex. It's not just just to do it for daytime flights, but ... 
 
No, no, the market is like that, and it's true to Africa that you're a ten-hour flight to 
Johannesburg, so you're happy to fly in the night. 
 
However, it could be a bit unfair that night flights could be taxed slightly higher than 
day flights. 
 
No, I'm just thinking, no, I'm only thinking in general that intercontinental is a very big 
problem here and the travels are getting longer and longer. So that's the challenge and that's 
where there are international challenges too. To be able to get international agreements, I 
think that's the most important, but also the hardest to get to. 
 
Of course it is true given regulatory requirements and policies and everything… I've 
read that Avinor has looked at the possibilities for this with electric aircraft. 
 
Yes, surprisingly enough, we are. I was a little skeptical when we started it, but the more you 
concretize it, the more it looks to be possible. And when the big aircraft manufacturers have 
so many engineers and battery manufacturers, so many engineers have been employed full 
time with such projects, so it must mean they see commercial opportunities. They do not 
waste money. They are indeed commercial actors. So both Boeing and Airbus are heavily 
involved in this. We have subsidiaries and collaborations with others too, so we believe this. 
We are going to have a conference for specially invited people now in March about this where 
there are people coming from airlines, I think too. There will certainly be a lot of press 
releases around it then and then there will also be a new Avinor main report about the market 
where we've seen a little more. Prerequisites for power, charging and infrastructure on the 
side there to get it and such concepts. What type of route, what kind of places could this work 
and what may be needed. All of this is dealt with in this report, which comes before Easter. 
 
I was very skeptical, I have to say that at first. The CEO was very excited about it there. But 
the more you start to count on it and think about it and battery capacity and so on. These 
planes have other operative features and, because they are blowing, many of them have some 
concepts, like propellers in front of the wings, and then you get at lower speeds before you 
blow the air over the wings and get the lifting effect. Yes, they can land on shorter runways. 
There are many things that are favorable to Norway if this is possible. 
 
Yes. Norway is quite big, per capita at least, for example on electric cars than Europe. 
Do you think that there will be a more special Norwegian phenomenon, or will it be 
more at a European level? 
 
In the long run, there may be bigger aircraft as well. It's one way they think it's going. It is 
dependent on battery technology, the amount of performance per kilo you can do. But I think 
that there will be a pressure to reduce emissions and will this come in. But it's always hard to 
get started and we are a major airport operator with many airports. Great turnover, many 
passengers even though we are a small country. So, we can help to get started in collaboration 
if they are going to develop and. So that's what we hope – if we can be a little catalyst, then 
that's what we hope for. Then we'll see how much they really dare to bet. But that it is 
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possible is no longer in doubt. In addition, we have biofuel we are investing in. We are trying 
to get more production on it and, yes, and have cooperative agreements with industrial players 
and work all the time with it as well. Such initiatives are important to be able to continue to 
exist with the other conditions one has. 
 
Just one very short concluding question. We had the flight passenger fee from 1978 to 
2002. Then it was abolished. Do you think what exists today will exist for long or is this 
something which is going to be removed in the future? 
 
No, I think it will exist for a while. When the Ministry of Finance has received some income, 
it is difficult to let it go again. 
 
 
End of interview. 
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K: Okay, so first of all, just for the record could you please just state your official job 
title for us? 
 
J: Head of Equity Research at Sydbank 
 
K: Ok, great. And is it ok for us to refer to you by your name and your position in our 
final document? 
 
J: Yeah, yeah it is.  
 
K: Ok, great. So we are looking in our thesis at different ways of how the current air 
passenger tax could be enforced and part of our analysis is related to the greenhouse gas 
emissions of airplanes. To the best of your knowledge, does aviation contribute 
significantly to climate emissions compared to the transportation sector overall? 
 
J: Yeah, it does, it does. It does massively if you look at the statistics on what it costs to 
transport a parcel for example by ship, by airplane, by land, airplanes are by far the worst in 
that regard when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
K: Aviation is taxed for environmental reasons. Give this, what is your opinion on taxing 
aviation given air travel’s lesser degree of substitutability as a means of travel within 
Norway relative to for example Denmark, where you have a very well-functioning train 
system? In Norway, we don’t really have the geography that allows for that. 
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J: You can say that it’s much more difficult in Norway to not be traveling by airplane. So I 
think it’s probably not as much an environmental tax in Norway because it’s much more 
difficult for a lot of people not to pay this tax, just because the number of substitutes for flying 
is very limited in some parts of the country.  
 
K: Right, ok. So now we’re going to come to our main section of questions, those (the 
previous questions) were just for some background. So what immediately comes to your 
mind when we say air passenger tax? 
 
J: Well, more cost and lower earnings among the airlines. Usually these taxes are not passed 
on to passengers because of the competitive environment. So instead of becoming a tax on the 
passengers it becomes a tax on the airline. 
 
K: Ok, thank you. And how do you feel about how the current tax is working? What 
have you noticed about the current air passenger tax? 
 
J: Yeah, it’s 83 kroner or something per passenger. I think first of all that it’s had almost the 
exact effect that I’ve just pointed to, that it has become more of a tax for the airlines than a tax 
on the passengers, because for competitive reasons. In a lot of destinations at least, this tax 
has not really increased prices that much. Of course, as I understand it, there are routes which 
are destinations which are exempt from the tax. I simply don’t have the local knowledge of 
the Norwegian market to really say if that has the right effect, if it’s been the right 
destinations that have been exempt from the tax. I haven’t got that local knowledge, but what 
we can see from earnings numbers, what we can hear from airlines, a lot of this airline tax has 
been absorbed by the airlines and has not really increased ticket prices 
___(incomprehensible).  
 
R: We can read that you previously had an equivalent air passenger tax in Denmark. 
How did that overall work since they ended up abolishing it? 
 
J: Laughter. I think that the Danish government found out that air traffic is actually quite 
important for Denmark, so it was not in the interest of the country to really tax airline 
passengers because it ended up being a tax on the airlines, and that will prohibit the airlines 
from really developing new routes and new destinations, and creating the network in and out 
of Denmark. So I think a the end of the day that that’s why they really abolished it, because if 
you want the passenger tax to really change people’s minds about traveling, and stop traveling 
by air, it’s way too low. And I think any way, no matter how you twist and turn it, it will 
almost end up being the airlines paying this tax because the competitive environment means 
they will have to absorb it and the passengers will not really feel it.  
 
K: Ok, so- 
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J: It’s difficult, but also from a competitive point of view, if we’re talking domestic Danish 
flights, you know we have the Danish rail being heavily subsidized by the government while 
on the other hand they’re extra-taxing the airlines or the airlines passengers. So I think it’s 
very difficult. At the end of the day I don’t think that you can really impact people’s wishes to 
travel by air by putting on a, now I say a minor tax of 100 kroner or so, I think it would be 
(need to be) a lot more to really impact people’s wish to go by airplane. 
 
R: Just looking into the future also, regarding when we’re talking about Scandinavian 
taxes, Sweden is considering implementing a tax, although this one will be a distance-
based one. Do you think that that will hurt Sweden’s aviation sector and push especially 
people from Göteborg and Malmö, for example, over  to Danish airports to travel, since 
it will become more expensive in Sweden? 
 
J: Well, I don’t think that it will hurt aviation. I’m confident that it will hurt aviation. 
Laughter. But it’ll probably hurt the low cost carriers the most because if we take Ryanair for 
example, a passenger tax is felt more on a ticket for 200, 300 kroner than on a ticket for 700, 
800, or maybe even 1000 kroner. So this would probably hurt the low-cost carriers the most 
when it comes to their expansion plans, but also we should remember that the likes of Ryanair 
and low cost carriers, well except Norwegian, have the earnings power to expand this. And 
some of the network carriers, they have a more difficult time doing that. So I think that was 
one part of the question, can you repeat the other part of the question?  
 
R: Since Sweden is so close to Denmark, or part of it is close to Denmark, do you think 
that it will push Swedes over to Danish airports to travel from there, given that ticket 
prices may rise in Sweden as a consequence? 
 
J: Yeah, it’s a multitude of things I think. I don’t think that Göteborg will really be impacted 
by this. I don’t think that anymore wants to go by boat to go to Aalborg or, I don’t know, it’s 
a three (hour)…, it’s quite a drive to get to Copenhagen. So I don’t think that will be an issue 
for Göteborg. But for Malmö, definitely. I think it’ll impact the airlines’ wishes to start up 
new routes. It’ll definitely do that. And also with a higher price, it’ll probably make some 
passengers take the trip to Copenhagen. But it’s difficult to say, you know, they have to pay to 
pass the Øresund Bridge, probably it’s not that huge of an issue because the cost of passing 
the Øresund Bridge from Malmö to Copenhagen is higher than the tax.  
 
K: Ok, so have you heard about the idea of only taxing empty seats on aircraft?  
 
J: Only taxing…? Sorry, I didn’t hear that. 
 
K: Only taxing the empty seats on aircraft.  
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J: No, no I haven’t really heard that. Laughter. It’s an efficiency tax, I don’t think we’ve seen 
that in many other industries. Not like that at least. That will be a tax that plays right into the 
hands of the low cost carriers, so I’m not sure if that will be such a great idea if what you 
really want is a good network in and out of the country and not just the ___  
(incomprehensible) flights that the network carriers are representing. But it’s a way of 
inducing the airlines to get their planes so ___ (incomprehensible) good. But you know on the 
other hand if SAS, if the tax was big enough, so SAS will need to get a better cabin factor on 
their flights, they’ll probably just, if they fly on the same destinations, 7 or 8 times a day then 
they’ll probably just fly 5 or 6 times a day. I know at least here in Denmark that will really be 
a good solution if you really want a good network in and out of the country. So I can see some 
kind of logic behind that but also quite a bit of paradoxes. 
 
K: Ok, so in the next part of the interview, we wanted to focus a bit closer on our 
research question, which is what is the effect of a theoretical empty seat tax on empty 
seats in the Norwegian airline industry? The purpose of our master thesis is to see how 
this alternative seat tax on empty seats will actually affect the industry. This is based on 
a lot of interest and an ongoing debate in Parliament today on how we can – 
 
R: They’re talking in Parliament on how we can change the tax as it is today. And also 
there has been some interest in, some people talking about, this specific idea. And also 
Bjørn Kjos actually had a quote one time: “put the tax on empty seats instead.” 
 
J: Laughter. Yeah, I imagine! He’s not a network carrier, is he? He likes to fly when he likes 
to fly. SAS has to fly when the passengers want to fly. Laughter. That’s very nice. 
 
R: So you touched onto this subject on our next question, which would be how would 
this generally affect the airlines? You were talking about that Norwegian would most 
likely have a larger gain from this than SAS, but – 
 
J: Yeah, the cabin factors in the companies, you know, low-cost airlines don’t have high 
frequencies on their destinations whereas the network carriers, they have built a network on a 
lot of frequency and they’re really fine masked (?) network, so network carriers generally 
have somewhat lower cabin factors than low-cost carriers. You know, if you choose to travel 
SAS, you do so because you want to be able to take the next flight home. In order to give this 
flexibility, especially to business passengers, you can’t have as high cabin factors as some of 
the low cost carriers, so I think this would be a kind of tax that plays right into the hands of 
the low cost carriers. They have some benefits but I think in order to maintain a good network 
in and out of a country, and domestically in a country, I’m not so sure that the low-cost 
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carriers will be able to provide that. I think also, you know, SAS still exists even if the 
company does not have a very big intercontinental network - that is what really shields it from 
the low-cost carriers and has done for a lot of time… For the likes of British Airways…But 
still SAS manages to stay alive. How can the company stay alive? Well you know, 
Scandinavian cost is not very efficient, if you look at the competitor’s costs, then all salaries 
are probably somewhat below SAS salaries for competitor’s pilots and cabin crew walking in 
and out of the same gate. So why does SAS manage to stay alive? Well it does because it has 
a unique product. There’s not a single low-cost airline that is able to provide that kind of 
network, that kind of frequency, that travel destination, around one-two-three hubs in the 
Nordic region. And I don’t think that the politicians appreciate this enough if they impose a 
___(audio breaks up here) seat tax.  
 
R: Just quickly also, how do you think that this will affect other key stakeholders, for 
example airports and the businesses that rely on air travel? And also companies they 
work with like catering, handling agents? If it were to be introduced. 
 
J: Well first of all if you look at travel agents, what will happen is that the tax itself will drive 
up costs among the airlines. So they would have to fill their planes even better, and that will 
probably drive down ticket prices a bit and it’ll hurt airlines’ income, I think, from what they 
think is the equilibrium of pricing today because prices will probably be lower to fill some of 
the blank seats. It’ll make it lot more difficult for business travelers. If SAS fills more of their 
seats, there will be less flexibility on the single ticket and that will probably end up with – if 
SAS were to keep its business model as it is today, I think ticket prices would increase for the 
passengers wanting the flexibility. It’s very difficult to say. I don’t know how big the impact 
would be for airports, positive of course because it would mean fewer empty seats, so that 
would of course be a positive for the airports. The aircraft are already there, so you just have 
to fill them up better. It’s not like I expect a lot of the aircraft to be grounded because of some 
empty seat tax.  
 
K: And in your opinion how would this empty seat tax impact climate protection efforts 
in general?  
 




J: Yeah, I think no matter how we twist or turn it, it will be a small positive, but it’s only a 
incremental, it’s on the margin, positive. If more passengers go on the airplanes it will be a bit 
more effective, but still you would get…I need to say this, if more passengers go on the 
airplane, they actually use a bit more jet fuel. It will only be incremental, but they will use a 
bit more. And it will get less tax for the government, so I would call it more of an efficiency 
tax because I don’t really see what it does for the environment. I must say, if the airlines fill 
up their planes better, then they weigh more because there are more passengers, and that will 
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use more jet fuel. Of course it would make the company a bit more efficient but it will also 
bring down the tax income for the government. So you will have a bit more fuel burn and you 
will have no money paid in taxes, a bit more effective airline and probably for a network 
carrier probably not as impactful as it would have been earlier because you’re playing into the 
hands of the low cost carriers. You will have diminished the position of the network carriers. 
So you’ll probably make the network in and out of your country worse, you’ll get more fuel 
burn, you’ll get less tax so if that’s a positive for the environment and the country then it’s a 
go.   
 
R: We touched on the pricing strategy earlier, you mentioned that some prices will go 
down to sort of try to fill up instead and some network carriers might actually increase 
prices to maintain flexibility. But what would you think the short and long term effects 
would be regarding route structure and fleet planning?  
 
J: I think it’s very difficult because Boeing and Airbus, they won’t just make a new plane 
because Norway is introducing an empty seat tax. So there will still be the same aircraft types 
to choose from, but of course the airlines will need to be even more focused on their strategy. 
Would they want to sell more tickets at a lower price to fill the last seats on the plane, or 
would they actually have to increase seat price for some types of passengers in order for them 
to pay for the empty seats to have the flexibility that they want?  
 
R: So you don’t think – 
 
J: I think long term if this tax is big enough, it’ll eventually drive the network carriers out of 
business and leave the market to the low-cost carriers, with the benefits and setbacks that it 
will create for the market. 
 
R: According to you, do you know approximately what percentage of the current taxes 
are passed on to the consumers? 
 
K: Just a rough estimate. 
 
J: Rough estimate, I would guess, and this is only a guess, between a third and half are 
probably passed on to consumers. I would guess that the rest is absorbed by the airlines. But 
you know, it’s very difficult, there’s not one rule of thumb, because it depends a lot on the 
competitive environment. If there’s a steep competitive environment with a drag on demand 
and a lot of capacity coming into the market, it’ll be almost 100% paid by the airlines. If we 
have an environment like the one we have today, with a lot of demand, good growth in the 
European region and the Scandinavian region, and we also have a situation where there is of 
course a lot of new airplanes coming into the fleet, but it’s not like totally massive on a 
European scale, then they will probably be able to pass some of the tax on to the customers. 
But I don’t think that it’ll be big (a big portion of the tax). So I would say in normal 
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circumstances, probably around a third of taxes they’ll be able to pass on to customers, and in 
a more benign environment, competitive-wise, it’ll probably be around half. 
 
R: But if an empty seat tax was to be introduced tomorrow, what would you say would 
be an efficient or effective price for such a tax to achieve an, for example, environmental 
purpose? 
 
J: So, what kind of tax in kroner should they set on an empty seat? 
 
K: In order for it to actually achieve its stated purpose of being an environmental tax. 
 
J: I don’t know. I won’t take a guess on that. It’s for the politicians to decide whether they 
want this to have an impact, or how they want this to have an impact. I don’t have the 
calculation methodologies to really say anything quantitative in that regard, I’m sorry. 
 
K: Do you think that it’s better for an aviation tax, on either passengers or empty seats, 
to be distance-based, as it is in a lot of other countries? Or should it be a flat fee like it is 
now in Norway? 
 
J: If you want to create a passenger tax, it makes sense to create this tax based on the distance. 
On the fuel burn. So it’s like if you fly a long way then you’ll have to pay more in tax but you 
should also remember that the fuel burn per kilometer is far less on the intercontinental flights 
than it is on the short-haul flights. Also I think that it’s kind of a (that there should be) 
regulation and taxation on the type of aircraft, how fuel-efficient it is, because you pay the 
same tax when you step into a 25 year old aircraft as when you step into a fuel efficient, sort 
of a new, aircraft. I think it would not be very fair either. So I would say some kind of 
difference dependent on aircraft, dependent on flight weight. But I think it’s difficult because 
you know, what’s been done so far, I don’t think that it’s really had any impact. Of course it’s 
had an impact on the government’s budget, because you get some taxes. But it hasn’t had the 
effect of really regulating passengers and making them fly less frequently.  
 
K: Do you think that, realistically, there will ever be a tax big enough to actually deter 
people from flying when they don’t have to? 
 
J: Nope. I don’t think so. It would be a surprise for me and of course it would be a huge 
setback for the industry, because it’s like asking if you think that they will make fuel so costly 
that we won’t drive our cars anymore. I think that it’s very difficult now because flying on an 
airplane and seeing the world has become so normal that it would be very difficult to withhold 
this type of freedom from consumers by heavily taxing the airlines or the passengers. 
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R: You actually touched upon the next question in the previous one. Given the 
development of increasingly more fuel- and emissions efficient aircraft such as SAS’ 
A340 contra Norwegian’s Dreamliners and Neo’s Airbus contra the older G20s other 
airlines are flying, could the tax be differentiated to reward airlines for flying more 
efficient aircraft? And would that have a positive effect? 
 
J: Yeah, I think that would definitely should be one item in this calculation. But it’s really 
difficult because when an airline buys an airplane, it will probably have an idea to have this 
airplane for 20 years or so. You know, a lot of aircraft are flying 25, 30 years and maybe even 
more. So it’s extremely costly to make big changes in your fleet and it’s also something that is 
only done over a long period of time. It’s taken SAS fifteen years and a bit more even to 
streamline its fleet of airplanes. So it’ll be a tax with some definite losers and some definite 
winners, and the losers will have a very difficult and time-consuming and very, very costly 
transition period in order for them to be on the winning team when it comes to taxation of the 
type of aircraft. 
 
K: So in your opinion, do you think that airlines would be more receptive towards this 
tax if the proceeds were earmarked specifically towards aviation-related climate 
mitigation efforts? 
 
J: I think that would definitely make it more digestible for the industry. But I think no matter 
how you twist and turn it, these types of taxes…I think the airlines feel that they are very 
specific on it only having a negative effect on them, and almost only on them. That is what 
we’ve seen historically. 
 
R: Do you think airlines would eventually find a way to put, as you mentioned earlier, 
one-third to one-half of such an empty seat tax onto the consumers? Or would this be a 
tax more carried by the airline itself? 
 
J: I think it’ll be very difficult. I don’t think there really is a way to pass on more, because the 
industry is just so competitive and you know when we search for an airline ticket, prices are 
almost all that we look at. So it is a really competitive industry with somewhat over capacity 
almost all of the time. It’d be extremely difficult to pass this on entirely to the consumers.  
 
R: So even though most of the airlines fly with cabin factors above 50%, this would still be 
more damaging than taxing the number of people on board a plane? 
 
J: Well, I don’t know if it will be more damaging, but it would definitely hit different 
companies in different ways. As I said, a passenger tax would not have the same…you know, 
if the effect of an empty seat tax is that Norwegian will lower their prices, and SAS in order to 
maintain their business model will increase their prices, then of course it’ll be more difficult 
for SAS to compete and for SAS to make money than it would for Norwegian. So I think that 
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we are creating some very different incentives for dealing with this tax that could lead to a lot 
of disruption of some of the carriers in the industry, whereas the passenger tax would create 
some disruption, even disruption, no matter what. No matter what type of carrier you are.  
 
R: We only have a couple of minutes left, so now you get to play the part of the Finance 
Minister, and just play around with some thoughts. Our closing question is: given the need for 
a tax on aviation, how would you design an optimal aviation tax which would be most 
effective, both from the government and also airlines’ point of view?  
 
J: Yeah, well, I think it’s difficult. I don’t have a very good answer for that but I think that the 
empty seat tax would create some very different scenarios for different business models. I’m 
not sure that’s what they really want. I think it’s so difficult, because if they really want 
people to fly less, then they should increase the tax massively. But that will of course hurt the 
industry profoundly. If you only want money in your government’s pocket, then it's a fine 
way they’ve done it so far. But they should’ve also borne in mind that the larger part of this 
burden is being carried by the airlines, and not by the passengers. I think it is extremely 
difficult to tax something that is so widespread and widely used as airplane traveling. I don’t 
really have the good answer. Of course I think if you want to tax something efficiently, you 
have to tax on the amount of jet fuel used, you have to tax on…that would be length, that 
would be the type of aircraft, but that would be extremely bureaucratic. And very difficult, I 
would think. That would also be a positive for the environment, probably, but not a positive 
for the industry. It would be very difficult to deal with. 
 
R: So the best thing that might be doable is that the government should just find a way to get 
the tax money from the consumer directly instead of having to go through an airline, which 
then makes airlines take a burden, in an ideal world?  
 
J: Yeah, I think so but that’s also difficult. Here in Denmark, when we talk about airline tax, 
it’s also like we’re taxing the rich now, we’re taxing the guys that are out on business flights 
ten, fifteen times a year. So just putting an environmental tax on all consumers, I don’t really 
think that is the way to go. Here in Denmark, we can’t build a bridge and not have a fee for 
passing on it because it has to be the users that are paying for this (laughter). Also I think that 
it would be very difficult politically, now we have an environmental tax to bring down, at 
least to pay for the airlines and their carbon emissions. But it’s not only the consumers flying 
on the airplanes that will pay it, it’s all consumers. I think that will be very difficult to sell, for 
the politicians. 
 
R: Well, that’s it for our questions. I think we’re also basically right on time. 
 
J: Yeah, it’s perfect. 
 
K: Thank you again for taking your time….. (irrelevant after this point) 
 115 
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R: We can start with a few very quick initial questions. The first question is whether you 
can state your official job title just for the part of the recording. 
 
T: Yes, I am the director in charge of strategy and infrastructure at Widerøe. 
 
R: We can quickly mention, make an introduction about us. My name is Rasmus and 
beside me, I have. 
 




R: She is American. So if she has any follow-up questions then they will be asked in 




R: Otherwise everything is in Norwegian. Is it okay that we refer to you with name and 
job title in the thesis? 
  




R: Basically it will be a publicly available thesis. That it is published and publicly 
available yes. 
 
T: Okay.  
 




T: Yes, something. So, I have a small presentation that deals with the air passenger tax. That 
is, I can show you ten pictures, maybe I should do it initially, and do the formal interview 
afterwards? 
 
R: That is fine. 
 
T: Very short, we have around 420 daily departures. That is how we are a relatively big player 
in Norway. We serve both tender routes, which are the green routes here, as well as serving 
commercial routes that are the red ones. When it comes to the tender routes, which are the 
green, the air passenger tax does not apply since it is compensated for through government 
grants but all the red routes are subject to the air passenger tax. Then we have a fleet of large, 
relatively small aircraft, where the largest is at 78 seats, in the domestic market, Widerøe has 
48 percent of the departures, so we are bigger than SAS, bigger than Norwegian and almost as 
big as those two together in terms of number of departures while compared to seat production 
we are around 22 percent and 15 percent of the passengers. What's a little interesting to see is 
that after the air passenger tax came in, think it was in June 2016, Widerøe has reduced the 
number of departures each year, but if we look at SAS and Norwegian, they have to a larger 
degree maintained production and that's also an expression for that the air passenger tax is 
hitting the commercial regional routes with small aircraft hard. Here we see our route results 
in 2015 before the air passenger tax came, here we see our route results after the air passenger 
tax came. So now, we are losing money on very many regional routes. 
 
It is also a true that our regional routes are so expensive to fly. Not necessarily because 
Widerøe is an operator or that, there is little competence but it is structural conditions. There 
are 73 percent higher fuel prices in the districts. On small planes, you allocate the costs to 
fewer seats so you get higher costs per seat. Each landing runs costs and we have a structure 
with many landings in the districts. We have to station airplanes and crew outside bases and it 
pushes costs instead of SAS and Norwegian having most employees based in Oslo, so they fly 
to and from Oslo right. Technological development is falling behind on small aircraft where 
no new aircraft are being produced for our type of operations, at least in the smallest airports 
with 800-meter runways, so we cannot produce new aircraft to operate such routes. 
Then we have thought that, purely politically, that the air passenger tax should compensate 
some of the structural challenges so that does not come on top, because it's out in the districts 
you really pay high prices, initially due to structural conditions. But on the contrary, so purely 
politically, they have made it harder to operate commercial routes in the districts through the 
air passenger tax but also because the other types of fees they have increased after. I will not 
show all of these but the example here is that our fees have increased by 71 percent compared 
to 2012, so the government has also changed some of the start fees and such things that make 
us pay Avinor higher fees than we did before. 
 
Then comes this with the passenger tax also we got this CO2 tax. Yes and then we have the 
history behind all these increases and now we pay 181 million in air passenger taxes. I 
mentioned earlier that on small planes we pay quite high charges overall then, at least to 
Avinor we pay 30 percent higher fees compared to a 737-800 per passenger. The effect of this 
is that there is an increase in international traffic, in domestic traffic there is almost no growth 
and that's because on international flights is almost subsidized, thus one avoids VAT, no CO2 
fee and this air passenger tax, it applies only one way , i.e. from Norway, not to Norway. For 
example, we pay 80 times as high air passenger tax on Bodø - Stokmarknes as Oslo - New 
York per kilometer. Here we have a little about the air passenger tax. There they take 83 
kroner Oslo - New York, the fee applies only from Norway. On these small short regional 
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routes we have, the total is 168 kroner round trip because you pay both ways and because you 
will have VAT as well. 
 
Other countries have seen that this is unreasonable. So for example in Sweden, it will be 60 
kroner on the short stretches, 400 kroner on the long ones. Similarly, there is also a high price 
in others, in several other countries, while Norway, they have added a fee that is equal 
regardless. So our suggestion it is that short stretches up to 320 km go down to 30 kroner, 
medium stretches to 65 kroner, 180 kroner and 240 kroner. Here the government would retain 
its fiscal fees or revenues of about 1.9 billion as they have today. This is how it would look in 
practice for short regional routes would then be better off but also national routes (riksruter) 
like Oslo – Kirkenes which is a fairly long stretch will also be a little better of, and it will be a 
bit more expensive for holiday destinations in Spain and Greece and a fairly more expensive 
if you are on long routes. 
 
So that is the way we think that the air passenger tax should be changed. Then you will have a 
stronger environmental profile. Unnecessary journeys on holiday and leisure where more and 
more will travel ever longer, it contributes to higher emissions while at the same time all 
foreign travel only pay one way. So you can actually divide these or you can multiply this 
price by two to get a comparison. That is how we look at the air passenger tax. So the way it 
works now, means continued downsizing of regional routes. We will consider further route 
cuts in the future. This is a little introduction about how we view this.  
 
R: Exciting. You are on to part of what we also thought about asking. We can do that as 
we get to the points. First and foremost, we just want to ask if it is okay that we record 
the interview to use in the analysis of the thesis afterwards. 
 
T: Yes, and then the audio recording starts now or is it already started? 
 
R: It already has, it started when the interview started, or when we start here but if you 
do not wish that what we talked about should be published, we will of course not include 
it.  
 
T: I think what I've said now can withstand the public’s eye. 
 
R: Yes okay. So then we have your views as you showed just on that PowerPoint and 
that we might include in the analysis and discussion. We can start with our first question 
which is: Norwegian commercial aviation contributes to climate emissions. Therefore, 
aviation is amongst others taxed for environmental reasons. But in view of this 
information, what is your opinion about taxation of Norwegian aviation given fewer 
available substitutes for air travel as a means of transportation in Norway compared to, 
for example, mainland Europe? 
 
T: Yes, you are on to that the importance of aviation in Norway is very strong because, yes, 
the substitutions are so and so (Norwegian saying). So if you are going from Finnmark to 
have a meeting in Oslo then suddenly there was no aviation then you would use Hurtigruten, 
car, or something else and it would take a few days. So aviation is of fundamental importance, 
and it also shown in the travel rate per capita in Norway, which is higher than in Europe 
because it is important. 
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In terms of emissions, there is triple taxation in Norway. In a way, the air passenger tax does 
have an environmental facility. At least that was what they said initially. Since then, they have 
moderated this to a fiscal tax but it was also intended to curb air traffic and have an 
environmental impact. But in Norway, we pay a CO2 tax and so we are already taxed in 
relation to the emissions we have. In addition, we have EU emission allowances, i.e. ETS that 
also taxes emissions and ETS should really be enough because that is the model the EU has 
joined which will lead emissions reductions of up to 40 percent. There aviation is a volunteer 
member. There we pay the fees. So we have a special Norwegian CO2 fee, we also have an 
air passenger tax and the fundamental here is that the Norwegian CO2 tax and air passenger 
tax, it has no environmental impact. We can reduce emissions here in Norway, but it only 
means that EU airlines can have higher emissions. 
 
R: Because there are so many different fees in Norway. Would Widerøe say that 
Norwegian aviation is over taxed compared to what might be appropriate for 
maintaining a good offer/supply? 
 
T: Yes, at least when it comes to the regional routes, the short stretches, then this air 
passenger tax hits hard. These are shorter routes per kilometer, so this charge is killing. I do 
not have a solid opinion about the framework conditions for SAS and Norwegian, but I only 
note that with the regional routes, a large proportion is not profitable and must be downsized. 
And we also know from before that ticket prices are highest in the districts. So it has become 
more expensive and poorer supply of routes. But I do not know if this was the intended 
purpose of introducing the air passenger tax was to affect the districts in particular. 
 
R: In the next question we are just going to ask what descriptive words are the first you 
think about when we say air passenger tax? 
 
T: Not thought out/not considered well (lite gjennomtenkt). Remember that the fee came a 
late night in the budget negotiations and they lacked any money into the treasury. The airline 
fee was introduced without any kind of analysis or study. 
 
Just look at Sweden, they have spent one year studying and obtaining consultation and 
looking at socioeconomic findings and having a conscious approach. Here it was just a flat fee 
that was rolled out like lightning from clear skies. This is the sugar fee number two. 
 
R: We have touched upon the next question and in that presentation you had how you 
think the current air passenger tax is working and regarding that, the summary was 
that it is making an impact and especially the regional routes are the hardest hit if it 
were so to understand? 
 
T: Yes or, in other words, the districts in the form of primarily short routes and with small 
aircraft where the framework conditions to begin with were very difficult because it has been 
aggravated by the fact that Avinor has increased its starting fees significantly since 2012 and 
2015. In addition, the market is a little more difficult out in the districts due to oil-related 
traffic that is now at a much lower level. So we started to struggle heavily before the air 
passenger tax came in June 2016, and it is the thing that tipped the scale that has led to a sharp 
increase in prices and the offer has deteriorated. We also note that on the main route network, 
i.e. where SAS and Norwegian are flying with large aircraft and longer stretches, the offer has 
not been reduced significantly, and it has not become much more expensive to travel. 
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R: That builds a little upon the next question we had that if you have noticed any 
consequences after the current fee was introduced. There I think, yes, we have received 
answers. It has increased, worsened profitability and as you said poorer framework 
conditions and reduced offerings that are main... 
 
T: Yes, we cut our production by 3.4 percent in 2016. We cut our production by another 3.6 
percent in 2017 and the first half of 2018, we have cut production by 4.2 percent. So it is a 
result of this new passenger fee while at the same time there have been challenging market 
conditions related to oil-related traffic. 
 
R: Have you heard of the idea of just taxing empty seats on board instead? 
 
T: Known with one of them, or, Norwegian has suggested a model where one to a larger 
degree favors airplanes that are full. It will only hit the districts to an even greater extent, 
because there are a lot of stops and you travel from major centers to the districts, let's say you 
start off early in Bodø at five o'clock in the morning to Lofoten and you pick up passengers 
going to Bodø which will connect or continue to Oslo. 
 
And it is clear at five o'clock in the morning you will not get any traffic out to Lofoten so we 
have a lot of flights that have fewer passengers. We also have a challenge as we have many 
stops, so unoccupied seats might appear along the way so in a completely natural structural 
way, the district routes will have a lower cabin factor than you have from Oslo to New York 
or whatever it should be. 
 
At the same time, it is the case that in particular international routes, it is on international 
routes that there has been considerable growth in recent years and on international flights, 
there is no VAT nor CO2 tax while the same time fuel prices are low when you fill up at Oslo 
compared to the districts. 
 
So naturally, you can stimulate demand on international routes to a much greater extent than 
we can manage on the district routes with the framework conditions they have. Thus, it will 
be difficult to get a good load factor out in the districts, and if you change the fees to even 
greater extent to hit these type of flights then we stray off the right path. It is not empty seats 
that have emissions. I think that what's causing emissions into the environment are departures, 
how far you fly and how big the planes are. 
 
And if you then on international routes have the framework conditions that allow you to sell 
cheap seats you manage to fill up the planes better and when you fill up the planes, you add 
new departures. So the result is also as you can see, explosive development on international 
flights and more and more choose to vacation in another continents and fly longer and more 
and there will be more emissions and if you go to the United States there is also no CO2 fee 
or ETS deal . So you do not pay for emissions when you fly to the United States. 
 
R: We have divided the interview into slightly different parts. In the next part of the 
interview, we will focus a little closer on our research question and what we are looking 
at is what the effect on the Norwegian aviation industry would be if a theoretical air 
passenger tax was put on empty seats. The idea is to look at how an alternative air 
passenger tax on empty seats will affect the Norwegian aviation industry, but we will 
also look at other proposals. We will be going back to that in a part two and that will 
amongst others build a lot upon what you talked a lot about initially. Our research 
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question is based on statements from the business community. You mentioned one of 
them earlier and other stakeholders, in addition, we are motivated by an ongoing debate 
in the parliamentary council on how to change the air passenger tax that we have today. 
 
T: Yes, until the parliament, let us see, the parliament asks the government to consider 
changing today's air passenger tax so that it receives an environmental profile, for example 
differentiating by the length of flight. If you, you have to set up the thesis the way you want, 
but I think it would be a much more exciting approach to look at the consequences of one, not 
this with empty seats because there are no emissions with empty seats but rather differentiated 
according to the length of the flight because that's what releases emissions into the 
environment. 
 
So a model could be that you have an air passenger tax based on the offered seat kilometers, 
that is, when you weigh the number of seats and length of the flight. Offered seat kilometers, 
it is actually the number of seats multiplied by the number of kilometers you fly. Then a short 
trip with a small airplane that pollutes little will then have a small share of the air passenger 
tax while a larger aircraft flying far with many seats will get a higher fee. 
 
So when you first fly far with a lot of seats, you will nevertheless have the incentive to fill the 
seats as best as possible, i.e. fly with the lowest number unoccupied seats. So, any airline does 
not want to fly with empty seats. So you do not need a new fee to stimulate not to fly with 
empty seats. Thus, an empty seat is a loss of passenger income.Just an example then. If you 
fly Stokmarknes - Bodø, that is 149 kilometers in flight distance or if you have to travel by car 
then, petrol or diesel, then you will spend 35 minutes by air or 5 hours and 45 minutes by car. 
The CO2 emissions will then amount to about 72 kilos per passenger from flying and with a 
gasoline car, it will be over 500 kg per passenger. This builds on 60 percent of the seats on the 
aircraft being sold and also 60 percent occupancy of a five-passenger car meaning three 
passengers in a car. 
 
So, in a way this is, it is also district-friendly or environmentally friendly to fly with small 
planes, and alternatively you could travel by boat that has lots of emissions or by car that can 
also have lots emissions because you have to travel around big mountains and around large, 
long fjords that make it a long stretch to drive. Remember environmental profile, so to put it 
into a little perspective as well. Very many talk about emissions from airplanes when talking 
about environment. It is a bit like the big ugly wolf. Do you know how big is the CO2 
emissions are in proportion to Norwegian emissions in domestically? How big is the share 
from air transport? What do you think? 
 
R: Well we read in a report from Avinor that, of Norway's total CO2 emissions, 
domestic traffic was 2.5 per cent. 
 
T: Yes, it is good that you are up to date. That puts it a bit in perspective then. It is relatively 
limited what these emissions are and has had a positive trend in the last two years. Then there 
have been fewer, less emissions on domestic traffic and we are a member of the EU quota 
system so in total we will contribute to a 40 percent reduction by 2030. 
 
R: Yes, because we can only, you are the third person we are talking with regarding this 
and we have been told earlier that a fee on empty seats would not be the cleverest that 
could have been introduced. 
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T: Remember now that a seat, either if somebody is sitting there or not, a seat has no 
emissions. It is a flight that has emissions and the farther you fly the more the emissions. That 
is how it is. 
 
R: So if we understand correctly, such a fee would ruin say almost the entire regional 
traffic then? 
 
T: Well, ruined and ruined. An alternative could be that the state then, more routes will 
become unprofitable and must be diluted or shut down and the state may then buy more routes 
through the tender scheme. But it would be a bad use of taxpayers' money then. You would 
need more subsidies to buy district routes. 
 
R: However, if it had been applied (the tax) outside of the FOT (PSO) routes, possibly if 
there had been a minimum limitation for such a tax, say aircraft flying with 50 seats or 
less was exempted from such a fee in order to maintain the route structure in Norway. 
Would things have been a bit different or would it still be in the same category? 
 
 
T: No that would be, it would not be as bad in any way. However, we have a lot, many routes 
also with 78 seats and some of the challenge, it is that we serve thin stretches, that is, low 
passenger volume and thus we have very many departures where we have two or three 
departures a day and if one fee would encourage you to have as few empty seats as possible, 
so we had to consider. Should one cut the production to some degree to achieve and average 
higher load factor. But if you go down from two departures to one departure then the offer 
becomes so bad that it does not work. So let's say Oslo - Bergen where SAS and Norwegian 
have, I do not know how many departures there are, there are probably 25-30 daily departures 
and if they are going to have a better load factor then they can remove a departure or two. 
Still, that is a good offer but once you get to the thin traffic streams with fewer departures, it 
will be difficult to make structural changes which gives you a higher load factor just because 
the number of departures becomes critically low if you thin out more. 
 
R: Can one ask, how is your profit margin affected by changes in taxes and how much of 
today's air passenger tax do you get back in the ticket price? 
 
T: On public service obligation network as I mentioned, it has not become more expensive for 
passengers because the government takes bills through increased grants. So it is the taxpayers 
that take care of that. On the commercial routes, if you do not do anything about the ticket 
prices then it will have an affect right on the bottom line. We tried to pass this on to customers 
so that already high prices became even higher and then we saw that there was a large 
drop/disappearance and the cabin factor, that's, and more empty seats. So we had to make new 
reviews. This market does simply not tolerate this. Then we chose to a larger degree to lower 
the ticket prices again, something that also affects the bottom line, so we cut production like 
we talked about earlier and then you enter a bad circle and we cut production and it leads to 
weaker demand, worse offers that again can make it even a bit more worse. So, no, it is a 
serious situation we are in now. 
 
R: Because we heard, we talked to Avinor amongst others and he said that the airlines 
or their calculations showed that the airlines on average managed to take 0 to 50 
percent, depending on, back on the air passenger tax. So that means that 0 to 100 
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percent potentially becomes, had to be covered by the airlines. Is this a situation you 
recognize? 
 
T: Yes, we recognize ourselves in that it is difficult to pass it on to the passengers because, 
yes, a bit like I mentioned earlier.  
 
R: Yes, then in the next section we would like to look into other alternative suggestions 
for possible, how a possible air passenger tax could be. The first question was what your 
opinion about a tax on seats based on distance traveled as in other countries. There you 
really gave a pretty nice and detailed explanation or suggestions on how it could be 




R: We can move on to the next. It is no secret that the development of ever more fuel 
and emissions-efficient aircraft has sharply increased. Could a flight tax have been used, 
can a flight tax also be differentiated to reward airlines to use more efficient and 
environmentally friendly aircraft? You have these E2’s on the way now, among other 
things, which consumes much less than other competing aircraft do. 
 
T: I think that regarding fuel consumption the airlines initially have strong incentive to renew 
the fleet because the fuel price in itself is so high and make up so much of the airlines' costs 
that it in itself provides an incentive to renew the aircraft fleet. Secondly, airlines have an 
incentive to renew the fleet because new aircraft have lower technical maintenance costs. On 
top of that, there is the CO2 fee we already have and this ETS fee we also have, so there are 
already well-functioning environmental taxes in place. At least ETS is well functioning. The 
CO2 tax does not work at all because it only affects domestic flights and if we reduce our 
domestic emissions, other European companies can emit more in Europe because of quota 
calculation, greater emission allowances that will then become available to others. So, this air 
passenger tax will also have an angle towards fuel, or renewal of fleet or such things, where 
we already have incentives in place, I think. Regardless, of the short field network 
(kortbanenettet, small community airports with 800 meter runways part of the PSO routes), 
we may want to buy new aircraft, but no one are selling them. 
 
R: That is true. They are the only ones you got for the time being the Dash 100 series 




R: Regarding the Dash 8-100 aircraft, Avinor has recently mentioned that they will 
make an effort to invest in electric aircraft. What does Widerøe think about that? 
 
T: We are very positive about that. We believe that on short distances, it will be possible in 
the future to fly electrically, either completely electric or a hybrid solution based on the 
technological development currently in progress with a number of aircraft manufacturers. So 
the airline producers themselves say that they think they can have solutions in place or new 
technology in place by the year 2030, and then it may take a little time to be installed and 
approved and such things. But it is the ultimate and best solution in the long run. And then 
suddenly there will be zero emissions while at the same time the environmental footprint on 
the ground would be very small. You can imagine adding new rail lines it would take a lot of 
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space and lots of noise along the rail lines while electric aircraft have low noise levels, no 
emissions and only a short runway at each end. 
 
R: So all in all, summarized then. If a tax based on distance had been introduced 
tomorrow, then would Norwegian aviation have been better or worse than today, if you 
look at only domestic routes?  
 
T: Definitely better than today. Also, just to illustrate it. So if you put 30 kroner on the 
shortest routes and 65 kroner on the rest of the domestic routes and elsewhere in Europe and 
increase a little on the longest routes in Europe and a little more on intercontinental flights 
then the state would retain its revenues. Norwegian aviation would be better off than today. 
 
R: Do you have any opinion, or you know which numbers you are willing to go 
publically with. I expect you have done some calculations. But if the tax suggestion you 
submitted to us here had become the case tomorrow, how much would the profit or 
margins in Widerøe change? 
 
T: Yes, we would still be weakened compared to what we had before the air passenger tax 
came and, as I mentioned for you, the framework conditions in relation to our type of 
operations are to begin with very difficult in 2015 and 2016. So still, this will be a significant 
disadvantage but I think that in relation to today's situation, it will be a big step in the right 
direction. 
 
R: Exactly.  
 
T: Just to add in. The model we propose here will also mean that foreign companies would 
take a larger proportion of the fiscal taxes into the Norwegian Treasury. The foreign 
companies are only flying to and from Norway and many of them are flying long routes so 
they will be carrying more of the fees instead of the fact that it is the Norwegian companies 
that are making the biggest contributions today.  
 
R: It is a disadvantage as you say with increased taxes in the airlines. Research and 
development, however, require funding. Would the airlines be more receptive to the air 
passenger tax if their revenues were earmarked climate measures for example, instead 
of going right into the construction of, for example, a new highway or similar things? 
 
T: Yes. It would then contribute to a greater extent to that air traffic in the longer term could 
be strengthened in relation to the environmental impact so it could be positive. For example, it 
could be used to prepare infrastructure in relation to electric aircraft as well. Yes, we see that 
it might be appropriate. But aviation already has proposals that the CO2 tax we currently have 
on emissions today should be environmentally oriented within aviation so that this charge 
could be used to subsidize biofuels that are initially very expensive and you will get a better 
development and more will use biofuels if the CO2 tax can then be used to subsidize biofuels 
given that one now finds a sustainable solution to biofuels. 
 
We are a little aware of that. If not, it is not possible to do that properly, it is not with two 
lines under the answer (Norwegian saying) that biofuel is necessarily an environmentally 
friendly solution to CO2. But yes, aviation will probably be positive that the airline fee will be 
more oriented towards technology development and adds to reducing the environmental 
 125 
impact of Norwegian aviation in the longer term. Whether it is realistic regarding the fact that 
the fiscal fee came to finance the state budget, it... 
 
 
R: Yes, we really have just one a bit open, closing question. You will be allowed to play 
finance councils, or finance minister. Given the need for a tax on aviation. You will not 
be able to avoid it. How would you have designed an optimal aviation tax in Norway? 
 
T: Yes, it is a bit like I have been through. I would distance base the air passenger tax on a par 
like many other countries have done. This will mean that those who fly the longest, the largest 
aircraft and the most passengers will pay more than they do today and it would mean that 
small aircraft on short distance flights in the districts that have low emissions in terms of 
alternative transport would come better out and make sure that one avoids the scheme in 
which the districts today carry a disproportionate share of the air passenger tax.  
 
R: We had, as I said, think it was from 1978 to 2002, an air passenger tax in Norway 
were for a major part of the time period that it was only international routes that had an 
air passenger tax. Could it have been realistic to do in Norway? We touched upon this 
earlier that we live in a country full of mountains. Would it have been possible to get a 
tax only on foreign routes instead? 
 
T: One thing is that it might be appropriate because the international routes already have 
extremely good framework conditions because they don’t pay a CO2 fee and that they do not 
pay VAT and that they only pay half the air passenger tax compared to the domestic routes so 
that could be a suitable option. Another thing is if it is possible to achieve. The latter 
significantly because of EU rules, which means that there must be objective terms, that is, you 
may have a fee based on distance but that you are excluding an area within the EU, I'm a little 
uncertain about whether it is doable. 
 
R: No, but I do not think we have that many questions left to ask. We can ask if you 
want a copy of the thesis when we finish in June? 
 
T: Yes, I would like that very much. 
 
R: I talked to someone a little earlier that you would like to look at it and if you could 
use it for your own purposes. If it potentially could be of interest in the long run, then we 
can, take a discussion when we get that far. But at least we will send that copy to you 
when it is finished, and then you can see what you think about it. 
 
T: Yes. If you wish, please feel free to send us a draft before it is done and we will give you 
some input. It is up to you whether you want to include the input or not. 
 
R: We shall consider and think about it and we have your email address. Is it you we 




R: But we say thank you for your time and useful input and all the PowerPoint 
presentations. It gave a lot of things to build the thesis on regarding the analysis and 
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discussions. Especially this with concrete figures on how the current situation has 
developed. It was very interesting to get an insight into. 
T: Good. Just tell me if there is anything more that you want from us or if we can contribute 
in any way, then we would like to spend some time helping you. 
 
R: Did you have a question Kayla or? 
 
K: Hi. I was just wondering. How was this model developed, that you found the different 
distances can give the same income to the state? Was it some special program that was 
used or?  
 
T: I understand. We have simulated this model our self based on traffic figures from Avinor, 
and so we have simulated how many are traveling far and short and arrived at these numbers. 




T: We have also made an alternative model based on the offered seat kilometers. 
 
R: It was the one you talked about where there was the number of seats divided by 
distance. 
 
T: Yes. Here we have simulated a little how it will look like if you instead look at the offered 
seat kilometers. I do not know if you are, if they are affiliated with seat kilometers as I 
mentioned earlier then. 
 
R: ASK and RASK and CASK and like that. 
 
T: Yes. ASK, available seat kilometer. So here we have just used a database and looked at 
how many offered seat kilometers the different companies have also we have split this 
between domestic and international routes. Then we have looked at how the fees can affect 
the different distances if you charge a fee of, it is that many cents per offered seat kilometer. 
So then one covers actual plane size and flight length and then they have different fees per 
passenger here. 
 
R: Yes right. I see Bergen - Las Palmas with Norwegian, for example, it would end up at 
a 140 per person for example and, yes, do not know if you have any specific domestic 
routes to show. You talked a bit about but. 
 
T: Well domestically, on the longest routes, we operate Bergen - Tromsø, there would some 
increase, but most of the routes today will not be 80 kroner plus VAT. 
 
R: Would that, yes for a fee per pax (passenger) it is included VAT? 
 




T: Also assuming 70 percent load factor, you also see here what this fee will be. Then you 
come down to say Hammerfest - Tromsø then it would be reduced to 18 kroner. This could be 
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a model, alternative model that has an environmental effect and that makes the one who, the 
passenger who is flying far pays more than the one who flies short. Not quite unreasonable if 
you ask me. 
 




R: As we said, should we have some more questions and we will contact you. We have 
your contact information. 
 
So just get in touch and we would like to contribute. I wish you luck too, I look forward to 
either a draft report or a final report. 
 
 







Hans Jørgen Elnæs 
 
Founder and Owner, WinAir AS 
 
Notes: 
• Interview conducted via Skype voice call on March 12, 2018. 
• Language of interview was Norwegian. 
o Transcription done by Kayla, direct translation of Norwegian to English.  





R: Our first question, just for the official record, is what is your job title? 
 
H: I am the founder and owner of WinAir AS, which is a company that analyzes and advises 
the aviation industry. 
 
R: We can introduce ourselves…(skipped transcribing this part) … Norwegian 
commercial aviation contributes to climate emissions. Therefore, Norwegian aviation is 
taxed for environmental reasons, among others. With this information in mind, what is 
your opinion on taxing of Norwegian aviation given fewer available substitutes for 
airplane travel as a mode of transportation in Norway, relative to, for example, 
continental Europe? 
 
H: Norwegians are the people who travel the most in Europe, and have the most flight trips 
per year. And aviation is critical for the logistics of business development and industry in 
Norway. The taxes levied on aviation by the authorities – you have some with are specifically 
domestic, like the CO2 tax etc. The flight passenger tax which came out in 2016 was 
originally meant as an environmental tax to reduce travel volume. This limited the further 
growth of aviation in Norway, both domestically and internationally. Even though other 
countries in Europe have comparable taxes, the markets are different. There are larger markets 
(than Norway’s) with a larger ability to take a price that defends this and the market is willing 
to pay a higher price including these fees. It is more limited in this respect in Norway. That’s 
also one of the reasons for Ryanair closing the airport Rygge. Closing that base located there.  
 
R: Which descriptive words are the first you think of when I say “flight passenger tax”? 
 
H: Laughter. What are you really thinking of here, Rasmus?  
 
R: We wanted to collect reactions of people, because people have different perspectives 
on the subject. I don’t know if you have any associations to the question. 
 
H: I have to say that I am very central in the fight against the flight passenger tax, because I 
worked at Ryanair’s main office in Dublin (was the Sales & Marketing Manager for Nordic 
countries & Baltic states at Ryanair). The day that I got the information on the flight 
passenger tax in 2015, I was at a party…it was a bad day.  
 
R: So there was not much champagne that day? 
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H: There was no champagne at the Ryanair office in Dublin. That I can promise you. It was 
the complete opposite, to tell the truth. 
 
R: How do you feel that the current tax (flight passenger tax) is working? 
 
H: The problem with this type of tax, Rasmus, is that…what is the actual instrument here? Is 
it so that we can have lower emissions on a global basis? When a plane flies in England, in 
Norway, in Germany, or in the Middle East, the location is not important, the emissions will 
happen regardless. So it doesn’t actually have an effect except to put a restriction on airlines’ 
opportunities to offer more routes and favorable prices for Norwegians. As a starting point, 
definitely that. It doesn’t mean that airlines and I are against that one should be charged for 
the carbon footprint one leaves. But there are a variety of international conventions like the 
European Trading Scheme that, in a way, take care of this here. And then Norway comes with 
a special tax which will take care of Norwegian circumstances. This is very unfortunate.  
 
R: Of course you know that this went especially hard for Rygge. But have you noticed 
any other consequences in addition to this after the current flight passenger tax was 
introduced?  
 
H: Many consequences, Rasmus. I will answer in three parts, starting in Norway, going on to 




H: In Norway, multiple companies have reduced traffic volume and overall flight numbers, 
and shut down routes which we can call secondary routes because this tax means that prices 
became too high, so people travel less. 
 
R: When you say secondary routes, do you mean that- 
 
H: Yes, secondary routes, primarily. If we look at the share of taxes of the overall price of a 
ticket price in Norway, it was high before the flight passenger tax came, but now it’s even 
higher. And additionally, there is VAT (moms) which the airlines can recover but passengers 
must pay for that in the total price. So that brings about a reduced supply (of flight options). 
Airlines don’t have the ability to handle this in their own internal accounting (put this better?) 
so it becomes passed on to their customers in one form or another, in the system here. When 
you look at, what the problem is…to increase flight frequency on secondary routes, as 
typified by Vestland, Ålesund, Kristiansund, Molde, Haugesund, and Kristiansand too, maybe 
some destinations in northen Norway also. There are restrictions on that. Especially for 
Widerøe, which has many small, short-distance routes, they were very unfortunate with this 
tax, this became a very large part of their ticket prices.  
 
When you look at Europe, Norway is far to the north. This makes low-price companies 
primarily must account for a much longer time to fly up to Oslo, Kristiansand, Vestland, and 
other places relative to, for example, just Copenhagen. In addition to these special taxes on 
top, they have to take this into account and to a large degree, appraise investing in other 
markets that are closer to central Europe, where market size can be larger, and risk is lesser 
than flying up to Norway. Many people have the desire to travel to Norway for tourism, etc. 
but the uncertainty and competition means that one abstains from Norway (the Norwegian 
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market) to a larger degree. It seems also that new routes come primarily to Copenhagen, 
secondarily to Stockholm, and then to other places in Denmark, very few to Norway.  
 
Looking at long distance routes, the picture is perhaps even more complicated because all 
airlines are fighting for the same passengers, as a starting point. If one wants to fly to the US, 
the Middle East, Australia, or other places, the market is limited. And this puts pressure on 
prices and makes us more, should I say…if we have more fiscal taxes and other complicated 
things which are put forward, which makes it, can I say, un-observable into the future, this 
puts limits on where airlines will then wish to fly. Now, they end up in markets where there 
are larger catchment areas, larger markets generally, like in Sweden, Denmark, and farther 
south in Europe. 
The Chinese have started many new routes in 2018, and there will come to be many new 
routes in Europe in 2018, including Copenhagen and Stockholm - but not a single route to 
Norway despite the fact that Norway is becoming more popular in China, because there they 
sell Norway as a tourist destination to business partners. Not a single Chinese flight coming to 
Norway on regular route traffic. There are a lot of similar things going on here.  
 
It is important to understand that the Norwegian market is a very small and spread out market. 
Eighty percent of the market is in the Østlandet region and the rest, the remaining twenty 
percent, is spread along the Oppland coast and further north. And that is something that the 
facilitators must think about and facilitate so that the airlines are given better framing 
conditions with more predictability than what they have today. There is therefore a large 
restriction on interest in the flight.  
 
R: You touched upon this already, but some people, including Norway’s finance 
minister, have said that the flight passenger tax is primarily a fiscal tax, even though it is 
heavily marketed as an environmental tax. What are your thoughts on this? 
 
H:  Actually, they aren’t allowed to call it an environmental tax. They had a meeting with Siv 
Jensen in December 2015 regarding the flight passenger tax and…it is Parliament who 
ultimately decides, independent of what FRP and Siv Jensen think. They could not have 
called this tax an environmental tax but as a starting point, it is what they set out to achieve. 
They wanted to regulate Norwegian people’s travel by plane to reduce overall annual 
emissions, which is available in the public record (regjerings handlingsplan)…a 30-40% 
reduction in NOX emissions in 2030, wasn’t it that number? 
 
R: Yes, that can be correct – 
 
H: Not exclusively for the aviation industry, but on a general basis I understand that the 
transport sector shall make up 40% of this reduction. This means flight and ground 
transportation. 
 
R: Have you heard of the idea of taxing empty seats on board a flight instead of 
occupied seats?  
 
H: Yes, I have heard of it. 
 
R: The rest of our inquiry will be sort of split in two. In the next part, we will focus 
closer upon the main research question, which is to see the effect of a theoretical empty 
seat tax on the aviation industry. The purpose is to see how an alternative flight seat tax 
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on empty seats will influence the aviation industry, but we will also touch upon other 
alternatives afterwards. This builds upon statements from the business world and other 
interests. I don’t know what you are thinking immediately after having heard this?  
 
H: As I understand it, this has been discussed in the industry and politically in Norway, about 
how one can, in a way, find the correct tools. So the question is should we reward the airlines 
who fill their planes and punish the airlines that do not fill up their planes? There are two 
relevant principles in commercial aviation. I’ll take you shortly through this. I’ll start with 
low price airlines. They have a doctrine that can be defined as  “yield passive, load factor 
active”. This means that it’s not the price of a sold flight ticket that creates, as a starting point, 
the bottom line - that is flights which are maximally filled up. This means that they will 
operate with a load factor between 90-96% on average for low price airlines in Europe.  Then 
you have the opposite, which is “yield active, load factor passive,” a phrase which has 
referred to network airlines for a long time. SAS has been in the leading driver’s seat here, 
average load factor, or cabin factor, for SAS lies under 70%. And in the past two months, 
January and February (2018), the load factor has been around 66-67%.  
 
For comparison, the  280 airlines who are a part of the International Aviation Association 
IATA in 2017 had an average load factor of 81.4%. SAS and this kind of company will be a 
big loser in this type of system, because SAS has such high costs that they can’t sell their 
tickets too cheaply. They try to maximize their unit incomes, which is primarily accomplished 
though their lucrative, good agreements with the business community, Eurobonus loyalty 
program, and such things. They are far, far behind with filling up their seats and they have 
been for many, many years. Do you have any comments on this? 
 
R: No, we have talked a bit with others but that was the first I have heard the expression 
“yield passive/active” etc. 
 
H: Yeah, there are two models: the low price model, which is income passive, cabin factor 
active. And the network companies have income active, cabin factor passive. The first is that 
when filling up the flight, you can then perhaps get passengers to buy many additional 
services, for example when you have a very low flight price. And today it is…as low price 
airlines see it, and what I work with, I have worked with these things in Dublin (at Ryanair), it 
is price which drives the market today. The volume of passengers which come abroad a flight 
are not business people on business trips. There are fewer leisure markets. They who are the 
larger wave in aviation today are independent of whatever place in the world or country you 
are in. That’s where the larger markets are growing. They are dependent on you going out and 
traveling, your colleagues going out and traveling, so you look at the price, right, when you’re 
going to London or Oslo or wherever? However, if you have a company card, you travel to 
the meeting regardless of what it costs. That’s what SAS makes a living off of, while the other 
low price airlines fill up their planes, and get partial incomes, what we call ancillary, from 
additional services like booking a seat, taking baggage on board, buying food on board, and 
booking a hotel. So low price airlines are a good complement… if they get a bonus because 
they come to Norway with full flights, we might think about it. But it wouldn’t be especially 
good for airlines like SAS.  
 
R: No. Next question was… is how will this tax generally affect airlines? It is pretty clear 
that it will favor some airlines above others. If there were to be an exception made for 




H: It’s hard to… FOT routes are a bit of a special tool independent of what special exceptions 
are made. FOT routes, I don’t know how familiar you are with this, Rasmus, but FOT routes 
are not especially known for having low flight prices. Completely the opposite. There are 
many restrictions on what an airline can do with their FOT routes because they are 
collaborations between the airline and interlining, that type of thing. I believe that… if you go 
a bit back, the flight passenger tax domestically, it will perhaps come to be revised in next 
year’s budget, where they will differentiate between levels, maybe different levels of flight 
routes. Shorter routes will have lower level than regular domestic routes, which will be on a 
medium level. On FOT routes…it is difficult to exclude individual segments here, to say that 
these will not pay but those will pay, either to pay a lower amount or just to be removed. That 
is another model, which we will maybe come back to.  
 
R: How do you think that a tax on empty seats will affect environmental efforts that they 
talk so much about? Would it have an effect, or -? 
 
H: If you had a tax on empty seats, the first thing that would happen is that routes on which 
medium sized flights are used, like the Boeing 737 and Airbus 320, which are typically what 
SAS and Norwegian uses domestically… then on these secondary routes with too low cabin 
factors, these planes would be switched out with smaller machines (Bombardier CRJ 100), 
like the ones that SAS rents in. SAS rents in 30% of its capacity from other suppliers who 
always have smaller planes. It would soon affect route quality and etc., routes would 
eventually be scaled down, if this tax were to be implemented. Alternatively, you throw out 
low prices. This is a very bad idea and a stupid solution, to tax seats.  
 
R: You were talking about price strategy, that either tickets would be “dumped” or that 
airlines would have to take really high prices to compensate. Flight route planning could 
be translated onto smaller planes. Route structure could see a cut in frequency.  
 
H: There will be a worse supply, because there are many routes in Norway which are 
secondary routes…which maybe won’t have full planes. And airlines don’t have the cash to 
be taxed for such…in this way, no. So this is unfortunate. I know that you will come with 
suggestions for alternative ways to tax and assess fees, right? 
 
R: Yes, we are coming to that soon. I just wondered first if you had any idea of how 
much of the current flight passenger tax are airlines able to recover back from 
customers? Or is it directly taken from their bottom lines? 
 
H: There have been many opinions on this. It is a bit dependent on what kind of company it 
is, but for a company like Norwegian, I think they recover back this cost by adjusting prices, 
at a cautious tempo. They recover in this cost. 
 
R: So you are saying that today, airlines are able to recover the majority of this cost 
back through ticket sales? 
 
H: I think that there is a fair opportunity because I think that SAS declared that it would cost 
them 700 million kroners from their bottom line. I don’t think that they’ve actually seen this 
happen. They have been able to adjust this without it being noticed, but for low price airlines 
the story plays out differently because the tax represents such a large part of an average ticket 
price. This ended up like what you said, at Rygge, where the average price became too high to 
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move the market from traveling via Gardermoen. Some had decided to travel in the first place 
because the price of a ticket was so low…this means that, if one will operate, one has to take 
on some of the cost themselves. Ryanair didn’t have the opportunity to pass this cost on to the 
customer in the ticket, so it had to search for other markets in able to have the opportunity to 
realize a better return on its invested capital. 
 
R: I was just in London myself, on a cheap ticket from Norwegian. There weren’t many 
kroners leftover for Norwegian of the total price I paid after taxes and fees were taken 
out. It’s a tough environment. 
 
H: Yes, a very tough environment. You can see that for some companies which are very well-
capitalized, like Ryanair, Easyjet, Wizzair, Eurowings… they sit in a better position than 
Norwegian does now. Norwegian is a very good company but they haven’t yet gotten good 
control over…they haven’t been able to build up the same capital base. This means that when 
they fight with their competitors, and in addition this type of fee trickles down in their system, 
like we have in Norway, England also has expensive fees, unfortunately, so it becomes small 
margins. And that is not so good.  
 
R: We can quickly end this section of the interview with a little bit of a fun question. 
There is a lot of discussion around the fact that this kind of tax must have an additional 
environmental impact. What do you think is approximately an effective price on empty 
seats would be in order for it to achieve this stated environmental purpose?  
 
H: I think that you come to get the environmental effect that one thinks one will get. If this 
kind of concept where you are charged for empty seats is introduced, airlines will flee from 
Norway, unfortunately. These flights will fly just as much, but in other places, with just the 
same emissions, the same air, just not in Norway. It doesn’t matter for these emissions, 
whether they happen in Stavanger or in Oslo, it all goes in the big global system. So it doesn’t 
have any meaning. There are other mechanisms that can be done here. Do you want me to 
discuss this or will we come back to it later?  
 
R: I was thinking about the next part of the interview. Maybe one of the more realistic 
suggestions that is being debated now is…what is your opinion on a flight tax on seats 
based on flown distance, like in other countries? 
 
H: You can say that my opinion on flight taxes is that I don’t think they are the correct 
approach. Especially in marginal markets like Norway, where we are not so many people and 
it is as a starting point already expensive to fly. And it is geographically complicated and it is 
expensive in the winter, which makes operating to Norway very cost intensive. But if you 
look at it more neutrally, is it right that you pay more relative to the footprint that you leave 
on a flight from Oslo to New York, which has a bigger footprint than a flight from Oslo to 
London. So you have to account for that, but I say that it is better with differentiated taxes that 
cover the actual emissions, in a way. This involves a formula for taxes which is alike for all.  
 
R: Given the development of continually more fuel- and emissions-efficient flights, you 
have 320 Neo, etc. can a tax be differentiated to reward an airline for increasing their 
will to make investments in these newer flights which emit less? 
 
H: This is a good idea. I have discussed this with politicians. Companies which have 
lower…flights with jet motors or turbines which have lower emissions getting a reward for 
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this. I believe that when this tax and potential instruments were being discussed some years 
ago…there were individual airlines in the Scandinavian region, don’t need to mention the 
names, that had a proportionately older aircraft fleet. They would be under very hard tension 
with this type of tax, while other companies which had ordered many new planes and had a 
very modern fleet, they would have had it good in this situation. The fact today is that many 
airlines have planes which are less than 6 years old, with more modern technology and lower 
emissions. These new planes which are coming out have even fewer emissions. They use less 
fuel, relatively. I think this is a very reasonable idea, that those who have less emissions must 
come out of it better than those who have higher emissions. This can chase away the 
companies and planes which have older turbines, and must use a lot of fuel, which means that 
they emit more CO2.  
 
R: On the subject of fuel- and emissions-efficient planes, Avinor has taken a pretty 
offensive politic aimed at electric planes. Do you think that this is something to wager on 
or do you look at it as a kind of flash in the pan? 
 
H: Avinor is wagering on two things, there are two tracks they’re going on. One is, as you 
said, electric planes, and the other is biofuel. This means the use of more…blending in of 
more biofuel in the fuel that planes use. I’ll discuss electric planes first. It is a long process of 
certifying new types of flight machines. It is one of the most complex certifications that 
exists. It will take time before this type of plane is approved for commercial use in civil 
aviation. On private flights, you can use your own choice of plane, this is here already. In 
Norway we have other challenges as well. For a start, these planes are pretty small already, 
they are under 20 seats. And you know in Norway, there is a lot of bad weather and 
challenging geographical, topographical special conditions. This affects, for example, flights 
on Widerøe’s shorter flights with light aircraft and limited range and all of that. It is perhaps 
not the place where they should start. I think that electric flights and other electric modes of 
transportation will come in the next 20 years with turbulent changes. We live in a relatively 
tough, operatively-challenging environment and there is not room for solutions that aren’t 
tailored for this. It will be a good amount of time before these electric planes will come. 
Avinor has said that by 2040, all domestic routes will be electric. That is in 20 years’ time, 
and a lot will happen between now and then. 
 
R: Just as a quick summary, I have a few more questions. You have the tax today, and 
there is discussion about tax based on distance flown. Would airlines in Norway have it 
better or worse if a distance based tax were to be introduced tomorrow? 
 
H: What you are talking about now is…the authorities will take in 200 million kroner in flight 
passenger tax. And it is clear that for longer flights that go to Asia, the USA, the Middle East, 
from Norway, the total ticket price is considerably higher than in Europe. A tax will have a 
smaller effect in the total picture of price, do you understand what I’m saying? It is dependent 
on how high this tax will be, right? It is a bit of a complex picture. But we are sticking to 
taxes and not other Avinor things. I support a higher tax on longer routes, but I will also say 
that, like we talked about, for companies that have cleanest emissions and things, they should 
get a bonus. Because for example, that could trigger that (the incentive could trigger 
investments in lower emissions). You can also have a bonus if they manage to fill up their 
flights as much as possible - if there is, for example, an average cabin load factor of 85% or 
higher, so they could also get a bonus in relation to what they have paid. This would give 
airlines an incentive, not just a tax, if they are able to tailor their operations in such ways, to 
fly with the most full seats possible. Flights will fly anyways, right? It doesn’t matter if there 
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are 180 or 250 passengers on board, there won’t be different emissions from a flight from 
Oslo to Bangkok because of that. And…(reference to a picture)…you are very taken up with 
empty seats on flights, but flights will fly anyways.  
 
R: I didn’t get any pictures, unfortunately. 
 
H: No, I am saying that you can see the dilemma here. That flights will fly if they have filled 
up 80% or if they have filled up 50%. Even if you have fewer passengers on board and a bit 
lower weight, the flight only uses marginally less fuel and has only marginally lower 
emissions. To punish half-empty flights, that’s a very analog way of thinking. When you look 
entirely at, as you say…based on distance or if companies fill up planes. If companies feel 
that, in Norway if they actively try to have the newest planes, Qatar, and Turkish, and SAS, 
and Ryanair, so they must have ____ (audio breaks up here). If they can come off as very 
environmentally friendly, if one can use that phrase, in relation to other airlines, then they will 
be rewarded by Norwegian authorities. They would have a chance to get a bonus, a rebate, on 
what we see in 2018. This is something that companies would like better.  
 
R: You also talked, in the messages we sent back and forth, about how there is a large 
possibility of changes coming. Unfortunately, the thesis must be delivered by June 15, 
and the new national budget won’t come before the 15 of May. So there will be a bit of 
difficulty with including this, in regards to time. But do you have any opinions on what 
they will put forth, having spoken to politicians before about this?  
 
H: Now, there are budget discussions every day. So there might be some leakage that you can 
pick up on. Maybe something interesting will come up that you can use. But what I think is 
that they are looking at a distance-based solution. And maybe two levels in Norway, where 
you will have maybe one level for the typical short flights and another level for all other flight 
routes domestically. Then you will have a level for flights to Europe, and another for 
intercontinental flights. This is an identical copy of the Swedish model, which starts on the 
first of April (2018). What won’t change is that there will be 2 billion kroner in the state’s 
account yearly from this.  
 
R: We are coming to the end, so there is one more question. If you were allowed to act as 
the Finance Minister, given that the authorities have decided that there must be a tax on 
aviation, whether it be on emissions, on seats, everything is allowed as long as it is a tax, 
how would you design the optimal tax, given your background? 
 
H: As a starting point, if I were the Finance Minister, I would split it a bit in two, Rasmus. I 
would have talked with my colleagues and looked at how we could expand the European 
Trading Scheme and the Corsia model to see how, on the whole, how could we affect the 
environment in a positive way with aviation. There is an optimal way to do this, because 
airlines do not want to pay for their carbon footprint, they are not interested in very many 
local instructions. As Finance Minister, from a Norwegian point of view, independent of EØS, 
Europe, and others, I would want Parliament to understand that aviation is crucial, that it 
creates jobs and gives a better economy in Norway, so we must take that into account when 
deciding what to do. If they aren’t interested in understanding that, many will want to impose 
taxes like the ones we’ve talked about today, with distance-based being two levels in Norway 
and Europe and a long-distance component. I would make it very clear that we want to attract 
planes and airlines to Norway that have the newest, most environmentally friendly planes and 
lowest emissions type of motors. I would give a bonus to those which manage to deliver that 
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and punish those that use older planes with older turbines and emit more. I wouldn’t be so 
happy to see, in Norwegian aviation, either when overflying or when landing at an airport 
operated by Avinor…so I would have gone more strongly out against it there, it would be a 
system split in two. Then one must find a cutover regarding this.  
 
R: That’s all we have to ask about… 
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R: Good morning and thanks for wanting to talk to us…First of all, can you state your 
official job title? 
 
T: Administrative director in NHO Luftfart (the Federation of Norwegian Aviation 
Industries). 
 
R: Norwegian commercial aviation contributes to climate emissions. Therefore aviation 
is taxed for, among other reasons, environmental reasons. With this in mind, what is 
your opinion on taxation of Norwegian aviation given fewer substitutes available for 
flights as a mode of transportation in Norway, relative to for example, continental 
Europe? 
 
T: It’s a very open and complicated question.  Because as a starting point, aviation from the 
year 2012 came into the EU’s quota system. So aviation, like the energy sector, process 
industry, some other industries, became a part of the system which is regulated by the 
quota ceiling and buying of quotas at a market price. There have been some technical 
misfortunes connected to how aviation is being taken into the quota system. But essentially 
what this involves, that aviation is a part of the quota system, is that collective emissions 
from aviation and the other sectors must be reduced by circa 43% in relation to 2005 by 
2030.  Regardless of how this is accomplished, the total emissions of quota-bound areas 
must fall by 43% by 2030. If individual sectors aren’t able to reduce their emissions, they 
must purchase quotas from other sectors to achieve an equivalent emissions reduction. So 
one achieves the emissions targets for these sectors that were set into place all over Europe, 
and one achieves them in a very cost-effective way, these reductions are achieved at the 
lowest cost possible. In a way, they are platforms…that aviation in Norway and in the rest 
of Europe is part of an international European quota system.  
 
 This means, in principle, that special regulations on the top of the quota system will 
undermine the quota system’s effectiveness. You can surely read more about this in the 
Grønn skattekommisjon, among others…the report that was made by the Norwegian 
Environment Agency and other authorities about 3-4 years ago, called Klimakur2020. 
With this degree of special regulation on top of a quota system, it means that locally, one 
can perhaps reduce some activity, but the sum of the available quota is unchanged. 
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  I will try to illustrate this in a populist way… you have a concern about people drinking 
too much at the office Christmas party. So you say “okay, we will pass out 1000 drink 
tickets and we will sell these at a good price for everyone at the company to use at the 
party.” And at the next Christmas, there will be 50 less drink tickets, and 50 less at the next 
one. Maybe one of the managers wants to be a bit more clever than the others and he says 
that there should be a tax on the drink tickets, so that we drink even less. They will 
probably drink less in that office, but the problem is that if the drink tickets which aren’t 
used remain available for the other employees, and there will be the same “emissions,” the 
same drinking. Just the same. This is how it is with the quota system as well. If you want to 
drink more, it is smart to buy drink tickets from those who have the least need to use them. 
This is the most cost effective way.  
 
 What is smart about the quota system, Jens Stoltenberg has tried to explain this and get the 
political environment in on this…many say that a quota system doesn’t work, this is totally 
wrong. The quota system works very well. (audio breaks up)…so the quota price is low. 
And the quota price affects incentives for technological adjustments. So if the quota price 
is low, incentives for new technological aren’t as strong as they would have been 
otherwise. But the goal is achieved, and this is why the quota system works. It is the 
fundamental plan in relation to the aviation sector.  
 
 Strictly speaking, the Norwegian authorities should have said that “yes, we are in the quota 
system for aviation, so we shouldn’t do anything else there. There isn’t a need for any 
special regulation on top, there isn’t a need for the CO2 tax, there isn’t a need for the flight 
passenger tax, there isn’t a need for any other taxes for the environment’s sake.” In a way, 
it’s counterproductive. You can read more about this in the Klimamelding which was put 
forth in the summer and is being handled by Parliament now.  In this document, the 
government is very clear that we must differentiate between quota-bound and non-quota-
bound sectors. Then you meet your former self, look yourself in the mirror because…it is 
apparent that emissions are what is important. Despite that, practical politics collides with 
principles. For example, we have a CO2 tax on aviation. On my side, I work very hard for 
aviation in Norway under the EU’s quota system, also before 2012. I work in relation with 
the government on this and what happened, we argued that the CO2 tax should be 
removed. Or alternatively that the CO2 must be adjusted downwards to approximately the 
equivalent proceeds as one would expect of the effects of the quota system to give. This 
was exactly what the government did, it was Erik Solheim who was the climate and 
environment minister at the time, he accepted this. At the time, I don’t exactly remember 
the number, the CO2 tax was 60-70 øre per liter. And it was adjusted downwards to around 
40 øre per liter. Later, the politicians in Norway forgot this. The CO2 tax now, in the 
budget for 2018, has increased to 1,28 kroner , it has almost tripled from 2012. In my eyes, 
this is purely symbolic politics. Fuel in Norway becomes a bit more expensive and in 
principle, this means that activity goes down in relation to what it would have been 
otherwise. The quotas that we don’t end up using in Norway, they go to other actors down 
in Europe for, in principle, a bit of a lower price and the collective emissions under the 
quota ceiling are exactly the same. So it has absolutely no effect on the collective 
emissions of Europe. It has a minor effect on the collective emissions of Norway, but it is 
purely symbolic, and this is what the politicians are chasing when they argue that we 
should fly less, than it isn’t sustainable, that we can travel by train instead, etc. 
 
 So there is a problem with a CO2 tax on top of a quota system, and then we get the 
infamous flight passenger tax of 80 kroner in 2016. Now, it has increased to 83 kroner and 
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then VAT is added, so in practice it is over 90 kroner. But politicians have been ambiguous 
on this, because they say there is a good environmental motivation behind this kind of tax, 
but those who actually understand know that it is a fiscal tax, it is not an environmental 
tax. In principle, this has exactly the same…it doesn’t have any environmental benefits or 
climate benefits, but of course gives money in the state’s treasury for the authorities. So 
there is not a double, but a triple measure in use, and on top of it all, Parliament has 
decided that from 2019, a so-called “omsetningskrav” will be introduced on biofuel, at 1%. 
And there is no functioning market for biofuel today, and price differences between biofuel 
and fossil fuel are very high. There is a 10-15 kroner difference (per liter). This means 
more costs, dependent on all the fuel that is filled. This is only applicable 
domestically…this will be about 60-120 million kroners per year, just with this 1% 
omsetningskrav. This is in principle a kind of environmental regulation, special regulation, 
that comes on top of the quota system.  
 
 So the short answer is that this kind of extra taxation on, national taxation in Norway…it 
has little to do with real environmental meaning collectively in Europe. It has a bit of local 
importance in Norway, but has no meaning when viewed as a part of the quota system’s 
scope. So I recommend you to check out especially the Grønn skattekommisjon’s 
statements on this, and also Klimakur 2020, and also the latest Klimamelding is clear on 
this principle even though they skip over the issue of special taxes on top and that the 
consequences of this are not positive.  
 
R: We will look into that more. Just a few questions we are using for comparative 
purposes. What descriptive words are the first you think of when I say flight 
passenger tax?  
 
T: Symbolic politics, in relation to the environmental motivation. Also there’s a feeling that 
it’s a “5 to 12:00” (last minute/rushed) decision, something that came in the last round of 
budget discussions. Very little examination of the consequences.  
 
R: You touched on this in the start, but just generally to sum it up, how do you feel that 
the current flight passenger tax is working? And what possible consequences has 
NHO Luftfart noticed from it? 
 
T: It is a difficult question. I can send over our recommendations made to the tax directorate. 
You can look at it, it’s long…What airlines say themselves is that they have to a large 
degree have observed many costs on their own bottom lines in the short term, especially on 
the so-called “stamrutene”, the larger commercial routes. On a portion on the regional 
routes, like those Widerøe chiefly operates, there has been a clear downscaling of 
production. Widerøe has reduced quite a lot on a lot of shorter regional routes that see little 
flight traffic and weak profitability. On many of the stamruter, there have been less such 
adjustments, but the airlines say that profitability in the system has been substantially 
weakened. When you look at traffic numbers, they don’t seem to bad. Traffic numbers 
domestically have had weak growth, but it is because the Norwegian economy in the last 
few years has begun to recover, in a way this compensates for the cost increases that have 
actually been involved. And a relatively careful portion of these taxes have been 




 If you look at Avinor’s statistics on flight movements, you see that total flight movements 
have decreased in the last year. But traffic volume has gone a bit up. This is because the 
airlines, on average, set in a bit larger plane types. They have had an adaptation towards 
the new 320 (?), which are the larger versions of these planes. The average plane size has 
increased, while the total number of flight movements, taken as a whole, has gone down. 
Also the price mechanism has been used to fill up these larger plane units which fly, 
combined with a certain economic growth in Norway, which has compensated for some of 
the cost disadvantages with this flight passenger tax. It is about 2 billion kroner, of which 
roughly 1,1-1,2 billion is linked to the domestic activity in Norway. There are taxes both 
ways.  Also, the tax is equal for short and long routes, which means that the shorter routes 
have a relatively higher burden domestically in Norway. If you fly from Bødø to 
Stokmarknes or Tromsø to Hammerfest, it is the same tax as between Oslo and Tromsø or 
Oslo and Kirkenes. What I’m uncertain about…there is very tough competition on the 
domestic network, which in a way has contributed to a dampening effect on price side, and 
only just on the supply side, in relation to what the tax proceeds and costs had pledged. 
The question is, the money, the tax does not evaporate on the domestic network in Norway, 
have the costs gone up by 1,1-1,2 billion kroner? …Which comes on top of a lot of other 
cost increases which are quite large – CO2 tax has increased a lot, it now has proceeds of 
500 million per year, with 1,28 kroner, it has almost tripled in 5-6 years. Also the VAT has 
risen substantially by 2% every year between 2016 and 2018...in total, about 500 million 
kroner increase from 2015 to 2018. It went up from 8% to 12% and this goes directly in to 
ticket prices. The business community gets an exception from VAT, but private individuals 
do not, there is a certain effect on cost levels and price levels. So the sum of the flight 
passenger tax, the CO2 tax, and VAT have substantially increased the cost level on the 
domestic network, and relatively more on domestic routes than on international routes that 
aren’t subject to VAT, that don’t have the CO2 tax, and have a relatively lower flight 
passenger tax. 
 
R: In the next part of the interview… as I wrote to you, the objective of our thesis is to 
analyze how an alternative flight seat tax will affect the Norwegian aviation industry. 
The main research objective is to see what effect a theoretical flight seat tax on empty 
seats instead of passengers will affect the industry. We will come back and at other 
ways of doing this afterwards, as said in the first section, but what are your 
immediate thoughts on the empty seat tax? 
 
T: Yeah, it has been discussed  before. One has also had the previous shift in terms of, among 
other things, the so-called airport charge to Avinor, which has sometimes been placed on 
seats, sometimes on passengers. It has been an argument actually in many contexts, to a 
larger degree, to tax empty seats, or one can tax all seats, or place a tax on the actual 
number of passengers, or one can connect the tax to the number of empty seats. 
Technically, there are many ways one can do this. The intention is that airlines should be 
stimulated to high use of their capacity utilization of the material and the empty seats that 
pollute, in a way. The starting point here is that aviation is the transportation mode which 
has the highest capacity usage of all – personal cars have on average 1,3-1,4 passengers per 
car on long trips, trains have a capacity usage of perhaps 30%, but flights use 70-80% of 
their capacity, dependent on the market. So as a starting point, aviation already has a 
higher capacity usage.  
 
 The disadvantage of taxing empty seats is that the marginal flight routes will be taxed the 
hardest. On smaller flights and on flights with multiple connections, it is harder to achieve 
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higher capacity usage. So Widerøe, which operates with maybe 60% capacity usage, will 
have a relatively tougher tax burden. Those that come better out of this are the low price 
airlines, which have policies to make their prices low in order to achieve high capacity 
usage. Ryanair operates with almost 100%, Norwegian operates also with a higher capacity 
usage than SAS, for example, which is more in the business segment and has a higher price 
per passenger but a lower capacity usage. There is a difference between classic business 
airlines and low price airlines, and it gives a disadvantage to regional operators who has 
smaller flights and more complicated route patterns.  
 
R: Do you think it would have a different effect if exceptions were made for FOT routes? 
If the tax was only placed on the “thinner” stamruter?  
 
T: There is already an exception made for FOT routes. The government compensates for a 
certain increase via economic support (tilskudder). Widerøe receives this, but Widerøe has 
a lot of regional commercial flight routes. For example, Hammerfest, Stokmarknes, etc. 
They have an area. They are heavily taxed in relation to the shorter distances etc. and they 
have a relatively high burden because of the short distances they fly.  
 
R: How will a tax on empty seats generally affect other interests, for example airports, 
consumer choice generally, business in general, and operations that are linked to the 
operations of airlines, like catering and handling? 
 
T: I don’t think…the point is that the state wants to have the same revenues regardless. If they 
want 2 billion kroner, it means that empty seats will have to be taxed extremely high. It 
would surely be a very high number, a thousand or something, because as a starting point 
they will want to have the same revenues. I can’t see that it is so practical. Another model 
is to tax all the seats, then you will have a lower rate. Or taxing actual passengers, which is 
simpler. I can’t see that there is a very big difference, because the state will get this money 
anyways. And it is difficult for operators, especially Widerøe, to make a system that will 
increase their capacity usage significantly compared to what they have today. Even if we 
give this incentive for better capacity usage, we don’t give an incentive for less climate gas 
emissions, just an incentive for a mode of transportation having higher capacity usage. The 
incentives aren’t so big that I can see them making a big difference. In addition, the rates 
will be extremely high if they are only applicable to empty seats. It would be hard to make 
it work. 
 
R: In your opinion, would this kind of idea have any special effect on climate protection 
efforts in Norway? Or would it have a quite small effect? 
 
T: It wouldn’t have any effect were the quota system as before. It wouldn’t have any 
meaning, it would be more symbolic. It would maybe have a marginal effect on capacity 
usage, you would have a few less seats than you would have had otherwise. How large this 
effect would be, that could be discussed, but I think it wouldn't be serious, just because 
companies already have strong incentives to use their available capacity. And if they 
managed to use even more, the rate would have to go up even more in order for the state to 
get the same revenues as before. So regardless of how you twist and turn it, you will get hit 
by a boomerang in the face, the state will take what it wants to take anyways.  
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R: So would this kind of idea have any short- or long-term effects when it comes to price 
strategy, route structure, or fleet planning, maybe it would be more profitable with 
smaller planes?  
 




T: No, I don’t think it would have a very big effect. It would be very difficult to accomplish, 
practically speaking. It would be a bit more theoretical. 
 
R: Do you have any concrete numbers for the percentage of taxes that airlines manage 
to pass on to consumers? Or is it variable from company to company? 
 
T: I don’t have a number, you’d have to get in contact with the companies. But I see that a 
number of these actors…when it applies to SAS and Norwegian especially, they have had 
problems with passing a large percentage of the flight passenger tax into their ticket price. 
And when they have done it, it’s been very little. More precisely, I don’t know. 
 
R: We talked to someone in Avinor who said that your numbers (from NHO Luftfart) 
were between circa 0-50%, that airlines manage to take in. Now we are going into the 
second portion of the interview, which has a more practical approximation to today. 
What are your thoughts on an aviation tax on passengers based on distance flown, as 
in other countries?  
 




T: One may have different views about it. It is a bit dependent on what kind of pressure one 
wants to take care of. For a company like Widerøe for example, which generally flies short 
distances, it would be an advantage that the tax is differentiated on distance. For example, 
distances of less than 300 kilometers would have a low rate, distances from 300-500 
kilometers would have a bit of a higher rate, and so on with 3 or 4 levels. This would mean 
that longer trips, intercontinental trips, would have the highest rate. If you want to have a 
reduced rate on the shorter trips which don’t have the largest volume, you must also have a 
higher rate on longer trips to compensate for the loss of income. I am assuming here that 
the collected tax would not change total tax revenues. At the same time, a company like 
Norwegian which operates many longer and intercontinental routes would likely face a 
higher rate, and the market would in a way be strangled. The question would be how 
airlines would adjust their operations, by changing their route structure - for example 
passengers to the USA would travel via Copenhagen or Amsterdam or other hubs to get 
out into the world and avoid the Norwegian tax system, reducing the effect of the 
Norwegian tax system. It is dependent on how this would be concretely structured. If it is 
profitable, or you get lower taxes with these kinds of adjustments.  
 
 Out of a consideration of fairness, there are some who believe that this kind of tax is 
rational, that a short trip in Northern Norway is not taxed as much as a longer trip from 
Oslo to Bangkok or Oslo to New York…that there is an element of reasonableness for 
longer trips to have a higher tax than shorter trips. That is understandable. There are some 
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who argue that this is reasonable in the environmental and climate sense. Especially for 
those flights which go outside of the EEA, which don’t fall within the quota system. On the 
traffic which goes outside of the EEA, this kind of tax will actually have climate effect. 
This is partially correct, but in ICAO, which is a UN organization, they have agreed to 
implement a global quota system by 2020. So from the point in time from which the quota 
system comes into effect, which is in practice 2021, this argument will also fall away, that 
a tax on distance flown outside of the EEA will also have an environmental effect.  
 
 So we are left with the question of fairness, and the question of whether to have a more 
reasonable, lower tax on shorter routes to stimulate the market…to get more traffic in the 
local area which will not be over-taxed by such a high proportion for shorter routes. But 
what people are going to think of this is up for debate. Widerøe would suggest this kind of 
model, but Norwegian for example would be less receptive to it. A good deal of tax 
revenues would be moved from national actors in Norway to the international market, and 
relatively more foreign actors. As such, you push a little more of the bill over to 
international companies instead of Norwegian companies.  
 
R: Today, we are seeing the next generation of flight motors in regards to emissions, 
Airbus family’s new Neo series, Boeing Bombardier C-series, …etc. Given the 
development of continually more fuel- and emissions-effective aircraft, can an 
aviation tax be differentiated to reward airlines which use more effective and 
environmentally friendly aircraft?  
 
T: Yes, this ties back into the discussion on…in principle, these instruments are (already) 
provisioned because there is already a quota system connected to emissions and fuel usage. 
So the need for the quota decreases the more energy effective aircraft become. You already 
have a differentiation along the lines of energy efficiency because both the quota system 
and especially the national CO2 tax are connected to use of fuel. So when you purchase a 
new aircraft, you not only get lower fuel costs, but also lower costs for the external effects 
of emissions. The industry already have strong incentives to use the most modern and 
energy effective material, as a starting point. Fuel prices make up roughly 20-25% of 
operating expenses for airlines. This is why Norwegian and others are very taken up with 
using the best materials, so that they can minimize their operating expenses to the 
maximum extent possible. It is almost the same thing twice over for most, if you are going 
to differentiate additionally in other areas. 
 
 There has been a discussion on if, for example, the airport tax should be differentiated 
based on emissions. But the airport tax is meant to cover costs for completely different 
things, like the runway system, terminal building, air facilities, air traffic control towers, 
etc. It is in a way incorrect if the taxes are differentiated after other conditions than those 
they should actually cover (bad wording on my part). So we are left with the flight 
passenger tax, and logic dictates that we could organize this in a bit of a more 
environmental direction. This is where a differentiation for distance could come in.  
 
R: Could the flight passenger tax itself be differentiated to account for emissions, for 
example, or would this be a bit too much discrimination?  
 
T: In this case, the flight passenger tax would become an environmental tax, a climate tax. It 
could of course be this way, but the point is that this could not be used internationally. It 
would come into conflict with some international agreements and conventions. Therefore, 
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authorities have created a departure tax from Norwegian airports, thereby avoiding formal 
problems with international agreements to which Norway is party. This has been done in 
Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom, because you cannot tax fuel on international 
flights because it conflicts with aviation agreements like the Chicago Convention and other 
rules of the game we have for how international companies can be taxed. These are old 
rules of the game from war time. The motivation was that a country can’t tax an airline 
from another country, an African country for example, when a Western airline comes, they 
can’t tax the fuel that they had used and get money in the state account in this way. Maybe 
by taxing fuel in this way and reshaping the flight passenger tax as a climate tax, many 
politicians would ideally want.  
 
R: On the subject of greener aviation, Avinor has declared that they are betting heavily 
on electric flights, amongst other things. How does NHO feel about this? 
 
T: It is positive that… Avinor’s contribution to both information and mapping of technology 
status also uses some resources which are made available on the Norwegian side so that we 
can take this new technology into account  when the time is right. But I don’t think that, 
from the Norwegian side, we don’t have any illusions that we will be the solution-makers 
for this type of technology. Very much of this development happens internationally, in 
other countries than Norway, in North America and Central Europe. There will definitely 
be a big development and especially regional flight routes in Norway could benefit from 
implementing adaptations for charging when this time comes, but for now its more of a 
buzzword. It is great that Avinor is engaging itself but the underlying here is how the 
global industry sees opportunities for taking this kind of technology into use. It must be 
deemed good enough, this is a decisive factor. And this goes back to the global, 
international measures we have like the quota system today, which gives an incentive and 
involves that quota costs in the long term will increase and strengthen incentives for 
emissions from quota-bound sectors go down 43% by 2030. This will strengthen the need 
for new technology. The quota system is in a way a tool for adjustment towards new 
technology. In such a long time perspective, to 2040 or 2050, new technologies must see 
the light of day in order to realize more carbon effective or carbon neutral aviation.  
 
R: You talk about the money here going maybe towards a communal fund for 
technological development. NHO has its NOx fund which supports climate initiatives. 
Would airlines be more receptive towards the flight passenger tax if the incomes 
collected would all end up in a similar fund? 
 
T: We have discussed this at length and we believe that in principle, the CO2 tax and flight 
passenger tax are wrong and don’t stimulate climate emissions reductions, collectively 
seen. So we have said that if the government will have these taxes anyways, they should 
use them for something rational. We have argued for the establishment of a CO2 fund 
where, to start, the proceeds from the CO2 tax could be used. But it could also be the 
proceeds from the flight passenger tax put into such a fund. The money would be used to 
finance subsidies or support for, to start, additional costs linked to production of biofuel in 
Norway. Eventually, it could become a subsidy fund to stimulate the use of new 
technology, very well electric planes or electric infrastructure. This would make it possible 
to roll out new technology and get more innovation in terms of local solutions in Norway 
than you would have gotten otherwise without the usage of subsidies. We work together on 
this with other actors in the business community to create a CO2 fund, of which aviation 
can be a part.  
 145 
 
R: Just to quickly sum up all that we have been talking about, if you had a distance-
based or a much more aggressive differentiation of emissions, would aviation be 
better or worse today? The state would get the same revenues anyways, so as long as 
they get the revenues… 
 
T: The state’s motivation is to gather money from the flight passenger tax, it is not an 
environmental tax or a climate tax, formally seen. The CO2 tax is surely the same. I don’t 
think it would make a big difference. The state is focused on keeping up its incomes, so 
that if it were formed in a slightly different way, with different types of markets or actors, 
revenues collectively seen will be the same in the medium to long term. 
 
R: If NHO had the opportunity to be the finance minister, how would you design an 
optimal aviation tax, given the need for a tax? 
 
T: I wouldn’t design a tax on aviation at all. It involves a taxation which is socioeconomically 
probable to be incorrect, because it is not connected to any costs of doing business. 
Aviation pays for all of its infrastructure, all of the costs linked to its operations including 
the external costs connected to the environment. There are also noise taxes at night and that 
sort of thing. And we are a part of the quota system, which covers costs linked to 
emissions. It is completely wrong to add a flight tax on top. This creates a worse and more 
expensive supply than you would get otherwise, which involves a socioeconomic loss (link 
to micro theory on DWL, can use a simple illustration here). In principle, I think that this is 
wrong and that the state does not need the money, given that we go in the plus with the oil 
incomes. So we don’t have a pressing need for this type of taxation. It is wrong that this 
kind of tax is on top of the other costs we incur. One must also think about different modes 
of transportation being priced differently – train, private car, plane, etc. Something that 
also gives a socioeconomic loss and an incorrect use of resources is that different modes of 
transport are priced differently. The railroad receives subsidies and economic support, free 
infrastructure, they don’t pay for anything, like aviation does. You get a socioeconomic 
loss and wrongful use of resources with this type of random taxation. This is my opinion, 
that it is wrong to have this kind of tax. You can read about this in the document 
(høringsbrev) that I will send over, that in principle this is completely wrong. 
 
R: The concluding question is in regards to the national budget which is coming on May 
15. If you were to look into a crystal ball, would you think that there will be a drastic 
change in the flight passenger tax or would it be essentially unchanged? 
 
T: There is currently something up for consideration by Parliament, that the flight passenger 
tax should be modified. The government and the Finance Department are probably sitting 
and working with this now. It can come in this year’s budget or it can come in the 2019 
budget. It remains to be seen, but I wouldn’t be surprised if it came up in the next budget.  
 
R: That’s all we had to talk about…  
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R: In order to get some background information, could you state your official job title. 
 
H: I am a research leader within social economy at TØI (Transport økonomisk institutt)  
 
R: Is it okay that we refer to you with your name and job title in our thesis? 
 
H: Yes, basically it is, but we will see, depends on what is said.  
 
R: We just want to say thank you for taking the time to talk with us. We can take a 
quick introduction. My name is Rasmus and I am sitting here with.  
 
K: Hi, Kayla.  
 
H: Hello  
 
R: She is American. The interview is Norwegian, but she understands Norwegian, so if 
she has follow-up questions, does she ask them in English if that is okay? 
 
H: That is okay. However, I don’t know what I can contribute with, but that's another matter. 
 
R: We are looking at the Norwegian air passenger tax, so we have some questions 
related to that. We see you have done a lot of research on aviation earlier and written 
many reports, at least from a socio-economic perspective. Therefore, it would be 
interesting also get your views on our questions. Based on your job. 
 
H: Yes.  
 
R: Then we start with the first question. Norwegian commercial aviation contributes to 
climate emissions. Therefore, aviation is taxed for environmental reasons. In light of this 
information, what is your opinion about taxation of Norwegian aviation given fewer 
available substitutes for flights as a means of transportation in Norway compared to for 
example mainland Europe? 
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H: So the question is, in one way, what kinds of practical alternatives you see, is that what 
you are thinking about? 
 
R: For example, in Norway, if you are going to get around in Norway in the shortest 
possible time, aviation is really the only alternative versus Europe where you have high-
speed trains and so on. So therefore, aviation is an essential part, but it may be very 
heavily taxed, even if it is really one of, in many cases the only usable means of 
transport. 
 
H: Well, I'm not entirely sure if aviation is so heavily taxed compared to other modes of 
transport. I am willing to believe that cars are taxed significantly higher in comparison to the 
cost related to it, at least with regards to long distance. 
 
R: So seen from a socio-economic perspective, aviation is not so heavily taxed as 
everyone makes it seem? 
 
H: No, not in relation to alternative car travel at least. Because, car travel is probably under 
taxed in the cities, but at the same time, I think that car travel is equally heavily taxed between 
the cities or on long distances. Therefore, I do not feel that aviation is so heavily taxed 
compared to the important transportation option.  
 
R: Yes, but also, we are looking, and given the actual climate emissions, because there 
will be more, less emissions for example for a person traveling by plane versus driving. 
 
H: Yes, it is also a bit like that, there is not that a big difference between the emissions from 
driving a car between Oslo and Bergen, and flying. It depends a little on how many people are 
in the car. If you are driving alone in the car, it's worse to drive a car. If you are driving with 
your family, then it is better to drive. In addition, airplanes are much worse than trains, just so 
it is clear. 
 
R: How do you think that the current air passenger tax is working? 
 
H: I perceive it as a pure taxation of airlines. Thus, in reality, this money is taken from the 
profits to the airlines, so that they get such a correspondingly smaller profit. In particular, it 
applies to the shorter routes where the air passenger tax hits hardest compared to the options, 
that more alternatives then arise. So I look at this as a, I do not think it has affected the ticket 
prices remarkably. I think primarily the airlines are feeling this on the bottom line. 
 
R: In light of that, you would Transport Økonomisk Institutt (TØI) describe this as a 
kind of, yes, tax or fee that does not have effect? That this simply... 
 
H: Now, I cannot speak on behalf of the transport economic institute. I can only speak on 
behalf of myself just so it is clear. No, I mean that it has an effect because it limits the 
incentive to start new routes, so it probably limits, there will be fewer profitable routes in 
Norway to put it like that. So, it is probably limiting the air traffic. I think so. 
 
R: Yes, because we have seen quite recently that Widerøe went out and said that they 
would cut 44 of 400 weekly departures as a result of, not necessarily the air passenger 
tax in itself, but that the higher level of fees that has occurred. 
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H: No, I think it is because they have less profitability on the short routes and that, in part, it is 
partly due to that fee. But just to have mentioned it, it does not mention that much that they 
have previously increased the number of slightly longer routes though. For example, they 
have set up direct routes between Lofoten and Oslo and it is clear that they have lost some of 
the basis for these short routes. 
 
R: Have you noticed any consequences after the current air passenger tax was 
introduced in Norwegian aviation? 
 
H: Not as far as I can see, I do not see any particular effect of that charge at all, except 
potentially on the supply side. So, the supply side has been slightly reduced or has not 
increased as much as it might have done otherwise. But it is impossible to see any effect on 
traffic, i.e. on passenger traffic. 
 
R: Some people include Norway's finance minister has said that it is basically just a 
fiscal tax although it is marketed as an environmental tax. What are your thoughts 
about that? 
 
H: No, view this as a fiscal fee, pure taxation of a mode of transport. I think the environmental 
effect is trivial. The reason I think is primarily that one has found a place where you can 
increase the fees without there being, or kept saying, even more protests than there has been. 
 
R: Have you heard of the idea of just taxing empty seats onboard aircraft? 
 
H: I have heard about it yes. It seems a bit weird though. So you might want to tax the seats. 
But to tax empty seats, I think it will be a bit, it will be a very weird way to do it.  
 
R: In the next part of the interview, we will focus more on what the main research 
question is: What will the effect of a theoretical air passenger tax put on empty seats in 
the Norwegian aviation industry be. The purpose of our master's thesis is to look at how 
an alternative air passenger tax put on empty seats will affect the Norwegian aviation 
industry as well as other possible alternative revisions of the current airline fee. We are 
building our thesis upon statements from industry and a number of stakeholders as well 
as an ongoing debate today about how to deal with airline fare. What thoughts do you 
do immediately after hearing this statement? 
 
H: In terms of taxation of empty seats, that would mean that even more problems will arise, 
even less profitability on routes with low load factors. So I assume it will get quite, if you 
collect the same amount to put it like that, I'd think you'll get even greater effect in the form of 
cutting out routes that are unprofitable. Then you can wonder if it, and there would be an 
environmental, environmental impact. That is clear. However, at the same time, some thin 
routes may then disappear, to a great disadvantage for those who use them. 
 
R: So how do you think such a tax would affect the airlines? Because you have Widerøe, 
that is one thing. They are flying a lot regional routes. For example, if there had been an 
exception for aircraft below a given size such as 50 seats to shield the regional routes. 
How would this potentially have turned out on larger routes and aircraft? 
 
H:  I think that this will hit the bottom line of the airlines even harder because they have, it 
will be terribly hard to do anything about the airfare with such a tax. So it will simply reduce 
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profitability and I think one will get a good deal of routes that would simply be closed down. 
I'm thinking what more to say. 
 
R: No, that is an answer if I should say so. For some can argue that, we have found that 
the airlines on average only manage to cover zero to fifty percent of the current air 
passenger tax through higher prices and hence, if one has more than a certain load 
factor, it could for example become less expensive to fill an empty plane, to pay for 
empty seats versus occupied seats, which is and argument someone could use.  
 
H: What's happening is that passengers give an income then in addition to the ticket and thus 
it's natural for them to adjust down, almost to lower the ticket price at the same time the costs 
either are there or increasing. If you want to get the same amount of tax revenue, you also 
have to pay twice as much. Because if you assume that the load factor is 2/3 in the first place, 
then about 80-90 kroner is not sufficient, but one would need to collect about 170 kroner. So 
it will, I think it's going to be relatively catastrophic to say it right. I think it could remind a 
little of the situation in 1999 when Color Air went bankrupt and Braathens was bought by 
SAS. In each case, it would go in that direction. 
 
R: But what would you say would be a sufficiently effective price on an empty seat, 
possibly in order for it to achieve its, in order to achieve an effective environmental 
effect? 
 
H: What did you say now?   
 
R: What would you say would be a sufficiently effective price per empty seat, possibly in 
order for such a tax to be able to achieve an efficiency and environmental impact? 
 
H: No, it is very difficult to say anything about. I would believe that, no, because I mean, as 
said, that today's fee has an effect and to get the same, exactly the same effect in total, we 
would have to double the amount. But at the same time, an air passenger tax on empty seats 
will work more efficiently than a tax on the passenger in terms of cutting out routes that are 
not profitable. Thus, one might think that you need to bring in less money then. Thus, you can 
operate with a lower revenue but maybe a similar amount per lot compared to what you now 
have in occupied seats. 
 
R: We also want to look into other alternative suggestions as to how a possible air 
passenger tax may be formed. What is your opinion about an air passenger tax on 
passengers and empty seats based on distance as they have in other countries? In 
addition, as being introduced in Sweden now for example. 
 
H: I do not know about the Swedish, what the Swedes have done but basically I think it's a lot 
better with a distance based fee, but I'm a bit unsure of what to do with travel made up of 
several flights. It is clear that if it turns out that it is much more expensive to fly directly from 
Oslo to China than to fly through another country, I don’t think it would be so smart. 
 
R: That people would rather fly via Amsterdam than fly on a direct route. 
 
H: Yes, that might be the effect and it is not, it is not desirable because it would lead to both 
poorer service and a poorer environment. So there is a limitation on that. But domestically, I 
cannot see the problem with this. 
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R: Given the evolution of ever more fuel and emissions-efficient aircraft, you have, 
among other things these new E2’s from Embraer that Widerøe is getting, you have the 
MAX from Boeing, NEO from Airbus. Can an air passenger tax also be differentiated to 
reward airlines to speed up using more efficient and environmentally friendly aircraft? 
 
H: Yes, you can imagine, but then I think one just as well should bet on the CO2 tax. I think 
that just as well, you can go on a straightforward basis and tax what one wants to avoid, 
climate emissions, greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, I doubt how it turns out when 
you consider that aviation is part of this European quota system, as on the other hand, as the 
discussion about how effective it is because quota prices are so incredibly low and there are 
many quotas left over. But in principle, the emissions are taken care of by the quota system, 
so you can wonder how much it turns into in theory for if you do not think it's going to be 
practical, it's natural to think of the CO2 tax primarily. 
 
R: For when, when you have this quota system through. If there is less pollution here, 
someone will still pollute more another place. Since Norway has committed itself to this 
and we are seeing on the horizon that ICAO is working on a worldwide solution, it 
would simply be more socio-economically profitable to scrap the air passenger tax in its 
whole and instead reap the increased benefit through increased economic activity of it 
being removed since the environmental issue has been taken into account? 
 
H: Yes, with an environmental fee, I think so. Then you can as well drop this fee because it is 
somehow solved in other ways, but the problem that is, has a fiscal effect. Then to get the 
same proceeds, you have to do something different and then the question is where to get it 
from. I mean, personally, I really mean that Norway's main environmental problem with 
regard to climate is that there are no big challenges related to solving demands to reduce 
emissions in the rest of the economy where there is no quota system and what is achieved to a 
certain degree, with this flight fee, it is possible that the government may move a little traffic 
car travel, so it actually seems to work opposite as intended. I do not think there is any big 
effect then but that can be some effect. 
 
R: Do you have any calculations on how a removal of the air passenger tax would have 
impacted the economy as a whole if you include potential gains then? 
 
H: No, we have no such calculations. I thought I had calculated that there would be an effect 
when the air passenger tax arrived, but I have not managed to see any such effect, and that is 
because, as I said, the airlines simply failed to pass the tax on to the passengers. And that 
Norwegian and SAS and Widerøe are earning less, that we are beginning to see the effect of 
now. So you read in the newspaper about Norwegian all the time and how bad it goes. But 
they have a very large route program and it's not just in Norway they operate.  
 
R: But would, if a tax based on distance would have been introduced tomorrow, do you 
think Norwegian aviation would have been better or worse than today as a whole? 
 
H: I think it would become better because then you would have a fee that works in relation to 
the income, i.e. the ticket prices. 
 




H: I would at least look more at where the money comes in i.e. the revenue, the ticket income, 
tried to relate it more to that and then I would have tried to relate more to what one would like 
to have as climate emissions and so on. So would have been a balance between those two 
factors. Ideally, one should, to the extent that one has taken out, say the environment, to the 
extent that one has taxed as much as the environmental impact implies, one should try to tax 
where price elasticity is the lowest or where it the reduction on demand is minimized, so it 
will in principle be on business travel then. But how to get theory into practice is hard to say. 
But it depends a bit on distance and CO2 emissions and things like that. I would relate it more 
to that.  
 
R: Do you think the airlines would be more receptive to paying a form of air passenger 
tax if the revenues were earmarked aviation-related climate measures? 
 
H: Yes, I certainly think so. They are for this quota because they are in the quota system so 
they are not completely; they are not against everything to put it that way. I do not really see 
what kind of measures that would though. 
 
R: Some have mentioned this with, the creation of a general where all revenue goes in, 
for example, that will support this with biofuel production. Avinor is very busy with, or 
has at least launched strong surveys with regard to future electric aircraft and such 
infrastructure. How do you think this with biofuels and potential electric aircraft in the 
long run by 2030 could affect an industry or aviation industry? 
 
H: Yes, these are two questions where one is on biofuel and there I can see no other problem 
than that it would be bound to how much biofuels one can get in an environmentally friendly 
way and the other is that it is as of today, very expensive compared to normal fuel. And it is 
clear that you come across that you could use this tax to subsidize that fuel after a while. In 
the case of electric aircraft it is clear that one is now starting to get, there is a sufficient 
electrification at least technologically. Thus, there are not so many electric vehicles on the 
market really other than Norway. But taking place there are, lots going on technologically 
now. So I have a certain belief that there may be some aviation with electric aircraft on short 
stretches in the future and it will be very good environmentally though. But I think we are 
limited to relatively short stretches and relatively light aircraft or small aircraft then. 
 
R: Do you think it will have something. So, there is talk about lots of costs if you look at, 
at least on that side. Would it have any, can the costs be defended against the gain you 
could possibly get from reduced emissions or is it a little more symbolic? 
 
H: I have to say that I find it hard to believe, even with electric cars it is difficult to find a 
profitability. So that it is going to be profitable with electric aircraft from an environmental 
perspective, I find it difficult to believe. And at least it will probably take a little longer time 
than up to year 2030. 
 
R: So the key would rather be to focus potentially more on improvements to the current 
plane with regards to weight and engines and consumption in general that way? 
 
H: Yes for a while ahead, I think so. It is also clear that biofuel is one, things happen and it is 
clear that it may be that in the future it may prove to be a way to go. But per today it seems a 
bit expensive and a bit difficult to get enough in a good way, so avoid. I do not know what 
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needs to happen in practice to serve the whole aviation sector, but I feel it will become a 
competition. On the other hand, it may be that it is just aviation that is going to use biofuel 
and to imagine that land transportation could switch over to electricity to a much greater 
extent, so that biofuels can be reserved for aviation to a much greater extent. 
 
R: That it can simply be a good option. 
 
H: Yes, that is maybe the most nearby option. 
 
R: Beyond that, I do not think we have so many more questions. We got good answers 
on  most of the things we wondered about . May we ask if you want a copy of our 
assignment when we arrive when we finish it in June? 
 
H: Yes, I'd love to have that. 
 
 









Associate Professor of Strategy, BI (Norwegian Business School) 
 
Notes: 
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R: Given that there’s a lot less substitutability when it comes to ways of traveling in 
Norway, with getting there in a reasonable amount of time...compared to example 
Denmark and France, where they have a lot of bullet trains and so on, what is your 
opinion on taxing aviation for environmental reasons, or taxing in general? 
 
E: Well, I think you absolutely should tax air travel for environmental reasons, because it is a 
major pollutant, or polluter. I think that taxation, the way it’s done now, which is primarily 
for…I’m not sure there is any sort of environmental taxation at all in the Norwegian airline 
industry as it is now. There is a passenger tax which applies per trip, per passenger, with some 
reduction for multi-leg trips. But that is a fiscal tax in the sense that its sole purpose is to get 
money into the government’s coffers. So I think the environmental effect is incidental and 
probably not very big.  
 
Tax…as for the way the Norwegian airline system is financed, there is an implied tax actually 
in the tax free system. There is one airport in Norway that makes money, which is 
Gardermoen. Avinor will tell you that there are 5 or 6 airports that make money, but that’s not 
true, chiefly because all the investments are taken centrally, so if you farm out the 
investments, there is only Gardermoen that really makes money. And that’s used to subsidize 
the 46 or so other airports. But that’s a redistributive tax between the… and its essentially 
subsidizing travel to the more remote areas of Norway. 
 
So, yes I think absolutely we should increase the taxes on air travel in Norway. And they 
should be environmental, and I think the best way to do that would be to tax fuel. It’s so easy 
to do and it encourages the airlines even more – they’re already really big on trying to have 
modern airplanes to cut down on fuel cost, but that would encourage that even more. So I 
think that the taxation that we have now for environmental purposes, that’s not what it’s set 
up to do, it may have that effect to a small degree. But Norwegians are the most frequently 
traveling people in Europe, except for Iceland and Malta which are island nations. And 
Norwegians are rich, so we travel a lot.  
 
K: What immediately comes to your mind when we say “the flight passenger tax?” 
 
E: It was a political compromise because they needed to raise another billion. And, I don’t 
know, some minor party said “why don’t we have a passenger tax?” And the conservatives, 
who essentially were against it, had to implement it. And as they said during the debate back 
then, it’s a fiscal tax to plug a hole in the budget. I think I’ve answered the question. 
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R: How do you feel that the current tax is working? 
 
E: I think I’ve answered that too. It does not reduce travel that much. It may have had an 
effect on making Ryanair pull out of Rygge, but I think they would have done that anyway. It 
has had an effect on profitability on Norwegian and SAS, because they haven’t taken it out in 
increasing prices. For Norwegian, in particular, it has been quite a drain on their profitability.  
 
R: We have talked to some people and they said that the estimate for how much they 
would be able to recoup in increased ticket prices was form 0-50% only. So it’s taken a 





R: There have been some media reports about Bjørn Kjos saying that he would prefer it, 
and also some environmental organizations who also wanted a tax to be put on empty 
seats. In the next part of the interview, we will focus more closely on our research area, 
which relates to different taxation schemes for Norwegian aviation. For example, we are 
exploring the effect of a theoretical seat tax placed on empty seats and how this will 
affect Norwegian aviation. We are basing this on peoples’ media statements, and 
towards the end we will look at other ways in which you could redo the current tax. 
What immediately comes to your mind after hearing this statement? 
 
E: It’s an interesting thought. In terms of the Norwegian…I mean, what it does is it raises the 
importance of load factors, filling the plane full. It will be a boon for people like Ryanair, or 
Norwegian. Mostly Ryanair and Wizzair, I think, because they are very good at having high 
load factors. It would be a problem for SAS, which is much more of a network airline. A 
network airline needs to maintain  a certain capacity in their whole network, their whole 
infrastructure, in order to provide necessary flexibility. So it would be a harder thing for SAS 
than for Norwegian.  
 
In terms of environment, it may cut down on frequency a bit. It would certainly make airlines 
cancel more flights. It might also encourage airlines to…let’s say there’s 100 kroner tax on an 
empty seat. That means that…I don’t know what the current passenger tax is now. If you get 
rid of the passenger tax as it is now, there would be certain taxes per passenger for the airport. 
But it might be in the airlines’ interest to subsidize that. So maybe you would get more 
spurious travel, people standing around waiting to get a free trip somewhere, just because they 
don’t want to pay the airline tax. I doubt if that1s going to be a big factor though. It would hit 
SAS harder than Norwegian, and no wonder that Bjørn Kjos likes that. 
 
K: What do you think if the FOT routes were to be exempt? The state subsidized flight 
routes to the smaller cities and smaller airports.  
 
E: Well, yeah, I think you probably have to do that, because it would be the government 
paying out money on one hand and taking back with another. There would have to be some 
sort of compensation scheme for that.  
 
R: How do you think this would have had an effect on other key stakeholders in the 
society? For example, airports, businesses that rely on air travel, and also companies 
who deliver services to airlines, such as handling agents, catering, and such? 
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E: I have no idea what would happen.  Norwegian air travel has been increasing every year, 
and it probably will increase, if not by internal travel within Norway, by increased tourism, 
particularly from Asia. There are new airplanes that allow more direct flights between various 
airports in Norway, and for instance, the US, and after a while in Asia. So I think the 
businesses you’re talking about are primarily driven by traffic volume, and that, I think, is not 
driven by taxes. It depends on how much you tax, of course, but I’m not sure. It may have an 
effect for businesses in the sense that it would be…you might get more marginal flights 
canceled if you depend less on the flight system. But the way things are set up in a lot of 
cases, you have to return the airplane, because it’s going to start flying the next day. There are 
situations where you may just want to pay the tax in order to not disrupt the setup. So I doubt 
if that’s going to have much of an effect.  
 
R: What do you think the effects would be… you mentioned price strategy very briefly, 
do you think it would have a big impact on price strategy? And also would the future 
fleet planning go into more smaller planes like C-series, Embraeir, instead of the larger 
Boeings and Airbuses. 
 
E: Again, I’m not sure. In the long term, it may have an effect. But a tax like that sounds like 
an experiment, so I think people would sort of wait for a while to see what they do. Because 
you can’t order a 100 million kroner plane, sorry a hundred million dollar plane, on some sort 
of tax experiment. If you look at the structure of the airplane fleet, you’re getting more and 
cheaper planes that can fly far. There is some innovation in the lower aspect, that you get 
short-haul planes which are much more fuel efficient. And there’s a void in the market for 
reliable passenger planes that could land on the relatively short airport runways that Norway 
has. That’s a peculiar problem for Norway, that Widerøe is facing because their fleet is very 
old and there really aren’t planes that can function in that role. It’s just not being produced 
anywhere. So something will happen with the fleet structure, but I don’t think that a tax like 
that would have much of an effect on them. One thing about the tax is that it would probably 
feel more just. People probably say that’s a better way of taxing, because it encourages the 
airlines to fill up the planes. But I doubt if you ___ (incomprehensible, audio at 15:40).  
 
R: The next question you answered earlier, but just to sum up, taxes primarily affect 
airlines margins because they aren’t able to get them back because of increased 
competition and lower ticket prices. If an empty seat tax were to be implemented 
tomorrow, would the aviation industry be worse off or better off than it is today?  
 
E: It would be a boon for the people that are good at filling their planes high, load factor 
would become a much more important factor. And I think, if you’re just comparing 
Norwegian to SAS, which are the two big carriers in Norway, it would be better for 
Norwegian because they have almost a, as far as I remember, a ten percent higher load factor 
than SAS. And SAS’ load factor is widely imbalanced. There are some flights that have 
relatively few seats taken. So it would affect SAS more than Norwegian. Load factor becomes 
more important, that’s the main thing. The trouble for the airlines in general is that the airline 
industry is interesting in the sense that everybody makes money except the airlines. And the 
reason for that is that they have a very un-differentiable product and high fixed costs. And so 
there are lots of schemes to do that. What you tend to see in a situation like that is lots of 
experimentation at the pricing side. You try to come up with all kinds of prices. And you 
would probably see some innovations in pricing, if you go to an empty seat tax, primarily 
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encouraging people to fill up planes in order for them not to pay it. You would probably see 
an even more, even higher differentiation between cheap seats and regular seats. 
 
R: Yeah, I’ve heard the saying that the way to become a millionaire in aviation is to start 
out as a billionaire. 
 
E: Yeah, if you want to create a small fortune in airlines, just start out with a big one.  
 
K: What portion of aviation taxes can be passed on to consumers? For an airline like 
SAS versus Norwegian?  
 
E: Relatively few. Like I said, the competition is heartless. It’s kind of interesting, because if 
you talk to people who do marketing and are concerned with things like company reputation 
and things like that, they’re forever saying “oh this airlines has a much better reputation than 
others.” But the airline that has by far the worst reputation is Ryanair. Incidentally, they’re 
also the biggest and most profitable airline in Europe. So when it comes to deciding whether 
you’re going to fly or not, the first thing you look at is who flies there, and the second thing 
you look at is price, and anything else is just incidental. As long as you’re not paying for it 
yourself, which is why they have all the airplanes frequent flyer clubs and so on. 
 
R: For an empty seat tax to have an efficiency, to have an effect as an environmental tax, 
what do you think a sufficient or effective price would be in order to achieve that? For 
planes to fly as fully as possible? 
 
E: I don’t know. I would suggest you talk to Frode Steen at NHH, who is more of a calculator 
of these types of things than I am. I think, I don’t know, a natural thing might be to take 
today’s passenger tax and switch it to an empty seat tax, for instance. But it would be…it 
wouldn’t necessarily be a complicated tax to administer, but you would have to make some 
sort of compensation for very low frequency routes that you want to maintain. And it might 
actually turn a few routes that are currently on a commercial basis and have them become 
routes that you have to support. 
 
K: Do you think that there would ever be a tax high enough to actually deter people 
from traveling for non-necessary reasons? That would actually work in reality? 
 
E: Not as long as Norwegians are so stinking rich as we are.  
 
R: In the next part, we will look closer at some other taxation alternatives. The first one 
has been implemented in several other countries today. Would it be better for an 
aviation tax on passengers to be distance-based instead of a flat fee, such as today?  
 
K: Like the Swedish model, for example. 
 
E: From an environmental standpoint , yes. The thing is, we’re getting into very minute 
details. I think it’s more interesting to say, could you double it? Maybe that would make 
people travel less. If you wanted to get really finicky on it, an airplane consumes much more 
fuel going up and down. If you did it purely distance based, you would essentially encourage 
more short hops. That’s why I think taxing the fuel would be the way to go, because that will 
encourage airlines to save fuel as much as possible, and it’s a much more direct tax on what it 
is that actually pollutes. So I think that a model like that, it’s a distortion in another way, I’m 
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not sure that the added complexity is beneficial. I don’t think it makes that much of a 
difference.  
 
R: You said earlier that it would encourage airlines to introduce more efficient aircraft 
regarding fuel burn and emissions. Could a passenger tax also be differentiated to 
increase that incentive? If you have a newer aircraft, you’d pay less even though you use 
less fuel.  
 
E: Perhaps. But we’re talking about very small percentages here. If you look at emissions in 
airlines, there is a certain effect of new technology. And the airlines are actually fairly well-
incentivized to go to new technology anyway, not just because the new airplanes are more 
fuel efficient but they are much simpler to maintain. You’re getting into modern technology, 
which is much more modular-based, you can switch out modules when they change. Things 
are digital rather than electronic and so on. There’s also a change in the business models for 
the people that deliver, for instance, engines and other things more towards service. So your 
costs are reduced quite a lot by getting new airplanes. The problem for most mainly legacy 
carriers is that they don’t have the money to finance them. But they don’t get anything for 
their old planes. So I think the incentive is already there. Further subsidizing a transitional 
fleet…I mean, there’s a waiting list for these new planes anyway. So I don’t think that…I’m 
sortof, I kind of like more simple taxation schemes, which is why I like taxing the fuel, 
because it’s un-arguable. One, the fuel causes so much pollution. And you could switch and 
say maybe you should tax CO2 or NOx or things like that, but it’s harder to measure and it 
becomes more theoretical.  
 
K: On that subject, do you think that airlines would be receptive towards this tax, 
towards any tax, if all of the revenues that were collected went to a specific fund that 
was earmarked for aviation-related climate efforts, instead of in the general fund as it is 
today? 
 
E: Maybe, I’m not sure what that could be. 
 
R: You have already NHO’s NOX fund, where the proceeds from the NOX tax goes into 
a fund used by the airlines to fund further research into more friendly biofuel, for 
instance.  
 
E: That’s subsidizing a switch to biofuel, which is currently 0.2% percent or something, so 
almost nothing. I don’t think that's enough. Again, you introduce so much complexity by 
doing that, you know? You’ve got to have people deciding on what to do on these things and 
so on and so forth. Nah, I think it should go into government coffers. If this research is 
interesting, we should set up a results-based incentive for the effect approach, and then make 
an appropriate investment decision. 
 
R: We’ve read more and more lately about especially Avinor having a greater interest in 
electrical planes, especially in the more regional routes of Norway. Do you that that’s 
just a symbolic thing, or would electrical planes really have an effect? 
 
E: As far as I know, there is no electrical plane now that can take any commercially 
interesting number of passengers. This is at this point. It’s going to take at least 30 years to 
get into commercial use. It is much, much harder to get an electrical plane to become 
commercially viable than it is to get an electrical car to become commercially viable. And 
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outside of Norway, you don’t see any country that has had a big effect, and we’ve had electric 
cars for a long time, since roughly 1985. So, I saw that announcement from Avinor about 
electrical airplanes, and I was interviewed by the newspaper, and my answer was basically 
there must have been some sort of technical development they’ve seen that I haven’t. 
Because, nope, I don’t think that’s going to happen. You may have drones, for one or two 
people, but I doubt in the short term, maybe the next 20-25 years, I doubt that’s going to have 
any effect whatsoever.  
 
K: With the next budget coming up on May 15th, what do you predict is going to happen 
in regards to the current flight passenger tax? 
 
E: I think it’s going to stay, because taxes once proposed have a tendency to stay, unless 
there’s a huge outcry against them. I don’t know, the politicians are fairly pragmatic when it 
comes to the airline industry. I don’t think we’re going to see any big changes. 
 
R: But if the air passenger tax theoretically were to be abolished, do you think that the 
total positive effects on society in the form of increased profitability, maybe more travel, 
would outweigh the revenue lost by abolishing it? 
 
E: I seem to remember that the revenue calculated is approximately one billion (NOK). I 
don’t think it makes a difference whatsoever. It does not have a big effect on travel, on how 
much people travel. And one billion for a country as rich as Norway doesn’t matter one way 
or another. The whole thing is very symbolic and very inconsequential. To get an effect, you 
would have to tax airline fuel, and you would have to tax it hard, and you would have to tax it 
across nations.  
 
R: Do you think we’ve heard about _____(audio breaks up) 
 
E: If the EU got together and imposed an airline fuel tax…I’m sort of wondering why 
countries don’t do it all over, where is the Middle East? It’s eminently rational. I don’t think 
it’s politically impossible to do. 
 
R: There’s already a quota emissions trading scheme in place within the EEA. Does this 
have any effects on curbing the number of flights as you see it, or is it too weak in its 
design and price to have an effect. 
 
E: The quotas are fairly cheap. I don’t think it makes much difference. People might get a 
better conscience, they can say they are purchasing quotas, but it doesn’t cost much. In order 
for taxes or schemes like that to have an effect, they have to be economically consequential. 
At present, they are not.  
 
R: Just to summarize, you think that the tax should be put on fuel and not on passenger 
seats.  
 
E: It strikes me as the simplest and easiest solution. Although politically, I don’t know, I 
appear frequently on the radio and TV to talk about airlines. And I sometimes wonder why, 
because airlines are not such a big industry. But a lot of us fly, and it’s something that’s 
popular to write about. A lot of people want to start airline companies, not because it’s such a 
huge idea from an investment viewpoint, because it’s not, but because it’s kind of glamorous 
to own an airline and a lot of people just want to fly.   
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Politically, it’s very unpopular to do anything that restricts people’s freedom to fly. You saw 
that when the conservative government came in, almost 8 years ago, and Siv Jensen became 
the finance minister, one of the first things she did was increase the alcohol quota with 2 
bottles of wine. And that was…A) it was popular among her voters and B) it was a very 
convenient way to increase the subsidies from Gardermoen to the other airports without it 
being visible.  Not visible in the state budget, because it’s all taken care of within Avinor, so 
it’s a very popular thing. If you look at it from a rational viewpoint, it is completely insane, 
the whole tax free thing. At Gardermoen, you have the biggest shopping center in Norway, 
and it’s open from 6 in the morning until 2 at night, whenever there’s an airplane. And you’re 
almost forced to walk through it. And if you continue, about half the people who fly to 
Gardermoen, fly to Gardermoen. The rest fly off. And if they come from abroad, they carry 
very heavy goods until the planes, burning even more fuel. And it’s a subsidization of people 
who are rich, because they can afford to travel. So the whole tax free thing is just insane and 
should be stopped. But that would force the government to come up with 85 billion kroner in 
order to subsidize all those airports out there, and it would make visible just how expensive 
they are, because they are really expensive. But from my colleague’s point of view, it’s just 
____(another speaker comes in, difficult to hear.)…tax fuel and get rid of the tax free system, 
because it’s just insane. 
 
 
















Appendix 3: Discontinued Passenger Taxes in Other Countries 
 
As there are countries currently enforcing different aviation taxes on departing passengers, we 
also find examples of countries that previously has had some form of air passenger tax only to 
abolish it later on. These countries include Denmark, The Netherlands and Ireland (SOU 
2016:83, 2016). In addition to these countries, there were also plans on introducing a flight tax 
in Portugal, although the government chose not to proceed with the plans. In the following, we 
will briefly look closer at these cases. 
 
The discontinued passenger charge in Denmark was introduced in 1991 and was meant to 
replace the so-called Charter Fee (Jørgensen et al., 2005). To begin with, this tax only applied 
for international flights and was set to 65 DKK. This however changed when the EU 
commission in 1996 informed Denmark that the tax was in violation of treaty provisions 
regarding the freedom of movement for people and services due to the charge only affecting 
international flights. The tax was therefore changed in 1998 to include both domestic and 
international departures and the tax was set to 75 DKK (SOU 2016:83, 2016). 
 
After the change in 1998, some additional minor changes besides those mentioned above were 
made to the tax due to the effect on important domestic routes with low traffic volumes. This 
also applied to routes to Greenland and the Faeroe Islands, which are regarded as domestic 
Danish flights. The tax revenue from the tax increased steadily from 55 million DKK in 1991 
to 504 million DKK in 2005 with the highest peak occurring in 2001. In 2004, 16 percent of 
the tax revenue came from domestic routes while 84 percent came from international routes 
(Jørgensen et al., 2005). In 2005, the Danish government decided to gradually discontinue the 
passenger charge. This was achieved by cutting the tax in half from 75 DKK to 37,5 DKK per 
passenger in 2006 before completely removing the tax from 01.01.2007 (Skatteministeriet, 
2014). This was done to improve conditions at and the competiveness of Danish airports as well 
as combating the negative effects it had on the Danish economy. It is also claimed that the tax 
caused passengers to travel to airports located in Sweden instead (SOU 2016:83, 2016). After 
the tax was discontinued in 2007, the Danish government suggested during the summer of 2011 
to reinstate the tax of 75 DKK. Despite the suggestion, the plans were never carried out (SOU 
2016:83, 2016).  
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The Netherlands is also a country that introduced an air passenger tax only to abolish it later 
on. The air passenger tax was introduced by the Dutch government from 1 July 2008 under the 
2008 national tax plan (Gordijn & Kolkman, 2011). The air passenger tax affected passengers 
that departed from Dutch airports but the tax did not apply to transfer passengers or to freight 
shipments. The air passenger tax was split into two different rates depending on the distance of 
travel. If the destination was located within an EU member country or a maximum distance of 
2 500 kilometers from the Netherlands the tax rate was 11,25 euros and for other flights the tax 
rate was 45 euros. The expected tax revenues were 350 million euros.  
 
The air passenger tax was regarded as one of the instruments to be used in making the tax 
system greener. One of the stated objectives was to transfer part of the taxes levied on labor and 
profit on to taxing environmental pollution. An air passenger tax was seen as a suitable 
instrument by the Cabinet with regards to taxing environmental pollution as air travel obviously 
contributed to pollution. Before the tax was implemented, it was estimated that the tax would 
cause the number of passengers travelling from Amsterdam Schiphol Airport to drop by around 
8-10 percent. At the time, this was considered to be acceptable numbers as this would only be 
a short-term drop, and that the numbers would quickly pick up again due to increasing growth 
at the time and therefore preventing an actual decrease in passenger numbers. The worst-case 
scenario, a temporary delay in growth would occur.  
 
As a result of the tax, passenger numbers began to fall immediately, especially at Amsterdam 
Schiphol Airport while the level of transfer passengers remained the same. Conservative 
estimates of the effects stemming from the air passenger tax are nearly two million fewer 
passengers departing from Amsterdam Schiphol Airport during the period. It must however be 
said that some of the effects experienced also came as a result of the global economic crisis and 
other trends and developments. Passengers in the Netherlands started using international 
airports such as Düsseldorf, Weeze and Brussels instead. Although this was a trend that began 
before the tax was implemented, the implementation of the tax accelerated this trend with 
Weeze airport seeing a 50 percent increase in Dutch passengers during the period of which the 
air passenger tax existed. KLM, the national airline of the Netherlands said in early October 
that they had 230 000 fewer passengers since the introduction of the air passenger tax. This 
number was in late November increased to 400 000 fewer passengers because of the tax.  
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After the travel and tourism industry released disappointing economic performance data, SEO 
Economic Research was commissioned to study the impact that the air passenger tax had made. 
The impact on airlines losing business, airports, tour operators and the tourism industry were 
losses of approximately 1.2 to 1.3 billion euros. The tax also failed to generate the expected tax 
revenue stated in the Coalition Agreement. The Cabinet then responded to the protests and 
negative effects of the air passenger tax by abolishing it in two steps as a measure in fighting 
the economic crisis. The first step involved setting the air passenger tax down to zero (€0) as of 
1 July 2009. The second step was to completely abolish the air passenger tax as of 1 January 
2010, a step that was made to offer the sector certainty in difficult times. A precondition for 
this was that Schiphol was to improve its competitive position through a number of measures. 
Another factor taken into account was aviation’s entry into the EU CO2 emissions trade system 
as of 2012 (Gordijn & Kolkman, 2011). 
 
Ireland previously enforced a tax called the Air Travel Tax. This was a departure tax put on all 
passengers departing from Irish airports since 30 March 2009 (Veldhuis & Zuidberg, 2009). 
However, flights operated on aircraft with a capacity of less than 20 passengers and flights 
operating from airports with less than 50 000 departing passengers the previous calendar year, 
were exempt from the Air Travel Tax (Revenue - Irish Tax and Customs, 2017). 
 
Originally, to begin with, the tax was split between two different rates. If the flight was longer 
than 300 kilometers from Dublin airport, the rate per passenger was 10 euros and if the flight 
was within 300 kilometers of Dublin airport, the rate was 2 euros (Veldhuis & Zuidberg, 2009). 
If no reduction in demand for air travel occurred, then the projected tax revenues from the air 
travel tax in 2009 would amount to 130 million euros. Based on a report commissioned by the 
airlines Aer Lingus, Ryanair and Cityjet in 2009, airlines have not been able to pass the air 
travel tax on to passengers through higher airfares. Instead, the airlines reacted with a 
combination of absorbing the tax by lowering fares and redeploying capacity outside of Ireland. 
Therefore, the actual revenue loss across all sectors as a result of the air passenger tax is higher 
than previously expected due to the impact of higher prices alone, which is estimated at between 
428 million euros and 482 million euros compared to the tax revenue of only 116 million euros.  
  
In 2011, the air passenger tax saw a change in the design. The rate changed from being distanced 
based to a flat tax of 3 euros per passenger regardless of distance flown (SOU 2016:83, 2016). 
This was due to the EU commission remarking that the previous rates being distanced based, 
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was in conflict with the treaty provisions of free movement of services. On 1 April 2014, the 
air travel tax was abolished. This was due to the excessive consequences the tax had on the Irish 
economy (SOU 2016:83, 2016).  
 
Portugal is a country which proposed to introduce a tax on departing passengers in 2014. It was 
supposed to be introduced as part of a green tax reform where aviation would compensate for 
their climate impact. In a slightly changed proposal, the Portuguese government in 2014 
proposed to tax passengers on domestic flights with 3 euros and passengers travelling on flights 
outside the EEA with 15 euros. Passengers travelling on international flights within the EEA 
would be exempt from the tax. The proposal was expected to be approved together with the 
budget in 2015, however the government decided not to include the proposed tax in the green 
tax reform after all. The reason for this was that aviation tax would be counterproductive and 
jeopardizing growth in an important sector for the Portuguese economy. It was also argued that 
the aviation would soon be covered by a global mechanism. Therefore, despite the proposed 
tax being able to generate an estimated 33 million euros in revenues, the proposed tax was 
dropped from the green reform because of the potential decreased interest in Portuguese airports 












Appendix 4: Current Air Passenger Taxes in Other Countries 
 
The following table  (adapted from PwC, 2017 and  (European Business Aviation Association, 
2015) lists examples of the different countries and their passenger taxes that can be found in 
Europe. A detailed text explanation follows below the table.  
 
Country Name Rates 
Austria Air Transport Levy Short haul: €7, Medium haul: €15, Long 
haul: €35  
Bosnia Government Tax $12 USD Flat Fee 
Croatia Civil Aviation Authority Tax Domestic: €0,68, International: €1,37 




Within EU: €4,48, Outside EU: €8,06 
EU Economy: €1,13 Non EU Economy: 
€4,51 EU Business class: €11,27 Non EU 
Business class: €45,07 
Germany Air Transport Tax Within EU & EFTA: €7,47, Outside EU & 
EFTA but max 6000km : €23,32, Other 
countries: €41,99 
Greece Airport Development Charge €12 Flat Fee 
Italy Council City Tax From Rome: €7,50, Other cities: €6,50 
Latvia Passenger Service Charge €3,10 Flat Fee 
Luxembourg Passenger Service Charge €3,79 Flat Fee 
Norway Air Passenger Tax 83 NOK Flat Fee 
United 
Kingdom 
Air Passenger Duty Less than 2000 miles: £13 Economy and 
£26 Business class. Above 2000 miles: £78 
Economy and £156 Business class 
Serbia CAD passenger tax €0,98 Flat fee 
 
As in Norway, there are also other countries that have introduced air passenger taxes over the 
years. It is estimated that total passenger taxes in European aviation will raise 6 billion euros in 
tax revenues during 2017 (PwC, 2017). It is however worth noting that the size of the tax and 
way the different taxes work vary from country to country and therefore in some cases, making 
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a direct comparison more difficult. The following list is an example of the different countries 
and passenger taxes that can be found in Europe: 
- Austria: Air Transport Levy 
- Croatia: Civil Aviation Authority Tax  
- France:  Civil Aviation Tax, Solidarity Tax, Fiscal Tax (Corsica) 
- Germany: Air Transport Tax 
- Greece: Airport Development Charge 
- Italy: Council City Tax 
- Latvia: Passenger Service Charge 
- Luxembourg – Passenger Service Charge  
- Norway: Air Passenger Tax 
- UK: Air Passenger Duty 
- Bosnia: Government (European Business Aviation Association, 2015) 
- Serbia: CAD passenger tax (European Business Aviation Association, 2015).  
 
The air passenger taxes mentioned above are taxes that are paid to the federal government with 
the purpose of raising revenue instead of being collected with the intention of offsetting the cost 
of a service provided, as aligned to the IATA list of ticket and airport taxes and fees (PwC, 
2017). Any aviation tax rates mentioned below are per passenger.  
 
The taxes that are most similar to the Norwegian air passenger tax can be found in Bosnia, 
Serbia, Greece, Latvia and Luxembourg. The similarity is that all of these countries charge a 
flat fee for all passengers regardless of distance flown. The main differences are that the 
Bosnian tax is only levied on passengers travelling on international flights. The taxes in Serbia, 
Latvia and Luxembourg apply for all passengers. This also applies to the tax found in Greece, 
although some intra Greek routes are exempt from taxation. The rates for the different countries 
are as follows: Bosnia USD $12, Serbia €0,98, Greece €12, Latvia €3,10 and Luxembourg 
€3,79.  
 
Germany, Austria and Croatia are countries that also have introduced air passenger taxes. The 
taxes in these countries however vary by distance flown. The Austrian tax differentiates 
between short haul (€7), medium haul (€15) and long haul (€35) where different countries and 
territories are placed in the different distance categories. The German Air Transport Tax 
differentiates between flying within the EU and EFTA (€7,47), countries not a member of the 
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EU but within 6 000km of Frankfurt (€23,32) and other countries (€41,99). The tax in Croatia 
does not depend on distance but has one rate for international flights (€1,37) and one for 
domestic flights and transfer passengers (€0,68). In Italy, carriers are subject to the council city 
tax. The rate of the tax depends on which airport the flight departs from. The rates differ 
depending if the passenger departs from an airport located in Rome (€7,50) or other airports 
(€6,50). For executive air charter flights, Italy also enforces a tax called the Italian Aero Taxi 
Tax where the rate to be paid is determined based on the distance flown.  
 
France operates with two different taxes on aviation. The first one is called the Civil Aviation 
Tax and applies to all commercial flights departing from an airport situated in French territory. 
The rate of the tax depends on whether you are traveling within the EU (€4,48) or outside the 
EU (€8,06). On top of the Civil Aviation Tax, one is also subject to the Solidarity Tax which is 
tax devoted to aid programs. This tax also applies to all commercial flights departing from an 
airport situated in French territory. The Solidarity Tax also differentiates between class of travel 
in addition to distance, meaning that flying business class is taxed heavier than flying economy. 
The rates for the Solidarity Tax are €1,13 for EU and €4,51 for non-EU economy flights and 
€11,27 for EU and €45,07 for non-EU flights in business class respectively.  
 
The United Kingdom has an aviation tax called the Air Passenger Duty. The Air Passenger 
Duty came into effect already in 1994. The government has also included business jets into the 
Air Passenger Duty. As with the French Solidarity Tax, this tax is also based on distance and 
class of travel. From 1 April 2018, the rates for flying will be as follows. If flying less than 
2000 miles, the rate is £13 for economy and £26 for business class while if flying more than 
2000 miles, the rate is £78 for economy class and £156 for business class (HM Revenue & 
Customs, 2018).  
 
As mentioned previously, there are also new aviation taxes planned. Sweden is a country that 
is considering implementing an aviation tax in 2018 (Statens Offentliga Utredningar, 2016). 
This would also be a tax where the rate is based on distance traveled. For flights within the EU, 
the rate is to be 60 SEK, for flights outside the EU but closer than 6 000km the rate is 250 SEK 
and for flights longer than 6 000km the rate will be 400 SEK. This tax will enter into force on 
1 April 2018 (Sveriges Riksdag, 2017). There has been lots of criticism pointed towards the 
coming tax where the International Air Transport Association is one of the critics. In a response 
to the Swedish government, they claim that the tax will cost 7500 jobs while severely damaging 
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Sweden’s economic competitiveness abroad. They also claim that the tax will have a negligible 
impact on the climate and that Sweden already is a part of European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme and that airlines already pay emission and noise charges at Swedish airports (IATA, 
2017). There are also countries that previously enforced air passenger taxes to abolish them 
again. An overview of these countries and their respective abolished air passenger taxes, their 
























Appendix 5: Cost Structure Overview 
 
The aviation industry in general, can be characterized as both fiercely competitive and cost 
intensive. This appendix contains a small overview of how the airline industry generally 
categorize their operating costs. An airline’s operating costs can be split into “total fuel cost” 
and “total non-fuel cost”. Total fuel costs change over time and include taxes paid on fuel. An 
important aside here is that taxes are not levied on fuel used on international flights, per the fuel 
tax exemption developed at the 1944 Chicago Convention, an agreement which established core 
principles permitting international transport by air while at the same time creating the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO for short (International Civil Aviation 
Organization - ICAO, 2018).  Total fuel costs are more variable due to the volatility of fuel 
price, which is of course linked to the global oil price. They also have a downward-trending 
component due to improvements in overall fuel efficiency with time. Total non-fuel costs are 
relatively more stable, and include fixed charges, for example those per aircraft, per passenger, 
fees to airports, and et cetera. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
